很多人想在另一个行业、另一个地方,或者用另一种策略复制 YC。一般来说,人们似乎假设:1) 尽管 YC 的起步有一定程度的神秘或运气成分,但应该不会那么难;2) 只要能让它启动,网络效应就会自我维持。 A lot of people want to replicate YC in some other industry or some other place or with some other strategy. In general, people seem to assume that: 1) although there was some degree of mystery or luck about how YC got going, it can’t be that hard, and 2) if you can get it off the ground, the network effects are self-sustaining. ¶
世界上出现更多类似 YC 的东西是好事;我一般都尽量帮忙。但它们几乎没有成功的。人们对「自我维持」那部分的判断是对的,但他们想不出如何把事情启动起来。 More YC-like things are good for the world; I generally try to be helpful. But almost none of them work. People are right about the self-sustaining part, but they can’t figure out how to get something going. ¶
YC 得以启动的全部秘密就是 PG 和 Jessica——没有什么别的魔法。一年里有几次,我会在聚会上遇到这样的谈话:有人讲述 PG 如何改变了自己的人生——人们谈起他时的感激之情,超过对几乎任何其他人。然后在场的所有人都会附和,无论是不是 YC 创始人(非 YC 创始人可能会谈到一篇影响深远的文章,或者被一家 YC 公司录用)。遗憾的是,Jessica 至今仍远未获得同等程度的公众认可,但经历过 YC 早期的人都知道真实的故事。 The entire secret to YC getting going was PG and Jessica—there was no other magic trick. A few times a year, I end up in a conversation at a party where someone tells a story about how much PG changed their life—people speak with more gratitude than they do towards pretty much anyone else. Then everyone else agrees, YC founders and otherwise (non-YC founders might talk about an impactful essay or getting hired at a YC company). Jessica still sadly doesn’t get nearly the same degree of public credit, but the people who were around the early days of YC know the real story. ¶
他们做了什么?他们在无名之辈身上下注,并且比此前任何人都更相信这些人。他们树立了强有力的规范,并强硬地回击针对 YC 创始人的恶劣行为。他们信任自己的信念,愿意按自己的方式做事,也愿意被既有的权力结构讨厌。他们专注于最重要的事情,努力工作,并花费大量时间与人一对一相处。他们理解社区的价值和长期主义。当 YC 还很小的时候,它给人的感觉像一个大家庭。 What did they do? They took bets on unknown people and believed in them more than anyone had before. They set strong norms and fought back hard against bad behavior towards YC founders. They trusted their own convictions, were willing to do things their way, and were willing to be disliked by the existing power structures. They focused on the most important things, they worked hard, and they spent a huge amount of time 1:1 with people. They understood the value of community and long-term orientation. When YC was very small, it felt like a family. ¶
也许最重要的是,他们建立了一个生态系统(感谢 Joe Gebbia 指出这一点)。这说起来容易做起来难,因为它要求不贪婪。YC 把很多钱留在了桌面上;其他人从这个生态系统中赚到的钱比 YC 自己赚到的还多。这巩固了 YC 的地位——给合伙人、校友、当届创始人、Hacker News 读者、Demo Day 投资人以及 YC 周围所有其他人带来的益处,是让 YC 得以运转的重要原因。 Perhaps most importantly, they built an ecosystem (thanks to Joe Gebbia for pointing this out). This is easy to talk about but hard to do, because it requires not being greedy. YC has left a lot of money on the table; other people have made more money from the ecosystem than YC has itself. This has cemented YC’s place—the benefits to the partners, alumni, current batch founders, Hacker News readers, Demo Day investors, and everyone else around YC is a huge part of what makes it work. ¶
我不确定这些算不算是特别有用的建议——没有一条听起来有多难,然而在之后的 15 年里,它甚至没有接近被复制。 I am not sure if any of this is particularly useful advice—none of it sounds that hard, and yet in the 15 years since, it hasn’t been close to replicated. ¶
但这似乎值得尝试。我相当确信,在这段时间里,没有哪两个人比他们俩对创业者们的职业生涯产生的总影响更大。 But it seems worth trying. I am pretty sure no one has had a bigger total impact on the careers of people in the startup industry over that time period than the two of them. ¶