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2015 年的科技萧条

The Tech Bust of 2015

来源 Sam Altman (personal blog) · 英文原文出处

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机器译文 本页中文为机器逐句翻译(qwen3.8-flash),未经人工审校,仅供阅读参考;引用与考据请以英文原文为准。 逐句机译与英文原文 1:1 存档(17 段);未经人工审校。

也许我们身处的不是科技泡沫,而是一场科技萧条。似乎没有人狂热地相信科技股的估值便宜,所以我们若真处在泡沫里反倒有些奇怪。在市场的很多领域,估值看起来太便宜了。而在估值看起来太高的那个领域,那些数字也许根本算不上真正的「估值」,因为交易结构已经变得更像债务了。 Maybe instead of a tech bubble, we’re in a tech bust.  No one seems to fervently believe tech valuations are cheap, so it’d be somewhat surprising if we were in a bubble.  In many parts of the market, valuations seem too cheap.  In the part where they seem too high, maybe they aren’t really valuations at all, because the deal structure has changed to become more like debt.

今年,许多小盘上市科技公司都遭到了重挫。像 Yelp 这样的公司,股价已经不到过去十二个月收入的 4 倍。 Many of the small cap public tech companies have taken a beating this year.  Companies like Yelp are trading at less than 4 times trailing revenue.

那些科技巨头是垄断者,它们的高估值是应得的。即便如此,要让我做空苹果、谷歌、亚马逊或 Facebook 中的任何一家(对标标普 500 指数),我都不会愿意。尤其是苹果,剔除现金后的远期市盈率只有个位数。 The tech mega-caps are monopolies and have deservedly high valuations.  But even then, I would not be willing to short a single one of Apple, Google, Amazon, or Facebook against the S&P.  Apple in particular trades at a single-digit ex-cash forward P/E.

2015 年,科技 IPO 占全部 IPO 的比例降到了七年来的最低水平。标普科技板块的市盈率低于标普整体的市盈率。这两个事实看起来都不像科技泡沫的迹象。 2015 has seen the lowest level of tech IPOs as a percentage of all IPOs in seven years.  The S&P Tech P/E is lower than the overall S&P P/E.  Neither of these facts seems suggestive of a tech bubble.

在私募市场这边,人们一直在抱怨早期估值(平心而论,过去四年我也一直觉得早期估值偏高)。但如果你在过去三年里按 Demo Day 的估值投资了每一家 YC 公司(过去三年 Demo Day 的平均估值并没有太大变化),你现在会非常满意——尽管投资者们抱怨 YC 是公司估值过高的最恶劣例子。 On the private side, people complain all the time about early-stage valuations (and to be fair, they’ve felt high to me for four years).  But if you invested in every single YC company over the past three years at their Demo Day valuation (average Demo Day valuations haven’t moved much in the past three years) you’d be very happy, even though investors complain that YC is the worst example of overpriced companies.

中期阶段看起来也大体合理,当然有一些著名的例外。这些例外吸引了所有的注意力——人们关注的不是那数百家表现出色的公司,而是那一小撮以高估值融到钱、如今正在挣扎或已经死掉的公司。 The mid-stages also seem generally reasonable, though of course there are notable exceptions. These exceptions get all the attention—not the hundreds of companies doing remarkably well, but that handful that have raised money at high valuations and are struggling or dead.

总体上看,中期轮次比过去四年中的任何时候都更难融到资。这同样不是泡沫的迹象。 On the whole, it seems harder than any time in the past four years to raise mid-stage rounds.  This is also not suggestive of a bubble.

那么问题出在哪里?后期私募估值。但也许答案是:这些「投资」其实并不是真正的股权——它们要更像债务得多。[1] 我最近见过的条款里有 2 倍清算优先权(即公司退出时,投资者先拿走出资额的 2 倍)和 3 倍清算上限(即他们赚到出资额的 3 倍之后,就不再参与分配剩余的收益)。 So where is the problem? Late-stage private valuations. But perhaps the answer is that these “investments” aren’t really equity—they’re much more like debt. [1] I saw terms recently that had a 2x liquidation preference (i.e. the investors got the first 2x their money out of the company when it exited) and a 3x liquidation cap (i.e. after they made 3x their money, they didn’t get any more of the proceeds).

这几乎已经算不上一种股权工具了。[2] 上面这个例子是极端情况,但也没有极端到哪里去。投资者买的是债,却把它包装得足够像股,以保住自己风险投资基金的豁免地位。在一个利率为零的世界里,人们会非常执着地寻找新的固定收益来源。 This is hardly an equity instrument at all. [2] The example here is an extreme case, but not wildly so.  Investors are buying debt but dressing it up close enough to equity to maintain their venture capital fund exemption status.  In a world of 0 percent interest rates, people become pretty focused on finding new sources for fixed income.

后期优先股存在一个巨大的断层:如果你是在用它来合成债务,那么价格是多少根本无所谓。一轮融资的条款越接近普通股(比如低于 1 倍的清算优先权),我就越认为那个估值是有意义的。毫不意外,最好的公司通常条款也最接近普通股(而且「最好的公司」从来不会长时间显得被高估)。 There is a massive disconnect in late-stage preferred stock, because if you’re using it to synthesize debt it doesn’t matter what the price is.  The closer the rounds get to common stock (a less-than-1x liquidation preference, for example), the more I think the valuation means something. Unsurprisingly, the best companies usually have the most common-stock-like terms (and “the best companies” are never the ones that seem overpriced for long anyway).

这些「债」中有一部分承销得很糟糕。一些独角兽肯定会死掉(而大家谈论的正是它们)。但这并不构成科技泡沫。更准确的说法是:如果未来几年一只独角兽都不死,那才叫科技泡沫。 Some of this debt is poorly underwritten.  Some unicorns will surely die (and those are the ones everyone will talk about).  That doesn’t make it a tech bubble.  It’d be more accurate to say it’s a tech bubble if no unicorns die in the next couple of years.

总结一下:公开市场看起来不存在科技泡沫。私募市场的早期和中期阶段看起来也不存在泡沫。后期私募公司看起来确实存在泡沫,但那是因为人们把这些金融工具误解成了股权。如果你把那些轮次重新归类为债务,那么就很难说泡沫到底在哪里了。 To summarize: there does not appear to be a tech bubble in the public markets.  There does not appear to be a bubble in early or mid stages of the private markets.  There does appear to be a bubble in the late-stage private companies, but that’s because people are misunderstanding these financial instruments as equity. If you reclassify those rounds as debt, then it gets hard to say where exactly the bubble is.

我预计,LP 迟早会意识到:买入后期科技公司的「债」,并不是他们当初签约想买的东西,到那时后期私募公司的价格将出现「修正」。我还认为,当利率实质性上升时,整个公开市场很可能会下跌——也许是大幅下跌——尽管那可能还要等很久。但我预计上市科技公司会与大盘同步波动,而不会跑输大盘。 At some point, I expect LPs to realize that buying debt in late-stage tech companies is not what they signed up for, and then prices in late-stage private companies will appear to correct.  And I think that the entire public market is likely to go down—perhaps substantially—when interest rates materially move up, though that may be a long time away.  But I expect public tech companies are likely to trade with the rest of the market and not underperform.

但无论短期和中期发生什么,我依然相信科技就是未来;如果要挑一种资产,买入之后一二十年都不去想它,我仍然想不出有什么比一篮子上市或未上市的科技股更好的选择。 But no matter what happens in the short- and medium-term, I continue to believe technology is the future, and I still can’t think of an asset I’d rather own and not think about for a decade or two than a basket of public or private tech stocks.

感谢 Jack Altman、Patrick Collison、Paul Graham、Aaron Levie、Geoff Ralston 和 Ali Rowghani 阅读本文草稿。 Thanks to Jack Altman, Patrick Collison, Paul Graham, Aaron Levie, Geoff Ralston, and Ali Rowghani for reading draft of this.

[1] 这些被扭曲的「估值」确实有真实的问题。这些公司招聘的员工常常把它们当成真实的估值。它还常常让公司自以为比实际大得多,从而去做与它实际阶段不符的事情。最后,太多廉价资金让公司能够顶着糟糕的单位经济运转,掩盖各种各样的内部问题。所以我认为,容易到手的资本正在伤害许多公司自身。 [1] There are real problems with these distorted "valuations".  Employees these companies hire often think of them as real valuations. It also often makes the company think of itself as much bigger than it is, and do the wrong things for its actual stage.  Finally, too much cheap money lets companies operate with bad unit economics and cover up all sorts of internal problems.  So I think many companies are hurting themselves with access to easy capital.

[2] 甚至在转向类债务轮次之前,人们愿意为一家公司 5% 的优先股支付的价格、与为这家公司 100% 的普通股支付的价格之间,就存在巨大的落差(而且有充分的理由——单是优先股的下行保护,就让它与普通股大相径庭)。随着这个价差的扩大,公开市场与私募市场之间的脱节越来越严重,给那些习惯了估值只涨不跌的公司造成了许多问题。 [2] Even before the shift to debt-like rounds, the disconnect between how much people will pay for 5% of a company in preferred stock vs. 100% of a company in common stock was massive (and for good reason--the downside protection alone with preferred stock makes it much different than common stock).  As this delta has accentuated, the public/private disconnect has gotten worse, and caused a number of problems for companies accustomed to valuations always going up.

出处与译稿

来源平台
Sam Altman (personal blog)
发表时间
2015 年 11 月 2 日
译稿来源
机器逐句翻译 · qwen3.8-flash
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未经人工审校(reviewed = 0)
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中文译文为阅读默认视图;引用与考据请以英文原文为准。外部链接仅作为来源引用保留。

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