评论家们正在努力寻找硅谷创业公司到底出了什么问题。先是说估值太高;接着说估值其实说明不了什么;然后说公司保持非上市状态太久;再然后是说烧钱速度。 Commentators are looking hard for what’s wrong with startups in Silicon Valley. First they talked about valuations being too high. Then they talked about valuations not really meaning anything. Then they talked about companies staying private too long. Then they talked about burn rates. ¶
但确实有什么地方感觉不对,尽管很难准确指出来。 But something does feel off, though it’s been hard to precisely identify. ¶
我认为答案是单位经济模型(unit economics)。2000 年互联网泡沫留下过一个笑话:「我们每服务一个客户就亏一点钱,但靠规模把亏的赚回来。」后来 Google 和 Facebook 进入全盛期,这种说法有很长一段时间不再流行。 I think the answer is unit economics. One of the jokes that came out of the 2000 bubble was “we lose a little money on every customer, but we make it up on volume”. This was then out of fashion for a long time as Google and Facebook hit their stride. ¶
如今,讲不清自己的单位经济模型究竟怎样才能成立的公司,比我记忆中任何时候都多。其解释通常不外乎以下几种:近乎无限的用户留存(「没错,我们的销售和营销成本非常高,每个用户的年利润也很薄,但我们会把这个客户永远留住」);成本的大规模削减(「我们会把所有人力都换成机器人」);声称公司终有一天可以停止购买用户(「我们现在以高于用户价值的成本获客,只是为了让飞轮转起来」);甚至更离谱的说法。 There are now more businesses than I ever remember before that struggle to explain how their unit economics are ever going to make sense. It usually requires an explanation on the order of infinite retention (“yes, our sales and marketing costs are really high and our annual profit margins per user are thin, but we’re going to keep the customer forever”), a massive reduction in costs (“we’re going to replace all our human labor with robots”), a claim that eventually the company can stop buying users (“we acquire users for more than they’re worth for now just to get the flywheel spinning”), or something even less plausible. ¶
这种情况在通不过 Peter Thiel「垄断测试」的创业公司里尤其常见——这些公司似乎不得不把能弄到的每一块钱都花在获客上,而一旦提价,客户就会叛逃到类似的服务那里。 This is particularly common in startups that don’t pass the Peter Thiel monopoly test—these startups seem to have to spend every available dollar on user acquisition, and if they raise prices, customers defect to a similar service. ¶
历史上大多数伟大的公司,在开始变现之后不久就拥有了健康的单位经济模型,哪怕公司整体在很长一段时间内都是亏损的。 Most great companies historically have had good unit economics soon after they began monetizing, even if the company as a whole lost money for a long period of time. ¶
硅谷一向愿意投资那些正在亏钱、但将来可能赚很多钱的公司。这很好。但我从未见过硅谷像现在这样,愿意投资那些财务模型已经清清楚楚地表明「很可能永远亏钱」的公司。低毛利的生意,在硅谷从来没有像眼下这么时髦过。 Silicon Valley has always been willing to invest in money-losing companies that may eventually make lots of money. That’s great. I have never seen Silicon Valley so willing to invest in companies that have well-understood financials showing they will probably always lose money. Low-margin businesses have never been more fashionable here than they are right now. ¶
融了很多钱的公司风险尤其大。用更多的钱把生意中的问题掩盖过去,而不是去修复产品或服务,这种诱惑实在太大了。 Companies that have raised lots of money are at particular risk. It’s so tempting to paper over a problem with the business by spending more money instead of fixing the product or service. ¶
烧钱速度本身并不可怕。可怕的是业务规模扩大之后,模型看起来并没有任何改善。还有一种可怕的情况是现金跑道太短(也就是说,银行里有 1 亿美元、每月烧 200 万美元,没问题;银行里只有 300 万美元、每月烧 100 万美元,就非常糟),哪怕单位经济模型看起来很漂亮。 Burn rates by themselves are not scary. Burn rates are scary when you scale the business up and the model doesn’t look any better. Burn rates are also scary when runway is short (i.e., burning $2M a month with $100M in the bank is fine; burning $1M a month with $3M in the bank is really bad) even if the unit economics look great. ¶
好消息是,只要你意识到这一点,就能避开这个陷阱。如果在你的领域里除此之外别无他法,那也许这本来就是一门烂生意。低毛利、超竞争的世界并不是唯一的去处。公司永远都能编出一套「我们将如何修复单位经济模型」的说辞,所以你真的必须格外努力,才能不让自己骗了自己。 The good news is that if you’re aware of this you can avoid the trap. If there’s no other way to operate in your space, maybe it’s a bad business. The low-margin, hyper-competitive world is not the only place to be. Companies always have an explanation about how they’re going to fix unit economics, so you really have to go out of your way not to delude yourself. ¶
如果你对自己提出的标准是:做出的产品好到人们会自发地向朋友推荐;商业模式简单易懂,你在每个用户身上赚的比花的多,而且随着规模扩大变得更好而不是更差——那你可能不会长得像今天那些最炙手可热的公司,但你会长得很像 Google 和 Facebook。 If you hold yourself to the standard of making a product that is so good people spontaneously recommend it to their friends, and you have an easy-to-understand business model where you make more than you spend on each user, and it gets better not worse as you get bigger, you may not look like some of hottest companies of today, but you’ll look a lot like Google and Facebook. ¶