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黑天鹅种子轮

Black Swan Seed Rounds

来源 Sam Altman (personal blog) · 英文原文出处

STATE2 中文可读 · 机器译文,未经人工审校 证据等级 A
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机器译文 本页中文为机器逐句翻译(qwen3.8-flash),未经人工审校,仅供阅读参考;引用与考据请以英文原文为准。 逐句机译与英文原文 1:1 存档(10 段);未经人工审校。

我在 2010 年开始做种子投资(2012 年起更加积极),那是在我成为全职 YC 合伙人之前。在这段时间里,我投资了约 40 家公司。到目前为止,其中有五家属于「真正出色」的类别——按最近一轮融资或最近一次报价的估值计算,当前价值约为 100 倍或更高。 I started seed investing in 2010 (and much more actively in 2012) before becoming a full-time YC partner. In this period, I invested in about 40 companies.  So far, five of them are in the “really good” category—a current value of ~100x or more, based on the valuation of the last round or last offer.

我一直在反复思考这些投资有什么共同点,以及它们与我其他投资的不同之处在哪里。最引人注目的观察是:以我的经验,人人都抢着进的「热门种子轮」,与非常成功的投资呈负相关。(A 轮和 B 轮可能情况不同,因为最好的公司在那个阶段往往已经呈现指数级增长。)我参与过的竞争激烈的种子投资,表现都不佳。 I’ve been thinking a lot about what these investments have in common, and what about them was different from other investments.  The most striking observation is that, in my experience, the “hot seed rounds” that everyone is fighting to get in are anti-correlated with very successful investments. (It’s probably different for A and B rounds because the best companies often have exponential growth at that point.)  The hotly-competed seed investments I’ve made have underperformed.

在我做过的所有真正出色的种子投资里,我尊敬的其他投资人都认为它们是坏主意。Stripe 起步的时候,「非常年轻的创始人去挑战非常成熟的行业」这件事还没流行起来,我当时问到的那些人普遍认为它永远不会成功(最初的计划是做一家银行),因为 Patrick 对这个行业一无所知。Teespring 被大多数投资人放弃,他们的说法是「这不过是一家卖 T 恤的公司。」 For all of the really good seed investments I’ve made, other investors I respected thought they were bad ideas.  Stripe started before it was cool for very young founders to take on very established industries, and the prevailing thoughts from people I asked about were that it was never going to work (the initial plan was to be a bank) because Patrick knew nothing about the industry.  Teespring got passed on by most investors, saying “It’s just a t-shirt company.”

就在我投资 Zenefits 之前,一位知名投资人告诉我,我根本不懂健康保险市场,这家公司不太可能再活过 3 个月。我做这笔投资的时候,公司正担心马上就要耗尽现金。我差点被那位投资人劝退。 Right before I invested in Zenefits, a prominent investor told me I didn’t understand the health insurance market at all and that the company was unlikely to survive another 3 months.  When I made this investment, the company was worried about imminently running out of cash. I almost got talked out of investing by the other investor.

一个重大例外是 Optimizely——当时的主流看法是 Optimizely 将会非常了不起,那是一个竞争激烈的种子轮。它是唯一一家我必须去争抢份额的高回报公司——另外四家,我本可以投入更多的钱。 The one major exception is Optimizely—the prevailing sentiment was that Optimizely was going to be great, and it was a competitive seed round.  It was the only high-return company where I had to fight for an allocation—in the other four, I could have put more money in.

对这个观察有一个一般性的例外:当创始人已经声名在外、拥有令人印象深刻的过往战绩时。那些种子轮几乎总是竞争激烈。 There is a general exception to this observation when the founders are already well-known and have impressive track records.  Those seed rounds are almost always competitive.

注意,其他投资人认为某笔投资很糟,并不保证它会成功。对于我到目前为止完全血本无归的那些投资,其他投资人同样告诉过我它们会很糟糕。逆向投资而看错,依然是糟糕——你必须逆向投资且看对。我认为,关于「其他投资人怎么想」,唯一可取的结论就是:忽略它。 Note that other investors thinking an investment is bad does not guarantee success.  For the total write-offs I’ve had so far, other investors also told me they were going to be terrible.  Being contrarian and wrong is still bad—you have to be contrarian and right.  I think the only takeaway about what other investors think is that you should ignore it.

伟大的公司在起步时往往看起来像坏主意——至少可以说,如果它看起来棒极了,种子轮很可能定价过高,而且很可能有很多人正在创办类似的公司。但即使我试图对价格因素做调整,热门轮次的投资表现依然更差。 Great companies often look like bad ideas at the beginning—at a minimum, if it looks great, the seed round is likely to be overpriced, and there are likely to be a lot of other people starting similar companies.  But even when I attempt to adjust for price, the hot-round investments still have underperformed.

我问了其他几位投资人的经历,大多数情况大致相似。真正的大热门公司,几乎没有过 TechCrunch 报道其「人人都想挤进去的超级竞争种子轮」的经历。 I asked a few other investors about their experiences, and most are roughly similar.  Most of the really big hits never had TechCrunch writing about their super competitive seed round everyone was trying to get in.

我认为这背后有很多原因。一个重要原因是:擅长融资与经营好一家公司几乎没有关系。另一个原因是:大多数投资人实际上非常厌恶风险——尽管他们嘴上说的不是这样——而伟大的公司在种子阶段看起来风险极大。第三个重要原因是:在种子阶段选中好公司本来就非常难,而且大多数公司并没有热门种子轮,所以大多数成功的公司也没有(不过我不认为这种随机分布能完全解释该现象)。但无论如何,创始人不必因为自己的种子轮没有被超额认购到爆而担心。 I think there are a lot of reasons for this.  A big one is that being good at fundraising has very little to do with running a good company.  Another is that most investors are actually very risk-averse despite what they say, and the great companies look really risky at the seed stage.  And a major third is that it’s just very hard to pick well at the seed stage, and most companies don’t have hot seed rounds, so most successful companies don’t either (though I don’t think this random distribution fully explains the phenomenon).  But in any case, founders shouldn’t worry if their seed round isn’t massively oversubscribed.

出处与译稿

来源平台
Sam Altman (personal blog)
发表时间
2014 年 7 月 28 日
译稿来源
机器逐句翻译 · qwen3.8-flash
审校状态
未经人工审校(reviewed = 0)
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