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《You and Your Research》,作者 Richard Hamming

You and Your Research, by Richard Hamming

来源 Sam Altman (personal blog) · 英文原文出处

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机器译文 本页中文为机器逐句翻译(qwen3.8-flash),未经人工审校,仅供阅读参考;引用与考据请以英文原文为准。 逐句机译与英文原文 1:1 存档(102 段);未经人工审校。

理查德·汉明于 1986 年 3 月做了这场演讲。[1] 这是我读过的最好的演讲之一,长期以来深刻影响着我对自己时间分配的思考。 Richard Hamming gave this talk in March of 1986. [1]  It's one of the best talks I've ever read and has long impacted how I think about spending my time.

这个周末我跟好几个人提起它,出乎我意料的是,他们竟从未听说过。所以我想还是在这里分享一下: I mentioned it to a number of people this weekend who, to my surprise, had never heard of it.  So I though I'd share it here:

【2023 年 5 月 28 日补充:可以看看 Gwern 整理的这个很棒的带注释版本(https://gwern.net/doc/science/1986-hamming)。】 [Addition 5/28/23: see this great annotated version (https://gwern.net/doc/science/1986-hamming) from Gwern.]

很荣幸来到这里。恐怕我愧对刚才的介绍。我演讲的题目是「你和你的研究」。它讲的不是如何管理研究,而是你个人如何做研究。我本可以就前一个题目讲一场——但今天不是,今天讲的是你自己。我说的也不是那种平庸的、按部就班的研究;我说的是伟大的研究。为了描述什么是伟大的研究,我偶尔会说「诺贝尔奖级别的工作」。不一定非得拿诺贝尔奖,我指的是那些我们公认为重大的东西。相对论也好,香农的信息论也好,以及诸多杰出的理论——我说的就是这个层次的东西。 It's a pleasure to be here. I doubt if I can live up to the Introduction. The title of my talk is, ``You and Your Research.'' It is not about managing research, it is about how you individually do your research. I could give a talk on the other subject - but it's not, it's about you. I'm not talking about ordinary run-of-the-mill research; I'm talking about great research. And for the sake of describing great research I'll occasionally say Nobel-Prize type of work. It doesn't have to gain the Nobel Prize, but I mean those kinds of things which we perceive are significant things. Relativity, if you want, Shannon's information theory, any number of outstanding theories - that's the kind of thing I'm talking about.

那么,我是怎么开始做这项研究的呢?在洛斯阿拉莫斯,我被调去运行别人搭建起来的计算机器,好让那些科学家和物理学家回去干他们的正事。我看出来自己是个跑龙套的。我看出来,尽管身体上我和他们没什么两样,但他们和我不同。说得直白点,我嫉妒。我想知道他们为什么和我如此不同。我近距离见过费曼,见过费米和泰勒,见过奥本海默,见过汉斯·贝特——他是我的老板。我见过相当多非常能干的人。我越来越着迷于「做成了的人」和「本可以做成的人」之间的差别。 Now, how did I come to do this study? At Los Alamos I was brought in to run the computing machines which other people had got going, so those scientists and physicists could get back to business. I saw I was a stooge. I saw that although physically I was the same, they were different. And to put the thing bluntly, I was envious. I wanted to know why they were so different from me. I saw Feynman up close. I saw Fermi and Teller. I saw Oppenheimer. I saw Hans Bethe: he was my boss. I saw quite a few very capable people. I became very interested in the difference between those who do and those who might have done.

我来到贝尔实验室时,进入的是一个非常多产的部门。当时部门主管是博德;香农也在,还有其他一些人。我继续追问那几个问题:「为什么?」「差别到底在哪里?」此后我通过阅读传记、自传,问人们诸如「你是怎么做成这件事的?」之类的问题,继续探寻。我试图找出差别究竟在哪里。这就是这场演讲要讲的东西。 When I came to Bell Labs, I came into a very productive department. Bode was the department head at the time; Shannon was there, and there were other people. I continued examining the questions, ``Why?'' and ``What is the difference?'' I continued subsequently by reading biographies, autobiographies, asking people questions such as: ``How did you come to do this?'' I tried to find out what are the differences. And that's what this talk is about.

那么,为什么这场演讲重要?我认为它重要,因为据我所知,你们每个人都只有一条命可活。就算你相信轮回转世,下辈子对这辈子也毫无用处!为什么你不在这唯一的一生里做些重大的事情呢——无论你怎么定义「重大」?我不打算替它下定义——你们都懂我的意思。我会主要谈科学,因为那是我研究过的领域。但据我所知——别人也这么告诉我——我说的很多话适用于许多领域。杰出的工作在大多数领域里特征都非常相似,不过我还是把自己限定在科学范围内。 Now, why is this talk important? I think it is important because, as far as I know, each of you has one life to live. Even if you believe in reincarnation it doesn't do you any good from one life to the next! Why shouldn't you do significant things in this one life, however you define significant? I'm not going to define it - you know what I mean. I will talk mainly about science because that is what I have studied. But so far as I know, and I've been told by others, much of what I say applies to many fields. Outstanding work is characterized very much the same way in most fields, but I will confine myself to science.

为了说到你们每个人心里去,我必须用第一人称来讲。我必须让你们放下谦虚,对自己说:「是的,我想做一流的工作。」我们的社会不赞成那些立志做出真正好工作的人。你不该有这种念头;运气应该从天而降,你靠碰巧做出伟大的事。好吧,这话说得挺蠢的。我说,为什么你不该立志做出重大的事情呢?你不必告诉别人,但你难道不该对自己说:「是的,我想做些重大的事情。」 In order to get at you individually, I must talk in the first person. I have to get you to drop modesty and say to yourself, ``Yes, I would like to do first-class work.'' Our society frowns on people who set out to do really good work. You're not supposed to; luck is supposed to descend on you and you do great things by chance. Well, that's a kind of dumb thing to say. I say, why shouldn't you set out to do something significant. You don't have to tell other people, but shouldn't you say to yourself, ``Yes, I would like to do something significant.''

要进入第二阶段,我得放下谦虚,用第一人称谈谈我所见的、我所做的和我所听到的。我会谈到一些人,其中有些你们认识,而且我相信,等散会之后,你们不会对外引用我说过的某些话。 In order to get to the second stage, I have to drop modesty and talk in the first person about what I've seen, what I've done, and what I've heard. I'm going to talk about people, some of whom you know, and I trust that when we leave, you won't quote me as saying some of the things I said.

让我不按逻辑顺序,而按心理顺序来讲。我发现最主要的反对意见是:人们认为伟大的科学是靠运气做出来的。一切都归结为运气。好吧,想想爱因斯坦。注意他做成了多少件不同的好事。全都是运气吗?重复得未免太巧了吧?再想想香农。他搞出来的不只是信息论。在那之前几年,他还做过其他一些好工作,其中一些至今仍锁在密码学的保密柜里。他做了许多好事情。 Let me start not logically, but psychologically. I find that the major objection is that people think great science is done by luck. It's all a matter of luck. Well, consider Einstein. Note how many different things he did that were good. Was it all luck? Wasn't it a little too repetitive? Consider Shannon. He didn't do just information theory. Several years before, he did some other good things and some which are still locked up in the security of cryptography. He did many good things.

你会一次又一次地看到,优秀的人物做出的不止一件事。偶尔也有人一辈子只做一件事,这个我们待会儿再谈,但更多时候成果是重复出现的。我主张,运气解释不了一切。我要引用巴斯德的话:「运气偏爱有准备的头脑。」我认为这话说到了点子上。确实有幸气的成分——也确实不全是。有准备的头脑迟早会找到重要的事情并把它做成。所以,是的,它是运气。你做的那件具体的事是运气,但你能做成事情,靠的不是运气。 You see again and again, that it is more than one thing from a good person. Once in a while a person does only one thing in his whole life, and we'll talk about that later, but a lot of times there is repetition. I claim that luck will not cover everything. And I will cite Pasteur who said, ``Luck favors the prepared mind.'' And I think that says it the way I believe it. There is indeed an element of luck, and no, there isn't. The prepared mind sooner or later finds something important and does it. So yes, it is luck. The particular thing you do is luck, but that you do something is not.

举个例子,我刚到贝尔实验室时,曾和香农共用一间办公室。他在做信息论的同时,我在做编码理论。我们两人在同一地点、同一时间各自做出这些成果,颇为可疑——那是氛围使然。你可以说:「是啊,那是运气。」另一方面你也可以说:「可为什么当时贝尔实验室那么多人,偏偏是这两个人做出来的?」是的,一部分是运气,一部分是有准备的头脑;但「一部分」之外的另一半,正是我接下来要讲的。所以,虽然后面我还会几次回到运气这个话题,我想先了结「运气是决定你能否做出伟大工作的唯一标准」这个说法。我主张,你对它有一定的、但不是完全的掌控。关于这一点,我最后引用牛顿的话。牛顿说:「如果别人也像我这样努力思考,他们也会得到类似的结果。」 For example, when I came to Bell Labs, I shared an office for a while with Shannon. At the same time he was doing information theory, I was doing coding theory. It is suspicious that the two of us did it at the same place and at the same time - it was in the atmosphere. And you can say, ``Yes, it was luck.'' On the other hand you can say, ``But why of all the people in Bell Labs then were those the two who did it?'' Yes, it is partly luck, and partly it is the prepared mind; but `partly' is the other thing I'm going to talk about. So, although I'll come back several more times to luck, I want to dispose of this matter of luck as being the sole criterion whether you do great work or not. I claim you have some, but not total, control over it. And I will quote, finally, Newton on the matter. Newton said, ``If others would think as hard as I did, then they would get similar results.''

你会看到的一个特征是——包括伟大科学家在内的许多人都有这个特征——他们通常在年轻时就有独立的想法,并且有勇气去追逐它们。比如爱因斯坦,在十二岁或十四岁左右,他问过自己一个问题:「如果我也以光速运动,光波看起来会是什么样子?」他当时就知道,电磁理论说不可能存在静止不动的局部极大值。但如果他以光速一起前进,他就会看到一个局部极大值。他在十二岁、十四岁上下就能看到这个矛盾,看出事情不对劲,看出光速有某种奇特之处。他最终创立狭义相对论,是运气吗?早在那时,他已经通过思考那些碎片,把一些拼块摆好了。这是必要条件,但不是充分条件。我要讲的所有这些条目,都既是运气、又不是运气。 One of the characteristics you see, and many people have it including great scientists, is that usually when they were young they had independent thoughts and had the courage to pursue them. For example, Einstein, somewhere around 12 or 14, asked himself the question, ``What would a light wave look like if I went with the velocity of light to look at it?'' Now he knew that electromagnetic theory says you cannot have a stationary local maximum. But if he moved along with the velocity of light, he would see a local maximum. He could see a contradiction at the age of 12, 14, or somewhere around there, that everything was not right and that the velocity of light had something peculiar. Is it luck that he finally created special relativity? Early on, he had laid down some of the pieces by thinking of the fragments. Now that's the necessary but not sufficient condition. All of these items I will talk about are both luck and not luck.

那么,有很多「脑子」怎么样?听起来不错。在座诸位大多数人的脑子,做一流工作大概都绰绰有余。但伟大的工作并不只是有脑子。「脑子」有各种衡量方式。在数学、理论物理、天体物理这些领域,「脑子」通常在很大程度上等同于操纵符号的能力。所以典型的智商测试容易给这些人打出相当高的分。而在另一些领域,它就是另一回事了。比如比尔·范恩,就是搞区域熔炼的那位,有一天走进我的办公室。他脑子里模模糊糊有个想法,知道自己想要什么,还带着几个方程。我很清楚,这人不太懂数学,口才也不怎么样。但他的问题看起来很有意思,我就把它带回家做了一点研究。最后我教会他怎么用计算机,让他能算出自己的答案。我给了他计算的能力。他继续往下做,在本部门几乎得不到任何认可,但最终把这个领域的奖拿了个遍。一旦他真正上了路,他的羞怯、笨拙、不善言辞都消失了,他在许多其他方面也变得高产得多。当然,他也变得能说会道多了。 How about having lots of `brains?' It sounds good. Most of you in this room probably have more than enough brains to do first-class work. But great work is something else than mere brains. Brains are measured in various ways. In mathematics, theoretical physics, astrophysics, typically brains correlates to a great extent with the ability to manipulate symbols. And so the typical IQ test is apt to score them fairly high. On the other hand, in other fields it is something different. For example, Bill Pfann, the fellow who did zone melting, came into my office one day. He had this idea dimly in his mind about what he wanted and he had some equations. It was pretty clear to me that this man didn't know much mathematics and he wasn't really articulate. His problem seemed interesting so I took it home and did a little work. I finally showed him how to run computers so he could compute his own answers. I gave him the power to compute. He went ahead, with negligible recognition from his own department, but ultimately he has collected all the prizes in the field. Once he got well started, his shyness, his awkwardness, his inarticulateness, fell away and he became much more productive in many other ways. Certainly he became much more articulate.

我还可以用同样的方式再举一个人。但愿他今天不在场——一个叫克洛格斯顿的家伙。我认识他时正在和约翰·皮尔斯的团队一起攻关一个问题,我当时没觉得他有什么本事。我问那些跟他同过学的朋友:「他读研究生时也这样吗?」「是的。」他们回答。好吧,换了我早把这人解雇了,但 J. R. 皮尔斯聪明,把他留了下来。克洛格斯顿最终做出了克洛格斯顿电缆。从那以后,好主意源源不断。一次成功给了他信心和勇气。 And I can cite another person in the same way. I trust he isn't in the audience, i.e. a fellow named Clogston. I met him when I was working on a problem with John Pierce's group and I didn't think he had much. I asked my friends who had been with him at school, ``Was he like that in graduate school?'' ``Yes,'' they replied. Well I would have fired the fellow, but J. R. Pierce was smart and kept him on. Clogston finally did the Clogston cable. After that there was a steady stream of good ideas. One success brought him confidence and courage.

成功科学家的特征之一是有勇气。一旦你鼓起勇气,相信自己能攻克重要的问题,那你就能做到。如果你认定自己不行,那几乎可以肯定你做不到。勇气是香农身上最突出的品质之一。你只要想想他的主要定理就明白了。他想创造一种编码方法,但不知道从何下手,于是他造了一个随机码。然后他卡住了。接着他问了一个看似不可能的问题:「一个随机码平均而言会怎样?」他随后证明,平均而言的码可以任意地好,因此必定存在至少一个好码。除了拥有无穷勇气的人,谁还敢这样想问题?这就是伟大科学家的特征:他们有勇气。他们会在不可思议的处境下继续前行;他们思考,并且继续思考。 One of the characteristics of successful scientists is having courage. Once you get your courage up and believe that you can do important problems, then you can. If you think you can't, almost surely you are not going to. Courage is one of the things that Shannon had supremely. You have only to think of his major theorem. He wants to create a method of coding, but he doesn't know what to do so he makes a random code. Then he is stuck. And then he asks the impossible question, ``What would the average random code do?'' He then proves that the average code is arbitrarily good, and that therefore there must be at least one good code. Who but a man of infinite courage could have dared to think those thoughts? That is the characteristic of great scientists; they have courage. They will go forward under incredible circumstances; they think and continue to think.

年龄是物理学家们尤其担心的另一个因素。他们总在说,你必须趁年轻做出来,否则就永远做不出来了。爱因斯坦出成果非常早,搞量子力学的那帮人在做出他们最好的工作时也都年轻得令人反感。大多数数学家、理论物理学家和天体物理学家,都是在年轻时做出我们心目中他们最好的工作的。并不是说他们年老时做不出好工作,而是我们最看重的往往是他们早期的成果。另一方面,在音乐、政治和文学领域,我们认为最好的作品常常是他们晚年做出的。我不知道你们各自的领域在这个尺度上处于什么位置,但年龄确实有影响。 Age is another factor which the physicists particularly worry about. They always are saying that you have got to do it when you are young or you will never do it. Einstein did things very early, and all the quantum mechanic fellows were disgustingly young when they did their best work. Most mathematicians, theoretical physicists, and astrophysicists do what we consider their best work when they are young. It is not that they don't do good work in their old age but what we value most is often what they did early. On the other hand, in music, politics and literature, often what we consider their best work was done late. I don't know how whatever field you are in fits this scale, but age has some effect.

不过让我说说为什么年龄会产生这种影响。首先,如果你做出了一些好工作,你就会发现自己被拉进各种各样的委员会,再也做不了任何工作。你可能落得我在布拉顿拿诺贝尔奖时看到的那副样子。奖项公布那天,我们全体聚在阿诺德礼堂,三位获奖者依次上台致辞。第三位是布拉顿,他几乎含着眼泪说:「我知道诺贝尔奖效应这回事,我不会让它影响我;我要继续做从前那个好样的沃尔特·布拉顿。」我心想:「说得真好。」但几个星期后,我就看到它开始影响他了。从那时起,他只能做伟大的问题了。 But let me say why age seems to have the effect it does. In the first place if you do some good work you will find yourself on all kinds of committees and unable to do any more work. You may find yourself as I saw Brattain when he got a Nobel Prize. The day the prize was announced we all assembled in Arnold Auditorium; all three winners got up and made speeches. The third one, Brattain, practically with tears in his eyes, said, ``I know about this Nobel-Prize effect and I am not going to let it affect me; I am going to remain good old Walter Brattain.'' Well I said to myself, ``That is nice.'' But in a few weeks I saw it was affecting him. Now he could only work on great problems.

当你出了名,做小问题就很难了。香农就是栽在这上面的。信息论之后,你拿什么来压轴?伟大的科学家常常犯这个错误。他们不再继续播下那些小橡子,而参天的橡树正是从橡子长出来的。他们想一步登天摘取大成果。事情不是这样运转的。所以,这就是为什么你会发现,早早获得认可似乎会让你绝育——这是又一个原因。事实上,我要告诉你我多年来最喜欢的一句评论。依我看,普林斯顿高等研究院毁掉的好科学家,比任何机构造就的都多——以他们入院前的成就衡量,也以他们入院后的成就衡量。并不是说他们入院后就不优秀了,而是他们入院前是卓越的,入院后只是优秀而已。 When you are famous it is hard to work on small problems. This is what did Shannon in. After information theory, what do you do for an encore? The great scientists often make this error. They fail to continue to plant the little acorns from which the mighty oak trees grow. They try to get the big thing right off. And that isn't the way things go. So that is another reason why you find that when you get early recognition it seems to sterilize you. In fact I will give you my favorite quotation of many years. The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, in my opinion, has ruined more good scientists than any institution has created, judged by what they did before they came and judged by what they did after. Not that they weren't good afterwards, but they were superb before they got there and were only good afterwards.

这就不免提前引出了工作条件这个话题。大多数人以为的最好的工作条件,其实不是。很明显不是,因为人们常常在工作条件糟糕的时候最高产。剑桥物理实验室最好的时期之一,就是他们几乎只有窝棚可用的时候——他们做出了有史以来最好的一些物理学成果。 This brings up the subject, out of order perhaps, of working conditions. What most people think are the best working conditions, are not. Very clearly they are not because people are often most productive when working conditions are bad. One of the better times of the Cambridge Physical Laboratories was when they had practically shacks - they did some of the best physics ever.

我讲一个我自己私人的故事。早些时候我就看明白了,贝尔实验室不会按惯例拨给我一英亩地的程序员,用绝对二进制给计算机器写程序。显然他们不会这么干。但当时人人都是那样做的。我可以毫不费力地去西海岸,在飞机公司谋个差事,但令人兴奋的人物都在贝尔实验室,飞机公司里的那帮人不是。我想了很久:「我到底走不走?」又琢磨怎样才能两全其美。最后我对自己说:「汉明,你认为机器几乎无所不能。那你为什么不能让机器来写程序呢?」起初在我看来是缺陷的东西,很早就把我逼进了自动编程的领域。看似缺点的东西,往往只要换个视角,就会变成你能拥有的最大资产之一。但当你第一次面对它、说着「哎呀,我永远也凑不齐足够的程序员,我怎么可能做出什么了不起的编程工作?」的时候,你是不会这么想的。 I give you a story from my own private life. Early on it became evident to me that Bell Laboratories was not going to give me the conventional acre of programming people to program computing machines in absolute binary. It was clear they weren't going to. But that was the way everybody did it. I could go to the West Coast and get a job with the airplane companies without any trouble, but the exciting people were at Bell Labs and the fellows out there in the airplane companies were not. I thought for a long while about, ``Did I want to go or not?'' and I wondered how I could get the best of two possible worlds. I finally said to myself, ``Hamming, you think the machines can do practically everything. Why can't you make them write programs?'' What appeared at first to me as a defect forced me into automatic programming very early. What appears to be a fault, often, by a change of viewpoint, turns out to be one of the greatest assets you can have. But you are not likely to think that when you first look the thing and say, ``Gee, I'm never going to get enough programmers, so how can I ever do any great programming?''

同样的故事还有很多;格蕾丝·霍珀也有类似的经历。我认为,如果你仔细观察就会发现,伟大的科学家常常只是把问题稍微转个角度,就把缺陷变成了资产。比如,许多科学家发现自己做不出某个问题时,最终转而研究为什么做不出。然后他们把它反过来,说:「不过当然了,事情本来就是这样的」,于是得到一个重要结果。所以,理想的工作条件是件很怪的事。你想要的条件,并不总是对你最好的条件。 And there are many other stories of the same kind; Grace Hopper has similar ones. I think that if you look carefully you will see that often the great scientists, by turning the problem around a bit, changed a defect to an asset. For example, many scientists when they found they couldn't do a problem finally began to study why not. They then turned it around the other way and said, ``But of course, this is what it is'' and got an important result. So ideal working conditions are very strange. The ones you want aren't always the best ones for you.

现在说说干劲的问题。你会注意到,大多数伟大的科学家都有惊人的干劲。我在贝尔实验室和约翰·图基共事了十年。他有惊人的干劲。我加入贝尔大约三四年后的一天,我发现约翰·图基竟然比我还略小几岁。约翰是天才,而我显然不是。我冲进博德的办公室,嚷嚷道:「怎么可能有人在我这个年纪懂得和约翰·图基一样多?」他往椅背上一靠,双手枕在脑后,咧嘴一笑,说:「汉明,你要是像他那样拼命干上那么多年,你会懂得多少,你自己都会吓一跳。」我只好灰溜溜地走出了办公室! Now for the matter of drive. You observe that most great scientists have tremendous drive. I worked for ten years with John Tukey at Bell Labs. He had tremendous drive. One day about three or four years after I joined, I discovered that John Tukey was slightly younger than I was. John was a genius and I clearly was not. Well I went storming into Bode's office and said, ``How can anybody my age know as much as John Tukey does?'' He leaned back in his chair, put his hands behind his head, grinned slightly, and said, ``You would be surprised Hamming, how much you would know if you worked as hard as he did that many years.'' I simply slunk out of the office!

博德的意思是这样的:「知识和生产力就像复利。」两个能力大致相当的人,其中一个比另一个多干百分之十,前者的产出会超过后者两倍还多。你知道得越多,学得越多;学得越多,能做的越多;能做的越多,机会越多——这和复利非常像。我不想给你们一个具体利率,但那个利率非常高。两个能力完全一样的人,其中一个能日复一日地每天多挤出一小时来思考,一生的产出会远远超过另一个。我把博德的话记在了心里;此后好几年我把多得多的时间用来更努力一点地工作,而我发现,我确实能完成更多工作。这话我不想当着我妻子的面说,但我有时候确实有点冷落她;我需要做研究。如果你想得到你想要的东西,你就得舍弃一些东西。这一点毋庸置疑。 What Bode was saying was this: ``Knowledge and productivity are like compound interest.'' Given two people of approximately the same ability and one person who works ten percent more than the other, the latter will more than twice outproduce the former. The more you know, the more you learn; the more you learn, the more you can do; the more you can do, the more the opportunity - it is very much like compound interest. I don't want to give you a rate, but it is a very high rate. Given two people with exactly the same ability, the one person who manages day in and day out to get in one more hour of thinking will be tremendously more productive over a lifetime. I took Bode's remark to heart; I spent a good deal more of my time for some years trying to work a bit harder and I found, in fact, I could get more work done. I don't like to say it in front of my wife, but I did sort of neglect her sometimes; I needed to study. You have to neglect things if you intend to get what you want done. There's no question about this.

关于干劲,爱迪生说过:「天才是百分之九十九的汗水加百分之一的灵感。」他也许有点夸张,但意思是,扎扎实实的工作,持之以恒地投入,能让你走出惊人的远。持续不断地投入努力,再加上一点点多做的、用得聪明的工作,才是真正起作用的。麻烦就在这里:用错了地方的干劲,到不了任何地方。我常常纳闷,为什么我在贝尔实验室的许多好朋友,干得和我一样辛苦甚至比我更辛苦,却没有那么多成果可拿得出手。努力用错地方是非常严重的问题。光是埋头苦干还不够——必须用得明智。 On this matter of drive Edison says, ``Genius is 99% perspiration and 1% inspiration.'' He may have been exaggerating, but the idea is that solid work, steadily applied, gets you surprisingly far. The steady application of effort with a little bit more work, intelligently applied is what does it. That's the trouble; drive, misapplied, doesn't get you anywhere. I've often wondered why so many of my good friends at Bell Labs who worked as hard or harder than I did, didn't have so much to show for it. The misapplication of effort is a very serious matter. Just hard work is not enough - it must be applied sensibly.

我还想谈谈旁边另一个特质,那就是模糊性。我过了一阵才发现它的重要性。大多数人都愿意相信一件事要么是真的、要么不是真的。伟大的科学家对模糊性有很高的容忍度。他们对理论的相信,足以支撑他们往前走;他们对理论的怀疑,又足以让他们注意到错误和缺陷,从而向前一步、创造出替代它的新理论。如果你信得太多,就永远发现不了破绽;如果你疑得太多,就根本迈不出第一步。这需要一种美妙的平衡。但大多数伟大的科学家都很清楚自己的理论为什么是对的,同时也清楚有哪些小小的、不太对劲的地方对不上,而且他们不会忘记这些。达尔文在他的自传里写道,他觉得有必要把每一条似乎与他观点相悖的证据都记下来,因为不记下来它们就会从他脑子里消失。当你发现明显的破绽时,你必须保持敏感,盯住这些东西,留意它们如何能解释、或者理论如何能修改以适应它们。伟大的贡献往往就出在这里。伟大的贡献很少是靠多添一位小数点做出来的。它归根到底是一种情感上的投入。大多数伟大的科学家都全身心地扑在自己的问题上。那些不投入的人,很少能做出杰出的、一流的工作。 There's another trait on the side which I want to talk about; that trait is ambiguity. It took me a while to discover its importance. Most people like to believe something is or is not true. Great scientists tolerate ambiguity very well. They believe the theory enough to go ahead; they doubt it enough to notice the errors and faults so they can step forward and create the new replacement theory. If you believe too much you'll never notice the flaws; if you doubt too much you won't get started. It requires a lovely balance. But most great scientists are well aware of why their theories are true and they are also well aware of some slight misfits which don't quite fit and they don't forget it. Darwin writes in his autobiography that he found it necessary to write down every piece of evidence which appeared to contradict his beliefs because otherwise they would disappear from his mind. When you find apparent flaws you've got to be sensitive and keep track of those things, and keep an eye out for how they can be explained or how the theory can be changed to fit them. Those are often the great contributions. Great contributions are rarely done by adding another decimal place. It comes down to an emotional commitment. Most great scientists are completely committed to their problem. Those who don't become committed seldom produce outstanding, first-class work.

不过我要再说一遍,光有情感投入也不够。它显然是个必要条件。而且我想我能告诉你原因。每一个研究过创造力的人,最后都不得不说:「创造力来自你的潜意识。」不知怎么,它突然就冒出来了,就那样凭空出现。好吧,我们对潜意识所知甚少;但有一件事你很清楚:你的梦也来自你的潜意识。而且你知道,你的梦在很大程度上是对白天经历的重新加工。如果你日复一日、深深地沉浸并投入一个课题,你的潜意识除了琢磨你的问题之外无事可做。于是某天清晨,或某个午后,你醒来,答案就在那儿了。而那些不投入当前问题的人,他们的潜意识跑到别的事情上摸鱼去了,不会产生大成果。所以管理自己的方法就是:当你手里有一个真正重要的问题时,不要让任何别的东西占据你注意力的中心——让你的心思一直钉在这个问题上。让你的潜意识饿着,它就只能去啃你的问题,这样你就能安稳睡觉,早上免费得到答案。 Now again, emotional commitment is not enough. It is a necessary condition apparently. And I think I can tell you the reason why. Everybody who has studied creativity is driven finally to saying, ``creativity comes out of your subconscious.'' Somehow, suddenly, there it is. It just appears. Well, we know very little about the subconscious; but one thing you are pretty well aware of is that your dreams also come out of your subconscious. And you're aware your dreams are, to a fair extent, a reworking of the experiences of the day. If you are deeply immersed and committed to a topic, day after day after day, your subconscious has nothing to do but work on your problem. And so you wake up one morning, or on some afternoon, and there's the answer. For those who don't get committed to their current problem, the subconscious goofs off on other things and doesn't produce the big result. So the way to manage yourself is that when you have a real important problem you don't let anything else get the center of your attention - you keep your thoughts on the problem. Keep your subconscious starved so it has to work on your problem, so you can sleep peacefully and get the answer in the morning, free.

刚才艾伦·奇诺维斯提到,我过去常在物理桌吃饭。我本来是和数学家们一起吃饭的,后来发现我的数学已经懂得相当多了;说实话,学不到什么新东西了。物理桌正如他所说,是个令人兴奋的地方,不过我觉得自己贡献有多大,他是夸大了。听肖克利、布拉顿、巴丁、J. B. 约翰逊、肯·麦凯和其他人聊天非常有意思,我学到了很多东西。但不幸的是,一个诺贝尔奖来了,一次升迁来了,剩下的都是残渣。没人想要剩下的那些。好吧,再和他们一起吃饭就没意思了! Now Alan Chynoweth mentioned that I used to eat at the physics table. I had been eating with the mathematicians and I found out that I already knew a fair amount of mathematics; in fact, I wasn't learning much. The physics table was, as he said, an exciting place, but I think he exaggerated on how much I contributed. It was very interesting to listen to Shockley, Brattain, Bardeen, J. B. Johnson, Ken McKay and other people, and I was learning a lot. But unfortunately a Nobel Prize came, and a promotion came, and what was left was the dregs. Nobody wanted what was left. Well, there was no use eating with them!

餐厅的另一头有一桌化学家。我曾和其中一位戴夫·麦考尔共过事;而且他当时正在追我们的秘书。我走过去说:「介意我加入你们吗?」他们没法说不,于是我开始和他们吃了一段时间。然后我开始问:「你们这个领域的重要问题是什么?」过了一周左右,又问:「你们正在做的重要问题是什么?」又过了些日子,有一天我进来说:「如果你们正在做的事不重要,如果你们不认为它会通向什么重要的东西,那你们还待在贝尔实验室干什么?」从那以后我就不受欢迎了;我只好另找饭搭子!那是春天的事。 Over on the other side of the dining hall was a chemistry table. I had worked with one of the fellows, Dave McCall; furthermore he was courting our secretary at the time. I went over and said, ``Do you mind if I join you?'' They can't say no, so I started eating with them for a while. And I started asking, ``What are the important problems of your field?'' And after a week or so, ``What important problems are you working on?'' And after some more time I came in one day and said, ``If what you are doing is not important, and if you don't think it is going to lead to something important, why are you at Bell Labs working on it?'' I wasn't welcomed after that; I had to find somebody else to eat with! That was in the spring.

到了秋天,戴夫·麦考尔在走廊里拦住我说:「汉明,你那句话扎到我心里去了。我整个夏天都在想,也就是我们领域的重要问题到底是什么。我没有换研究方向,」他说,「但我认为想这个非常值得。」我说了声「谢谢你,戴夫」,就走开了。几个月后我注意到他当上了部门主管。前些天我注意到他成了美国国家工程院院士。我注意到他成了事。而那桌上其他那些人的名字,我在科学界、在科学圈子里,从来没有听人提起过。他们无法问自己:「我所在领域的重要问题是什么?」 In the fall, Dave McCall stopped me in the hall and said, ``Hamming, that remark of yours got underneath my skin. I thought about it all summer, i.e. what were the important problems in my field. I haven't changed my research,'' he says, ``but I think it was well worthwhile.'' And I said, ``Thank you Dave,'' and went on. I noticed a couple of months later he was made the head of the department. I noticed the other day he was a Member of the National Academy of Engineering. I noticed he has succeeded. I have never heard the names of any of the other fellows at that table mentioned in science and scientific circles. They were unable to ask themselves, ``What are the important problems in my field?''

如果你不研究重要的问题,你就不可能做出重要的工作。这是明摆着的。伟大的科学家都仔细思考过他们领域里的若干重要问题,并且一直留心琢磨怎样去攻克它们。让我提醒你,「重要问题」这个词必须用得谨慎。物理学的三个头号问题,从某种意义上说,我在贝尔实验室的那些年根本没人碰。我所说的「重要」,是指做成了保证拿诺贝尔奖、外加你想要多少就有多少的钱。我们没碰的是:(1) 时间旅行,(2) 瞬间传送,(3) 反重力。它们算不上重要问题,因为我们没有进攻路线。让一个问题重要的,不是它的后果,而是你有一条合理的进攻路线。这才是让一个问题重要的东西。当我说大多数科学家不研究重要问题时,我是在这个意义上说的。据我观察,普通的科学家几乎把所有时间都花在那些他相信不会重要、也不相信会通向重要问题的题目上。 If you do not work on an important problem, it's unlikely you'll do important work. It's perfectly obvious. Great scientists have thought through, in a careful way, a number of important problems in their field, and they keep an eye on wondering how to attack them. Let me warn you, `important problem' must be phrased carefully. The three outstanding problems in physics, in a certain sense, were never worked on while I was at Bell Labs. By important I mean guaranteed a Nobel Prize and any sum of money you want to mention. We didn't work on (1) time travel, (2) teleportation, and (3) antigravity. They are not important problems because we do not have an attack. It's not the consequence that makes a problem important, it is that you have a reasonable attack. That is what makes a problem important. When I say that most scientists don't work on important problems, I mean it in that sense. The average scientist, so far as I can make out, spends almost all his time working on problems which he believes will not be important and he also doesn't believe that they will lead to important problems.

前面我说过要播下橡子,好让橡树长出来。你不可能总是精确地知道自己该站在哪里,但你可以持续在可能出事情的地方保持活跃。而且即使你相信伟大的科学全凭运气,你也可以站在闪电会劈下来的山顶上;你不必躲在安全的山谷里。但普通的科学家几乎一直在做例行的、安全的工作,所以他(或她)产出寥寥。就是这么简单。如果你想做伟大的工作,你显然必须研究重要的问题,而且你得有自己的想法。 I spoke earlier about planting acorns so that oaks will grow. You can't always know exactly where to be, but you can keep active in places where something might happen. And even if you believe that great science is a matter of luck, you can stand on a mountain top where lightning strikes; you don't have to hide in the valley where you're safe. But the average scientist does routine safe work almost all the time and so he (or she) doesn't produce much. It's that simple. If you want to do great work, you clearly must work on important problems, and you should have an idea.

沿着这条思路,在约翰·图基等人的再三敦促下,我最终采用了所谓的「伟大思想时间」。每周五中午我去吃午饭,从那以后只讨论伟大的思想。所谓伟大的思想,是指这类问题:「计算机在整个 AT&T 将扮演什么角色?」「计算机将如何改变科学?」比如,我当时得出一个观察:十个实验里有九个在实验室做,一个在计算机上做。有一次我对副总裁们说,这个比例会倒过来,也就是十个实验里九个会在计算机上做,一个在实验室做。他们认定我是个不懂现实的疯数学家。我知道他们错了,后来他们被证明错了,而我被证明对了。他们在不需要的时候建了实验室。我之所以看到计算机正在改变科学,是因为我花了大量时间追问:「计算机将对科学产生什么影响,我又能怎样改变这个进程?」我问自己:「它将怎样改变贝尔实验室?」在同一次发言里我还说过,在我离开之前,贝尔实验室会有一半以上的人与计算机器密切打交道。喏,你们现在人人都有终端了。我认真思考过我的领域要往哪里去、机会在哪里、什么是该做的重要事情。让我到那边去,这样才有机会做出重要的事情。 Along those lines at some urging from John Tukey and others, I finally adopted what I called ``Great Thoughts Time.'' When I went to lunch Friday noon, I would only discuss great thoughts after that. By great thoughts I mean ones like: ``What will be the role of computers in all of AT&T?'', ``How will computers change science?'' For example, I came up with the observation at that time that nine out of ten experiments were done in the lab and one in ten on the computer. I made a remark to the vice presidents one time, that it would be reversed, i.e. nine out of ten experiments would be done on the computer and one in ten in the lab. They knew I was a crazy mathematician and had no sense of reality. I knew they were wrong and they've been proved wrong while I have been proved right. They built laboratories when they didn't need them. I saw that computers were transforming science because I spent a lot of time asking ``What will be the impact of computers on science and how can I change it?'' I asked myself, ``How is it going to change Bell Labs?'' I remarked one time, in the same address, that more than one-half of the people at Bell Labs will be interacting closely with computing machines before I leave. Well, you all have terminals now. I thought hard about where was my field going, where were the opportunities, and what were the important things to do. Let me go there so there is a chance I can do important things.

大多数伟大的科学家都知道许多重要的问题。他们手头攥着十到二十个重要问题,一直在为它们寻找进攻路线。当一个新的想法冒出来时,你会听到他们说:「嗯,这个跟我那个问题有关。」于是他们丢下其他所有事情,扑上去追它。现在我可以给你们讲一个别人讲给我听的恐怖故事,不过我无法担保它属实。我在机场和一位洛斯阿拉莫斯的老朋友聊天,我说幸亏裂变实验当时是在欧洲做出来的,这才让我们在美国搞起了原子弹。他说:「不对;在伯克利我们也攒了一批数据;只是因为在造更多设备,一直没腾出手来处理,但如果我们把那些数据处理了,我们也会发现裂变。」他们手里攥着它,却没有追下去。他们拿了个第二! Most great scientists know many important problems. They have something between 10 and 20 important problems for which they are looking for an attack. And when they see a new idea come up, one hears them say ``Well that bears on this problem.'' They drop all the other things and get after it. Now I can tell you a horror story that was told to me but I can't vouch for the truth of it. I was sitting in an airport talking to a friend of mine from Los Alamos about how it was lucky that the fission experiment occurred over in Europe when it did because that got us working on the atomic bomb here in the US. He said ``No; at Berkeley we had gathered a bunch of data; we didn't get around to reducing it because we were building some more equipment, but if we had reduced that data we would have found fission.'' They had it in their hands and they didn't pursue it. They came in second!

伟大的科学家,当机会打开时,会扑上去追。他们丢下其他所有事情,排除其他一切去追一个想法,因为他们早已把事情想透了。他们的头脑是有准备的;他们看到机会就扑上去。当然,很多时候并不会成功,但你不需要打中很多次就能做出伟大的科学。这事儿还算容易。主要的诀窍之一是活得够长! The great scientists, when an opportunity opens up, get after it and they pursue it. They drop all other things. They get rid of other things and they get after an idea because they had already thought the thing through. Their minds are prepared; they see the opportunity and they go after it. Now of course lots of times it doesn't work out, but you don't have to hit many of them to do some great science. It's kind of easy. One of the chief tricks is to live a long time!

还有一个特质,我过了一阵才注意到。我观察到那些开门工作和关门工作的人之间存在以下事实。我注意到,如果你把办公室的门关着,你今天和明天能完成更多工作,你比大多数人更高产。但十年之后,不知怎么你就不太知道哪些问题值得做了;你做的一切苦工,在重要性上都有些偏门。开着门工作的人会受到各种各样的打扰,但他也偶尔会得到关于世界是什么样子、什么才可能重要的线索。我无法证明这个因果链条,因为你可以说:「关着的门象征着封闭的心智。」我不知道。但我可以说,开门工作的人和最终做出重要事情的人之间有相当好的相关性,尽管关门工作的人往往干得更辛苦。不知怎么,他们做的似乎是稍微不对劲的东西——偏得不多,但足以让他们与名声擦肩而过。 Another trait, it took me a while to notice. I noticed the following facts about people who work with the door open or the door closed. I notice that if you have the door to your office closed, you get more work done today and tomorrow, and you are more productive than most. But 10 years later somehow you don't know quite know what problems are worth working on; all the hard work you do is sort of tangential in importance. He who works with the door open gets all kinds of interruptions, but he also occasionally gets clues as to what the world is and what might be important. Now I cannot prove the cause and effect sequence because you might say, ``The closed door is symbolic of a closed mind.'' I don't know. But I can say there is a pretty good correlation between those who work with the doors open and those who ultimately do important things, although people who work with doors closed often work harder. Somehow they seem to work on slightly the wrong thing - not much, but enough that they miss fame.

我想谈另一个话题。它来自一首歌,我想你们很多人都知道:「不在于你做什么,而在于你怎么做。」我先从自己的例子讲起。在绝对二进制的年代,我被人忽悠着在数字计算机上算一道连最好的模拟计算机都算不了的题。我算出了答案。但当我仔细一想,我对自己说:「汉明啊,这个军工项目你早晚得交报告;花了那么多钱你总得有个交代,而且每个搞模拟计算的单位都会抢着要这份报告,看看能不能挑出毛病。」我当时做积分用的是个相当蹩脚的方法,说得客气点,但我确实算出了答案。我意识到,这个问题的本质其实不只是算出答案;而是第一次、并且无可争议地证明,我能在模拟计算机自己的地盘上用数字机器打败它。于是我重做了求解方法,建立了一套漂亮优雅的理论,改变了我们计算答案的方式;结果并没有什么不同。发表的报告里有一个优雅的方法,此后多年它被称为「汉明积分微分方程法」。它现在多少有些过时了,但曾几何时的确是个很好的方法。通过把问题稍微改一改,我做出了重要的工作,而不是琐碎的工作。 I want to talk on another topic. It is based on the song which I think many of you know, ``It ain't what you do, it's the way that you do it.'' I'll start with an example of my own. I was conned into doing on a digital computer, in the absolute binary days, a problem which the best analog computers couldn't do. And I was getting an answer. When I thought carefully and said to myself, ``You know, Hamming, you're going to have to file a report on this military job; after you spend a lot of money you're going to have to account for it and every analog installation is going to want the report to see if they can't find flaws in it.'' I was doing the required integration by a rather crummy method, to say the least, but I was getting the answer. And I realized that in truth the problem was not just to get the answer; it was to demonstrate for the first time, and beyond question, that I could beat the analog computer on its own ground with a digital machine. I reworked the method of solution, created a theory which was nice and elegant, and changed the way we computed the answer; the results were no different. The published report had an elegant method which was later known for years as ``Hamming's Method of Integrating Differential Equations.'' It is somewhat obsolete now, but for a while it was a very good method. By changing the problem slightly, I did important work rather than trivial work.

同样的道理,早年在阁楼上用那台机器时,我一道题接着一道题又一道题地解;成功的相当多,也有几次失败。有一个星期五,我做完一道题回家,说来奇怪,我并不高兴;我很沮丧。我看得见人生就是一道题接着一道题又一道题的长队。想了很久之后,我决定:「不,我应该从事可变产品的大规模生产。我应该关心明年的所有问题,而不只是摆在眼前的这一道。」通过换一种提问方式,我仍然得到同样甚至更好的结果,但我改变了格局,做出了重要的工作。我去攻那个大问题了——我怎样才能驯服机器,在还不知道明年的问题是什么的情况下把它们全部解决?我怎样为此做好准备?我怎样把眼前这道题做好,让自己始终站在上头?我怎样遵守牛顿的法则?他说过:「如果说我看得比别人远,那是因为我站在巨人的肩膀上。」如今我们是站在彼此的脚背上! In the same way, when using the machine up in the attic in the early days, I was solving one problem after another after another; a fair number were successful and there were a few failures. I went home one Friday after finishing a problem, and curiously enough I wasn't happy; I was depressed. I could see life being a long sequence of one problem after another after another. After quite a while of thinking I decided, ``No, I should be in the mass production of a variable product. I should be concerned with all of next year's problems, not just the one in front of my face.'' By changing the question I still got the same kind of results or better, but I changed things and did important work. I attacked the major problem - How do I conquer machines and do all of next year's problems when I don't know what they are going to be? How do I prepare for it? How do I do this one so I'll be on top of it? How do I obey Newton's rule? He said, ``If I have seen further than others, it is because I've stood on the shoulders of giants.'' These days we stand on each other's feet!

你应该用这样的方式做你的工作:让别人能够在它的基础上继续搭建,让他们真的会说:「是的,我站在某某的肩膀上,所以看得更远。」科学的本质是累积的。把问题稍微改一改,你常常就能做出伟大的工作,而不只是好工作。我不再攻孤立的问题;我立下决心,除非它能代表一整类问题,否则绝不再去解孤立的问题。 You should do your job in such a fashion that others can build on top of it, so they will indeed say, ``Yes, I've stood on so and so's shoulders and I saw further.'' The essence of science is cumulative. By changing a problem slightly you can often do great work rather than merely good work. Instead of attacking isolated problems, I made the resolution that I would never again solve an isolated problem except as characteristic of a class.

如果你够得上数学家的水准,你就知道,推广的努力往往意味着解法反而简单。常常只要停下来问一句:「这是他想要的这道题,但它其实是某某类问题的代表。是的,我可以用一种远比专门解法优越的方法攻下整类问题,因为我先前陷在不必要的细节里。」抽象这件事常常让事情变得简单。而且,我还把这些方法存档备用,为将来的问题做好准备。 Now if you are much of a mathematician you know that the effort to generalize often means that the solution is simple. Often by stopping and saying, ``This is the problem he wants but this is characteristic of so and so. Yes, I can attack the whole class with a far superior method than the particular one because I was earlier embedded in needless detail.'' The business of abstraction frequently makes things simple. Furthermore, I filed away the methods and prepared for the future problems.

结束这一部分之前,我提醒你们一句:「蹩脚的工匠才怪工具——好工匠用手头有的东西接着干,拿出他能拿出的最好答案。」我还要说,通过改造问题,通过换个角度看事情,你可以让你最终的产出大不一样——因为你既可以用一种让别人确实能在你的成果上继续搭建的方式去做,也可以用一种让下一个人基本上只得把你做过的事重做一遍的方式去做。这不只是干活的事,这是你写报告的方式、写论文的方式、整个态度的事。做一个宽泛的、一般性的工作,和做一个非常特殊的个案,花的气力其实差不多。而且前者令人满足得多、回报也大得多! To end this part, I'll remind you, ``It is a poor workman who blames his tools - the good man gets on with the job, given what he's got, and gets the best answer he can.'' And I suggest that by altering the problem, by looking at the thing differently, you can make a great deal of difference in your final productivity because you can either do it in such a fashion that people can indeed build on what you've done, or you can do it in such a fashion that the next person has to essentially duplicate again what you've done. It isn't just a matter of the job, it's the way you write the report, the way you write the paper, the whole attitude. It's just as easy to do a broad, general job as one very special case. And it's much more satisfying and rewarding!

现在我要讲一个令人很不愉快的话题了:光把工作做出来是不够的,你还得把它推销出去。「推销」对科学家来说是件别扭的事。它很难看;按理说不该需要做它。世界理应翘首以待,等你做出了伟大的东西,他们就该冲出来欢迎它。但事实上,每个人都忙着自己的工作。你必须把成果呈现得足够好,好到他们愿意放下手里的事,看看你做了什么,读一读,然后回来说:「是的,这东西不错。」我建议你们,翻开一本期刊、一页页翻过去的时候,问问自己为什么有些文章你会读、有些不读。你最好把报告写到这种程度:当它发表在《物理评论》或任何你想发的地方时,读者翻着翻着不会把你的那几页直接翻过去,而是会停下来读你的文章。如果他们不停下来读,你就得不到承认。 I have now come down to a topic which is very distasteful; it is not sufficient to do a job, you have to sell it. `Selling' to a scientist is an awkward thing to do. It's very ugly; you shouldn't have to do it. The world is supposed to be waiting, and when you do something great, they should rush out and welcome it. But the fact is everyone is busy with their own work. You must present it so well that they will set aside what they are doing, look at what you've done, read it, and come back and say, ``Yes, that was good.'' I suggest that when you open a journal, as you turn the pages, you ask why you read some articles and not others. You had better write your report so when it is published in the Physical Review, or wherever else you want it, as the readers are turning the pages they won't just turn your pages but they will stop and read yours. If they don't stop and read it, you won't get credit.

推销有三件事必须做。你必须学会写得清楚、写得好,让人愿意读;你必须学会做比较正式的报告;你还必须学会做非正式的谈话。我们有过许多所谓的「幕后科学家」。开会时他们一声不吭。等决定都做完三个星期了,他们才交一份报告,论证你为什么应该这样那样。好吧,太晚了。他们不肯在争论正酣的会议中央、在事情进行当中站起来说:「我们应该这样做,理由如下。」这种沟通方式,和准备好的演讲一样,你也必须掌握。 There are three things you have to do in selling. You have to learn to write clearly and well so that people will read it, you must learn to give reasonably formal talks, and you also must learn to give informal talks. We had a lot of so-called `back room scientists.' In a conference, they would keep quiet. Three weeks later after a decision was made they filed a report saying why you should do so and so. Well, it was too late. They would not stand up right in the middle of a hot conference, in the middle of activity, and say, ``We should do this for these reasons.'' You need to master that form of communication as well as prepared speeches.

我刚起步的时候,一演讲就几乎要当场病倒,紧张得不得了。我意识到,我要么学会流畅地演讲,要么就等于给我的整个职业生涯落下个半身不遂。IBM 第一次请我晚上去纽约做演讲时,我下决心要做一场真正好的演讲,一场人们想听的演讲——不是技术性的,而是宏观的——并且在结束时,如果他们喜欢,我就轻声说一句:「什么时候还想要,我随时来。」结果,我得到了大量面对有限听众练演讲的机会,克服了恐惧。而且,我还得以研究哪些方法有效、哪些无效。 When I first started, I got practically physically ill while giving a speech, and I was very, very nervous. I realized I either had to learn to give speeches smoothly or I would essentially partially cripple my whole career. The first time IBM asked me to give a speech in New York one evening, I decided I was going to give a really good speech, a speech that was wanted, not a technical one but a broad one, and at the end if they liked it, I'd quietly say, ``Any time you want one I'll come in and give you one.'' As a result, I got a great deal of practice giving speeches to a limited audience and I got over being afraid. Furthermore, I could also then study what methods were effective and what were ineffective.

在跑各种会议的同时,我一直在研究为什么有些论文被人记住而大多数不会。技术人员总想讲高度专门化的技术内容。而大多数时候,听众想要的是宏观的、一般性的演讲,想要的综述和背景远比演讲者愿意给的多。结果,许多演讲是无效的。演讲者报个题目,突然就一头扎进他解决的那些细节里。听众里没几个人跟得上。你应该先画出一幅总的图景,说明为什么这件事重要,然后慢慢地勾勒你做了什么。这样,多得多的人会说:「是的,乔做了那个」,或者「玛丽做了那个;我真看明白是怎么回事了;是的,玛丽的报告讲得真好;我听懂玛丽做了什么了。」人们的倾向是做高度限定的、保险的演讲;这通常是无效的。而且,许多演讲塞进去的信息实在太多了。所以我说,「推销」这个道理是明摆着的。 While going to meetings I had already been studying why some papers are remembered and most are not. The technical person wants to give a highly limited technical talk. Most of the time the audience wants a broad general talk and wants much more survey and background than the speaker is willing to give. As a result, many talks are ineffective. The speaker names a topic and suddenly plunges into the details he's solved. Few people in the audience may follow. You should paint a general picture to say why it's important, and then slowly give a sketch of what was done. Then a larger number of people will say, ``Yes, Joe has done that,'' or ``Mary has done that; I really see where it is; yes, Mary really gave a good talk; I understand what Mary has done.'' The tendency is to give a highly restricted, safe talk; this is usually ineffective. Furthermore, many talks are filled with far too much information. So I say this idea of selling is obvious.

让我总结一下。你必须研究重要的问题。我不承认全靠运气,但我承认运气占相当大的成分。我信奉巴斯德的「运气偏爱有准备的头脑」。我非常推崇我自己的做法——多年来周五下午只谈伟大思想——这意味着我拿出 10% 的时间,努力去理解领域里更大的问题,也就是什么是重要的、什么不是。早年我发现,我嘴上相信的是「这个」,行动上却整个星期都朝着「那个」方向行军。这挺蠢的。如果我真的相信机会在那边,我为什么朝这边走?我要么得改目标,要么得改做法。于是我改了我的做法,朝我认为重要的方向行军。就这么简单。 Let me summarize. You've got to work on important problems. I deny that it is all luck, but I admit there is a fair element of luck. I subscribe to Pasteur's ``Luck favors the prepared mind.'' I favor heavily what I did. Friday afternoons for years - great thoughts only - means that I committed 10% of my time trying to understand the bigger problems in the field, i.e. what was and what was not important. I found in the early days I had believed `this' and yet had spent all week marching in `that' direction. It was kind of foolish. If I really believe the action is over there, why do I march in this direction? I either had to change my goal or change what I did. So I changed something I did and I marched in the direction I thought was important. It's that easy.

你也许会对我说,你没法掌控自己必须做什么。好吧,刚起步的时候,你也许不能。但一旦你小有成就,找你要结果的人就多得你应付不过来,你就有一些选择权了——尽管不是完全的。关于这个,我给你们讲个故事,它和「教育你的老板」这个话题有关。我有个老板叫谢尔库诺夫;他过去是、现在也仍然是我的好朋友。有一次一个军方的人来找我,要求周五前必须给出一些答案。可我已经把计算资源排满了,要实时为一群科学家处理数据;我齐膝深地陷在一堆短小的、重要的急活里。这个军方的人要我周五下班前解决他的问题。我说:「不行,我周一给你。我可以周末加班做。我现在不做。」他跑去找我的老板谢尔库诺夫,谢尔库诺夫说:「你必须给他算;他周五就得要。」我问他:「为什么我必须?」他说:「你必须。」我说:「好吧,谢尔盖,不过周五下午你就坐在办公室里,赶回家的末班车,看着这家伙走出那扇门吧。」我在周五下午很晚才把答案给了那个军方的人。然后我走进谢尔库诺夫的办公室坐下;等那人出门时我说:「你看,谢尔库诺夫,这家伙胳膊底下什么都没夹;可我已经把答案给他了。」周一早上谢尔库诺夫打电话问他:「你周末来加班了吗?」我听得出来那头顿了一下,那家伙在脑子里飞快地过了一遍将要发生什么;但他知道加班是要签到的,没签就不敢说签了,于是他说没有。从那以后,谢尔库诺夫对我说:「你的期限你自己定;你可以改。」 Now you might tell me you haven't got control over what you have to work on. Well, when you first begin, you may not. But once you're moderately successful, there are more people asking for results than you can deliver and you have some power of choice, but not completely. I'll tell you a story about that, and it bears on the subject of educating your boss. I had a boss named Schelkunoff; he was, and still is, a very good friend of mine. Some military person came to me and demanded some answers by Friday. Well, I had already dedicated my computing resources to reducing data on the fly for a group of scientists; I was knee deep in short, small, important problems. This military person wanted me to solve his problem by the end of the day on Friday. I said, ``No, I'll give it to you Monday. I can work on it over the weekend. I'm not going to do it now.'' He goes down to my boss, Schelkunoff, and Schelkunoff says, ``You must run this for him; he's got to have it by Friday.'' I tell him, ``Why do I?''; he says, ``You have to.'' I said, ``Fine, Sergei, but you're sitting in your office Friday afternoon catching the late bus home to watch as this fellow walks out that door.'' I gave the military person the answers late Friday afternoon. I then went to Schelkunoff's office and sat down; as the man goes out I say, ``You see Schelkunoff, this fellow has nothing under his arm; but I gave him the answers.'' On Monday morning Schelkunoff called him up and said, ``Did you come in to work over the weekend?'' I could hear, as it were, a pause as the fellow ran through his mind of what was going to happen; but he knew he would have had to sign in, and he'd better not say he had when he hadn't, so he said he hadn't. Ever after that Schelkunoff said, ``You set your deadlines; you can change them.''

一次教训就足以教育我的老板:为什么我不想接那些挤掉探索性研究的大活,为什么我不接那些吞掉全部研究计算资源的救火任务是有道理的。我反而想用这些设备来算大量的小问题。再说一遍,早些年我的计算能力很有限,而且在我这个领域里,「数学家要机器没用」是明摆着的共识。但我需要更多机器容量。每次我不得不对别的领域的某个科学家说「不行,我没有机器容量」时,他就抱怨。我就说:「去找你们的副总裁,说汉明需要更多计算能力。」过了一阵子,我就能看到高层那边正在发生什么:许多人对我的副总裁说:「你手下那人需要更多计算能力。」我要到了! One lesson was sufficient to educate my boss as to why I didn't want to do big jobs that displaced exploratory research and why I was justified in not doing crash jobs which absorb all the research computing facilities. I wanted instead to use the facilities to compute a large number of small problems. Again, in the early days, I was limited in computing capacity and it was clear, in my area, that a ``mathematician had no use for machines.'' But I needed more machine capacity. Every time I had to tell some scientist in some other area, ``No I can't; I haven't the machine capacity,'' he complained. I said ``Go tell your Vice President that Hamming needs more computing capacity.'' After a while I could see what was happening up there at the top; many people said to my Vice President, ``Your man needs more computing capacity.'' I got it!

我还做了第二件事。早年我把我们仅有的一点编程力量借出去支援计算事业时,我说:「我们的程序员没有得到他们应得的认可。你们发表论文的时候,必须感谢那位程序员,否则别想再从我这里得到任何帮助。那位程序员必须被点名感谢;她干得很辛苦。」我等了一两年。然后我翻了一整年的《贝尔系统技术杂志》文章,数了数其中有多大比例感谢了某位程序员。我把数据拿到老板面前说:「这就是计算在贝尔实验室扮演的核心角色;如果 BSTJ 有多重要,计算就有多重要。」他只好认了。你是可以教育你的老板的。这是件苦差事。在这场演讲里,我只是从下往上看;我没有从上往下看。但我告诉你们的是,怎样在高层管理的阻力之下仍然得到你想要的东西。在那里你也得推销你的想法。 I also did a second thing. When I loaned what little programming power we had to help in the early days of computing, I said, ``We are not getting the recognition for our programmers that they deserve. When you publish a paper you will thank that programmer or you aren't getting any more help from me. That programmer is going to be thanked by name; she's worked hard.'' I waited a couple of years. I then went through a year of BSTJ articles and counted what fraction thanked some programmer. I took it into the boss and said, ``That's the central role computing is playing in Bell Labs; if the BSTJ is important, that's how important computing is.'' He had to give in. You can educate your bosses. It's a hard job. In this talk I'm only viewing from the bottom up; I'm not viewing from the top down. But I am telling you how you can get what you want in spite of top management. You have to sell your ideas there also.

好,现在我要讲到这个题目了:「为成为伟大科学家付出的努力,值得吗?」要回答这个,你得去问过的人。等他们放下谦虚,大多数人会说:「是的,做出真正一流的工作、并且自己知道它是一流的,这滋味抵得上美酒、女人和歌声加在一起」——如果是位女士,她会说:「抵得上美酒、男人和歌声加在一起。」你再看看那些当老板的,他们总想回来,或者找你要报告,试图参与那些发现的时刻。他们总是在那儿碍手碍脚。可见,做成过的人想再做一次。不过这是个有局限的调查。我从来不敢去问那些没做出伟大工作的人对此是什么感受。这是个有偏的样本,但我仍然认为这是值得拼搏的。我认为,努力去做出一流的工作,非常明确地值得,因为真相是:价值在拼搏之中,多于在结果之中。把自己磨炼成器的这场拼搏,本身似乎就是值得的。成功和名声,在我看来,不过是红利。 Well I now come down to the topic, ``Is the effort to be a great scientist worth it?'' To answer this, you must ask people. When you get beyond their modesty, most people will say, ``Yes, doing really first-class work, and knowing it, is as good as wine, women and song put together,'' or if it's a woman she says, ``It is as good as wine, men and song put together.'' And if you look at the bosses, they tend to come back or ask for reports, trying to participate in those moments of discovery. They're always in the way. So evidently those who have done it, want to do it again. But it is a limited survey. I have never dared to go out and ask those who didn't do great work how they felt about the matter. It's a biased sample, but I still think it is worth the struggle. I think it is very definitely worth the struggle to try and do first-class work because the truth is, the value is in the struggle more than it is in the result. The struggle to make something of yourself seems to be worthwhile in itself. The success and fame are sort of dividends, in my opinion.

我已经告诉你们怎么做了。它这么容易,那为什么那么多天赋异禀的人还是失败了呢?比如,我到今天都认为,贝尔实验室数学部里有相当一些人,能力远胜于我、天赋远厚于我,但他们的产出没有我多。他们中有些人确实比我产出多;香农比我多,另外几个人也产出很多,但比起许多装备比我精良的人,我的产出算是非常高的。为什么会这样?他们怎么了?为什么那么多大有前途的人失败了? I've told you how to do it. It is so easy, so why do so many people, with all their talents, fail? For example, my opinion, to this day, is that there are in the mathematics department at Bell Labs quite a few people far more able and far better endowed than I, but they didn't produce as much. Some of them did produce more than I did; Shannon produced more than I did, and some others produced a lot, but I was highly productive against a lot of other fellows who were better equipped. Why is it so? What happened to them? Why do so many of the people who have great promise, fail?

嗯,原因之一是干劲和投入。能力稍逊但全心投入、做出伟大工作的人,比那些身怀绝技却只是玩玩票的人做得更多——后者白天上班,下班回家干别的,第二天回来再接着上班。他们缺少那种对真正一流工作来说显然必不可少的深度投入。他们产出大量好作品,但记住,我们谈的是一流的工作。这里有差别。优秀的人、非常有才华的人,几乎总能产出好作品。我们谈的是杰出的作品,是那种拿诺贝尔奖、得到承认的作品。 Well, one of the reasons is drive and commitment. The people who do great work with less ability but who are committed to it, get more done that those who have great skill and dabble in it, who work during the day and go home and do other things and come back and work the next day. They don't have the deep commitment that is apparently necessary for really first-class work. They turn out lots of good work, but we were talking, remember, about first-class work. There is a difference. Good people, very talented people, almost always turn out good work. We're talking about the outstanding work, the type of work that gets the Nobel Prize and gets recognition.

第二个原因,我认为是性格缺陷的问题。我举一个我在尔湾遇到的人为例。他曾是一家计算中心的主任,当时临时外调做大学校长的特别助理。很明显,他手里的职位前途远大。有一次他把我叫进办公室,向我展示他处理信件的方法,以及他怎么打理往来函件。他指出秘书的效率有多低。他把所有信件都堆在周围;他记得每样东西在哪儿。他用他的文字处理器就能把信发出去。他吹嘘这有多妙,没有秘书插手他能多干多少活。好吧,背着他,我去找了那位秘书。秘书说:「我当然帮不了他;我收不到他的邮件。他不肯把东西给我登记;我都不知道他把东西堆在地板上的哪儿。我当然帮不了他。」于是我去对他说:「你看,如果你按现在这套方法,什么事都单打独斗,你能走多远完全取决于你一个人能走多远。如果你肯学着和系统协作,系统能支撑你走多远你就能走多远。」结果,他后来再没有走得更远。他有想要完全掌控的性格缺陷,不肯承认你需要系统的支持。 The second thing is, I think, the problem of personality defects. Now I'll cite a fellow whom I met out in Irvine. He had been the head of a computing center and he was temporarily on assignment as a special assistant to the president of the university. It was obvious he had a job with a great future. He took me into his office one time and showed me his method of getting letters done and how he took care of his correspondence. He pointed out how inefficient the secretary was. He kept all his letters stacked around there; he knew where everything was. And he would, on his word processor, get the letter out. He was bragging how marvelous it was and how he could get so much more work done without the secretary's interference. Well, behind his back, I talked to the secretary. The secretary said, ``Of course I can't help him; I don't get his mail. He won't give me the stuff to log in; I don't know where he puts it on the floor. Of course I can't help him.'' So I went to him and said, ``Look, if you adopt the present method and do what you can do single-handedly, you can go just that far and no farther than you can do single-handedly. If you will learn to work with the system, you can go as far as the system will support you.'' And, he never went any further. He had his personality defect of wanting total control and was not willing to recognize that you need the support of the system.

这种事你会一次又一次地看到:优秀的科学家跟系统对着干,而不是学着与系统协作、利用系统提供的一切。系统能提供的东西很多,只要你学会用它。这需要耐心,但你可以学会把系统用得相当好,也可以学会绕过它。说到底,如果你想要一个「不行」的答复,你只要去找老板,轻轻松松就能拿到一个「不行」。如果你想做什么事,别请示,直接做。把一个既成事实摆在他面前。别给他对你说「不行」的机会。但如果你想要一个「不行」,那很容易就能拿到。 You find this happening again and again; good scientists will fight the system rather than learn to work with the system and take advantage of all the system has to offer. It has a lot, if you learn how to use it. It takes patience, but you can learn how to use the system pretty well, and you can learn how to get around it. After all, if you want a decision `No', you just go to your boss and get a `No' easy. If you want to do something, don't ask, do it. Present him with an accomplished fact. Don't give him a chance to tell you `No'. But if you want a `No', it's easy to get a `No'.

另一种性格缺陷是自我主张,这里我讲讲我自己的经历。我从洛斯阿拉莫斯过来,早年在纽约麦迪逊大道 590 号用一台机器,我们只是租用上机时间。那时我还穿着西部风格的装束,大斜口袋、波洛领带,全套行头。我隐约觉得我得到的服务不如别人好。于是我开始测量。你来了就排队等;我觉得我没得到公平的待遇。我对自己说:「为什么?没有哪位 IBM 副总裁下过指示说『给汉明穿小鞋』。是最底下的秘书们在这么做。一有空当出来,他们会抢着找个人插进去,但他们出去找的是别人。那么,为什么?我又没有亏待过他们。」答案是:我的穿着打扮不符合他们心目中那种场合的人该有的样子。原因归结起来就是这个——我穿得不合宜。我必须做个决定——我是要坚持自我、想怎么穿就怎么穿、让它持续不断地损耗我职业生涯的精力,还是表面上随和一些?我决定努力表现得随和一些。我一这么做,得到的服务就好多了。而现在,作为一个上了年岁的、有色彩的老怪人,我得到的服务比别人还好。 Another personality defect is ego assertion and I'll speak in this case of my own experience. I came from Los Alamos and in the early days I was using a machine in New York at 590 Madison Avenue where we merely rented time. I was still dressing in western clothes, big slash pockets, a bolo and all those things. I vaguely noticed that I was not getting as good service as other people. So I set out to measure. You came in and you waited for your turn; I felt I was not getting a fair deal. I said to myself, ``Why? No Vice President at IBM said, `Give Hamming a bad time'. It is the secretaries at the bottom who are doing this. When a slot appears, they'll rush to find someone to slip in, but they go out and find somebody else. Now, why? I haven't mistreated them.'' Answer, I wasn't dressing the way they felt somebody in that situation should. It came down to just that - I wasn't dressing properly. I had to make the decision - was I going to assert my ego and dress the way I wanted to and have it steadily drain my effort from my professional life, or was I going to appear to conform better? I decided I would make an effort to appear to conform properly. The moment I did, I got much better service. And now, as an old colorful character, I get better service than other people.

你的穿着应该符合说话对象的期待。如果我要去 MIT 计算中心做演讲,我就系上波洛领带、套件旧灯芯绒外套之类的。我懂得不让我的衣着、外表、举止妨碍我在乎的东西。非常多的科学家觉得他们必须坚持自我、按自己的方式行事。他们非得能做这个、那个、或别的什么,并且为此持续不断地付出代价。 You should dress according to the expectations of the audience spoken to. If I am going to give an address at the MIT computer center, I dress with a bolo and an old corduroy jacket or something else. I know enough not to let my clothes, my appearance, my manners get in the way of what I care about. An enormous number of scientists feel they must assert their ego and do their thing their way. They have got to be able to do this, that, or the other thing, and they pay a steady price.

约翰·图基几乎总是穿得很随便。他走进一间重要的办公室,对方要过很久才反应过来:这是一位一流人物,最好认真听他说话。在很长一段时间里,约翰不得不克服这种敌意。这是白白浪费的力气!我没说你应该随大流;我说的是「表面上随大流能让你走得远得多」。如果你偏要在方方面面主张自我,「我就要按我的方式来」,那么在整个职业生涯里你都在持续支付一笔不大不小的代价。而这放到一辈子来看,会累积成巨量的、毫无必要的麻烦。 John Tukey almost always dressed very casually. He would go into an important office and it would take a long time before the other fellow realized that this is a first-class man and he had better listen. For a long time John has had to overcome this kind of hostility. It's wasted effort! I didn't say you should conform; I said ``The appearance of conforming gets you a long way.'' If you chose to assert your ego in any number of ways, ``I am going to do it my way,'' you pay a small steady price throughout the whole of your professional career. And this, over a whole lifetime, adds up to an enormous amount of needless trouble.

我肯花心思给秘书们讲笑话、对她们友善一点,得到的回报是极佳的秘书支援。比如有一次,因为某个蠢原因,默里山所有的复印服务全都占线了。别问我是怎么回事,反正就是全占满了。我有急活要印。我的秘书打电话到霍姆德尔找了人,跳上公司的车,跑了一小时的路赶过去把东西印好,再赶回来。这是对我平时花心思逗她开心、讲笑话、与人为善的回报;正是那一点点额外的付出,后来帮了我。当你明白必须利用系统、研究怎样让系统替你干活时,你就学会了怎样让系统迁就你的愿望。或者,你也可以一辈子跟它打一场不宣而战的小战争。 By taking the trouble to tell jokes to the secretaries and being a little friendly, I got superb secretarial help. For instance, one time for some idiot reason all the reproducing services at Murray Hill were tied up. Don't ask me how, but they were. I wanted something done. My secretary called up somebody at Holmdel, hopped the company car, made the hour-long trip down and got it reproduced, and then came back. It was a payoff for the times I had made an effort to cheer her up, tell her jokes and be friendly; it was that little extra work that later paid off for me. By realizing you have to use the system and studying how to get the system to do your work, you learn how to adapt the system to your desires. Or you can fight it steadily, as a small undeclared war, for the whole of your life.

我认为约翰·图基白白付出了可怕的代价。他无论如何都是天才,但我认为,如果他肯稍微随和一点、不那么事事主张自我,事情本来会好得多、也简单得多。他就是要时时刻刻穿自己想穿的。这不仅适用于穿着,也适用于上千件别的事;人们就是要不停地跟系统斗。不是说你们偶尔斗一斗也不行! And I think John Tukey paid a terrible price needlessly. He was a genius anyhow, but I think it would have been far better, and far simpler, had he been willing to conform a little bit instead of ego asserting. He is going to dress the way he wants all of the time. It applies not only to dress but to a thousand other things; people will continue to fight the system. Not that you shouldn't occasionally!

当年图书馆从默里山中央搬到很远的一头时,我的一个朋友递交了一份申请,要一辆自行车。好吧,这个机构不傻。他们等了一阵,寄回一张园区地图说:「请在这张地图上标出你打算骑行的路线,以便我们给你买一份保险。」又过了几个星期。他们又问:「你打算把自行车存放在哪里、怎么上锁,以便我们如此这般。」他终于明白,自己当然会被繁文缛节缠到死,于是作罢了。此人后来当上了贝尔实验室的总裁。 When they moved the library from the middle of Murray Hill to the far end, a friend of mine put in a request for a bicycle. Well, the organization was not dumb. They waited awhile and sent back a map of the grounds saying, ``Will you please indicate on this map what paths you are going to take so we can get an insurance policy covering you.'' A few more weeks went by. They then asked, ``Where are you going to store the bicycle and how will it be locked so we can do so and so.'' He finally realized that of course he was going to be red-taped to death so he gave in. He rose to be the President of Bell Laboratories.

巴尼·奥利弗是个好人。有一次他给 IEEE 写了封信。当时贝尔实验室的官方书架空间高度是固定的,而 IEEE 会刊的高度更大;既然官方书架空间的尺寸改不了,他就给 IEEE 出版部门写了这封信,说既然那么多 IEEE 会员都在贝尔实验室、而官方空间只有这么高,期刊的尺寸应该改一改。他把信送上去请老板签批。退回来的是一张签了字的复写副本,而他至今都不知道原件到底寄没寄出去。我不是说你们不该做出改革的姿态。我是说,我对能干之人的研究结论是:他们不会让自己投身到那种战争里去。他们比划两下就放手,回头接着干正事。 Barney Oliver was a good man. He wrote a letter one time to the IEEE. At that time the official shelf space at Bell Labs was so much and the height of the IEEE Proceedings at that time was larger; and since you couldn't change the size of the official shelf space he wrote this letter to the IEEE Publication person saying, ``Since so many IEEE members were at Bell Labs and since the official space was so high the journal size should be changed.'' He sent it for his boss's signature. Back came a carbon with his signature, but he still doesn't know whether the original was sent or not. I am not saying you shouldn't make gestures of reform. I am saying that my study of able people is that they don't get themselves committed to that kind of warfare. They play it a little bit and drop it and get on with their work.

许多二流的人会被卷进对系统的某种小小的挑衅里,然后一路把它打成全面战争。他把精力耗费在一个愚蠢的项目上。现在你们要对我说了,总得有人去改变系统。我同意;总得有人去。你想做哪一个?改变系统的人,还是做一流科学的人?你到底想成为哪一个?想清楚,当你跟系统搏斗、跟它较劲的时候,你在做什么、为了好玩要走多远、又值得浪费多少精力去跟系统斗。我的建议是让别人去斗,你接着做你的一流科学家。你们中间极少有人有能力既改革系统、又成为一流科学家。 Many a second-rate fellow gets caught up in some little twitting of the system, and carries it through to warfare. He expends his energy in a foolish project. Now you are going to tell me that somebody has to change the system. I agree; somebody's has to. Which do you want to be? The person who changes the system or the person who does first-class science? Which person is it that you want to be? Be clear, when you fight the system and struggle with it, what you are doing, how far to go out of amusement, and how much to waste your effort fighting the system. My advice is to let somebody else do it and you get on with becoming a first-class scientist. Very few of you have the ability to both reform the system and become a first-class scientist.

另一方面,我们也不能总是退让。有些时候,适度的反叛是明智的。我观察到,几乎所有科学家都喜欢纯粹为了好玩而对系统搞点小挑衅。归根到底,基本的事实是:你不可能在一个领域保持原创性而在其他方面毫无原创性。原创就是与众不同。你不可能做一个有原创性的科学家而在其他方面毫无原创之处。但许多科学家任由自己在别处的怪癖,让他为那点自我满足付出远超必要的代价。我不反对一切自我主张;我反对的是其中某些。 On the other hand, we can't always give in. There are times when a certain amount of rebellion is sensible. I have observed almost all scientists enjoy a certain amount of twitting the system for the sheer love of it. What it comes down to basically is that you cannot be original in one area without having originality in others. Originality is being different. You can't be an original scientist without having some other original characteristics. But many a scientist has let his quirks in other places make him pay a far higher price than is necessary for the ego satisfaction he or she gets. I'm not against all ego assertion; I'm against some.

还有一种毛病是愤怒。科学家常常发怒,而这不是处理事情的方式。打趣,可以;发怒,不行。愤怒是错位的。你应该跟随并合作,而不是一天到晚跟系统对着干。 Another fault is anger. Often a scientist becomes angry, and this is no way to handle things. Amusement, yes, anger, no. Anger is misdirected. You should follow and cooperate rather than struggle against the system all the time.

还有一点,你应该看事情的积极面,而不是消极面。我已经给你们举过好几个例子了,类似的例子还有很多很多:在既定处境下,通过换一种看法,我是怎样把表面上的缺陷变成资产的。我再给你们举一个例子。我是个自负的人;这一点毫无疑问。我知道大多数请假写书的人都不能按期写完。所以临走前,我逢人便说,等我回来的时候,那本书一定写完了!是的,我一定写完——要是写不完,我都没脸回来!我利用我的自负,逼自己按我想要的方式行事。我把牛皮吹出去,就不得不兑现。我多次发现,自己像一只被逼入绝境的老鼠掉进真陷阱里时,能力惊人。我发现说「哦,好的,我周二把答案给你」其实很划算——当时我对怎么做毫无头绪。到周日晚上,我就真得拼命想周二怎么交差。我常常把自尊押在桌面上,有时也会失败,但正如我说的,像一只被逼到墙角的老鼠,我很惊讶自己竟那么多次干得漂亮。我认为你需要学会驾驭自己。我认为你需要知道怎样把一种局面从一种看法转换成另一种看法,从而增加成功的机会。 Another thing you should look for is the positive side of things instead of the negative. I have already given you several examples, and there are many, many more; how, given the situation, by changing the way I looked at it, I converted what was apparently a defect to an asset. I'll give you another example. I am an egotistical person; there is no doubt about it. I knew that most people who took a sabbatical to write a book, didn't finish it on time. So before I left, I told all my friends that when I come back, that book was going to be done! Yes, I would have it done - I'd have been ashamed to come back without it! I used my ego to make myself behave the way I wanted to. I bragged about something so I'd have to perform. I found out many times, like a cornered rat in a real trap, I was surprisingly capable. I have found that it paid to say, ``Oh yes, I'll get the answer for you Tuesday,'' not having any idea how to do it. By Sunday night I was really hard thinking on how I was going to deliver by Tuesday. I often put my pride on the line and sometimes I failed, but as I said, like a cornered rat I'm surprised how often I did a good job. I think you need to learn to use yourself. I think you need to know how to convert a situation from one view to another which would increase the chance of success.

而人类的自我欺骗是非常、非常普遍的。你有一百种方法把事情变个样子、糊弄自己、让它看上去是另一回事。当你问「你为什么没做某某事」时,对方有一千条借口。如果你看科学史,如今通常有十个人同时站在那儿严阵以待,而我们奖励的是最先到的那个人。另外九个人会说:「呃,我也有这个想法,只是没做,如此这般。」借口太多了。为什么你不是第一?为什么你没把它做对?别找借口。别糊弄自己。你对别人想讲多少借口都可以。我不介意。但对自己,请务必诚实。 Now self-delusion in humans is very, very common. There are enumerable ways of you changing a thing and kidding yourself and making it look some other way. When you ask, ``Why didn't you do such and such,'' the person has a thousand alibis. If you look at the history of science, usually these days there are 10 people right there ready, and we pay off for the person who is there first. The other nine fellows say, ``Well, I had the idea but I didn't do it and so on and so on.'' There are so many alibis. Why weren't you first? Why didn't you do it right? Don't try an alibi. Don't try and kid yourself. You can tell other people all the alibis you want. I don't mind. But to yourself try to be honest.

如果你真想成为一流的科学家,你需要认识你自己,认识你的弱点、你的长处,以及你那些糟糕的毛病,比如我的自负。怎样把缺点变成资产?当你没有人手可以调动时,怎样把那恰恰变成你必须走的方向?我再说一遍,在我研究历史的过程中我看到,成功的科学家换了个视角,原本的缺陷就变成了资产。 If you really want to be a first-class scientist you need to know yourself, your weaknesses, your strengths, and your bad faults, like my egotism. How can you convert a fault to an asset? How can you convert a situation where you haven't got enough manpower to move into a direction when that's exactly what you need to do? I say again that I have seen, as I studied the history, the successful scientist changed the viewpoint and what was a defect became an asset.

总结一下,我认为,那么多本可成就伟大的人却未能成功,原因包括:他们不研究重要的问题;他们不在情感上投入;他们不肯把难做的事转换成另一种容易做、但仍然重要的局面;而且他们不停地给自己找不做的借口。他们不停地说这都是运气。我已经告诉你们这有多容易;而且还告诉了你们怎样改过。所以,出发吧,去做伟大的科学家! In summary, I claim that some of the reasons why so many people who have greatness within their grasp don't succeed are: they don't work on important problems, they don't become emotionally involved, they don't try and change what is difficult to some other situation which is easily done but is still important, and they keep giving themselves alibis why they don't. They keep saying that it is a matter of luck. I've told you how easy it is; furthermore I've told you how to reform. Therefore, go forth and become great scientists!

讨论——问答环节 DISCUSSION - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

A. G. 奇诺维斯:嗯,这是整整 50 分钟浓缩的智慧,是一段非凡职业生涯积累下来的观察;我都数不清有多少观察正中我心。其中一些非常、非常应时。有一条是呼吁增加计算能力的;今天上午我就从好几个人那里反复听到同样的话。所以,尽管距你当初说这些话已经二三十年了,迪克,它今天仍然正中靶心。我能想到我们每个人都能从你的演讲里汲取的种种教益。比如,今后我在走廊里走动时,希望不会在贝尔科看到那么多关着的门。那条观察我觉得非常有意思。 A. G. Chynoweth: Well that was 50 minutes of concentrated wisdom and observations accumulated over a fantastic career; I lost track of all the observations that were striking home. Some of them are very very timely. One was the plea for more computer capacity; I was hearing nothing but that this morning from several people, over and over again. So that was right on the mark today even though here we are 20 - 30 years after when you were making similar remarks, Dick. I can think of all sorts of lessons that all of us can draw from your talk. And for one, as I walk around the halls in the future I hope I won't see as many closed doors in Bellcore. That was one observation I thought was very intriguing.

迪克,非常、非常感谢你;这是一场精彩的回忆。现在开放提问。我相信在座很多人愿意就迪克谈到的几点深入聊聊。 Thank you very, very much indeed Dick; that was a wonderful recollection. I'll now open it up for questions. I'm sure there are many people who would like to take up on some of the points that Dick was making.

汉明:首先回应一下艾伦·奇诺维斯关于计算的话。过去计算归研究部门管,整整十年我不停地对管理层说:「把那台 !&@#% 机器弄出研究部门。我们被逼着整天跑题目。我们没法做研究,因为光顾着操作和运行计算机器了。」这话最终传通了。他们打算把计算从研究部门挪到别的地方去。至少可以说,我成了不受欢迎的人;我很惊讶居然没人踢我的小腿,因为每个人的玩具都被没收了。我走进埃德·戴维的办公室说:「埃德你看,你得给你的研究人员一台机器。如果你给他们一台很大的机器,我们就会回到从前的麻烦里——忙着伺候它,没空想问题。给他们你能给的最小的机器,因为他们都很能干。他们会学着在小机器上做事,而不是搞大规模计算。」在我看来,UNIX 就是这样诞生的。我们给了他们一台相当小的机器,他们决定让它干出大事。他们必须想出一套系统来做到。它就叫 UNIX! Hamming: First let me respond to Alan Chynoweth about computing. I had computing in research and for 10 years I kept telling my management, ``Get that !&@#% machine out of research. We are being forced to run problems all the time. We can't do research because were too busy operating and running the computing machines.'' Finally the message got through. They were going to move computing out of research to someplace else. I was persona non grata to say the least and I was surprised that people didn't kick my shins because everybody was having their toy taken away from them. I went in to Ed David's office and said, ``Look Ed, you've got to give your researchers a machine. If you give them a great big machine, we'll be back in the same trouble we were before, so busy keeping it going we can't think. Give them the smallest machine you can because they are very able people. They will learn how to do things on a small machine instead of mass computing.'' As far as I'm concerned, that's how UNIX arose. We gave them a moderately small machine and they decided to make it do great things. They had to come up with a system to do it on. It is called UNIX!

A. G. 奇诺维斯:我必须接一句。迪克,在我们如今的环境里,我们一边跟监管部门带来或要求的那些繁文缛节搏斗,一边有位气急败坏的助理副总裁说过一句话,被我引用了一遍又一遍。他咆哮道:「UNIX 从来就不是一项交付物!」 A. G. Chynoweth: I just have to pick up on that one. In our present environment, Dick, while we wrestle with some of the red tape attributed to, or required by, the regulators, there is one quote that one exasperated AVP came up with and I've used it over and over again. He growled that, ``UNIX was never a deliverable!''

问:个人压力呢?它会有影响吗? Question: What about personal stress? Does that seem to make a difference?

汉明:会,它有影响。如果你不在情感上投入,它就没影响。我在贝尔实验室的大多数年份都有早期胃溃疡。后来我去了海军研究生院,多少放松了些,现在身体好得多了。但如果你想当伟大的科学家,你就得忍受压力。你可以过舒服的日子;你可以做个好好先生,或者你可以做个伟大的科学家。但正如利奥·迪罗谢说的,好好先生最后一名。如果你想过有滋有味的幸福生活,有大量娱乐和别的什么,你会过上舒服日子的。 Hamming: Yes, it does. If you don't get emotionally involved, it doesn't. I had incipient ulcers most of the years that I was at Bell Labs. I have since gone off to the Naval Postgraduate School and laid back somewhat, and now my health is much better. But if you want to be a great scientist you're going to have to put up with stress. You can lead a nice life; you can be a nice guy or you can be a great scientist. But nice guys end last, is what Leo Durocher said. If you want to lead a nice happy life with a lot of recreation and everything else, you'll lead a nice life.

问:关于勇气的那番话没人能反驳;但我们这些头发花白的、或已经功成名就的人不必太担心。而我在当今年轻人身上感觉到的是一种真切的担忧:在高度竞争的环境里承担风险。对此您有什么智慧之言吗? Question: The remarks about having courage, no one could argue with; but those of us who have gray hairs or who are well established don't have to worry too much. But what I sense among the young people these days is a real concern over the risk taking in a highly competitive environment. Do you have any words of wisdom on this?

汉明:我再引用些埃德·戴维的话。埃德·戴维担心的是我们整个社会普遍丧失了勇气。在我看来,我们确实经历了不同的时期。从战争中走出来,从造出原子弹的洛斯阿拉莫斯走出来,从造出雷达等等事情中走出来,有一批胆量很大的人走进了数学部门、走进了研究领域。他们刚刚亲眼看到事情被做成;他们刚刚打赢了一场了不起的战争。我们有理由拥有勇气,因此我们做成了很多事。我无法安排那样的局面再来一次。我不能责怪如今这一代人没有它,不过我同意你说的;我只是没法去责怪。在我看来,他们没有追求伟大的渴望;他们缺少去做的勇气。但我们当年有,因为我们处在一个拥有它的有利环境里;我们刚刚打完一场极其成功的战争。在那场战争里,我们有很长一段时期处境非常、非常糟;如你们所知,那是一场极为绝望的搏斗。而我们的成功,我认为,给了我们勇气和自信;这就是为什么你们看到,从四十年代末到整个五十年代,实验室里迸发出惊人的高产,那是被早年的经历激发出来的。因为我们许多人早年被迫去学别的东西——我们被迫去学我们不想学的东西,被迫敞开大门——然后我们才能利用学到的这些东西。事实就是这样,我也无能为力;我也不能责怪如今这一代人。这只是事实。 Hamming: I'll quote Ed David more. Ed David was concerned about the general loss of nerve in our society. It does seem to me that we've gone through various periods. Coming out of the war, coming out of Los Alamos where we built the bomb, coming out of building the radars and so on, there came into the mathematics department, and the research area, a group of people with a lot of guts. They've just seen things done; they've just won a war which was fantastic. We had reasons for having courage and therefore we did a great deal. I can't arrange that situation to do it again. I cannot blame the present generation for not having it, but I agree with what you say; I just cannot attach blame to it. It doesn't seem to me they have the desire for greatness; they lack the courage to do it. But we had, because we were in a favorable circumstance to have it; we just came through a tremendously successful war. In the war we were looking very, very bad for a long while; it was a very desperate struggle as you well know. And our success, I think, gave us courage and self confidence; that's why you see, beginning in the late forties through the fifties, a tremendous productivity at the labs which was stimulated from the earlier times. Because many of us were earlier forced to learn other things - we were forced to learn the things we didn't want to learn, we were forced to have an open door - and then we could exploit those things we learned. It is true, and I can't do anything about it; I cannot blame the present generation either. It's just a fact.

问:管理层有什么能做或该做的吗? Question: Is there something management could or should do?

汉明:管理层能做的很少。如果你们想谈研究管理,那是完全不同的另一场演讲。那还得再讲一个小时。这场演讲讲的是:无论管理层做什么、无论有什么样的反对,个人怎样做出非常成功的研究。怎么做到?就照我观察到的那些人的做法去做。就这么简单,也这么难! Hamming: Management can do very little. If you want to talk about managing research, that's a totally different talk. I'd take another hour doing that. This talk is about how the individual gets very successful research done in spite of anything the management does or in spite of any other opposition. And how do you do it? Just as I observe people doing it. It's just that simple and that hard!

问:头脑风暴是每天进行的过程吗? Question: Is brainstorming a daily process?

汉明:那曾经是很流行的做法,但看来没什么成效。对我自己来说,我觉得和别人谈是有益的;但一场头脑风暴会很少值得开。我确实会专门去找某个人说:「你看,我觉得这里面一定有东西。我是这么看的……」然后开始来回地谈。但你得挑能干的人。再打个比方,你们知道「临界质量」这个概念。物质够了就有临界质量。我过去还提出过一个概念叫「吸音体」。如果吸音体太多,你抛出一个想法,他们只会说「嗯,嗯,嗯」。你要做的是激活临界质量:「对,这让我想起某某事」,或者「你有没有想过那个或者这个?」当你和别人交谈时,你要甩掉那些吸音体——他们是好人,但只会说「哦,是的」——去找那些能反过来激发你的人。 Hamming: Once that was a very popular thing, but it seems not to have paid off. For myself I find it desirable to talk to other people; but a session of brainstorming is seldom worthwhile. I do go in to strictly talk to somebody and say, ``Look, I think there has to be something here. Here's what I think I see ...'' and then begin talking back and forth. But you want to pick capable people. To use another analogy, you know the idea called the `critical mass.' If you have enough stuff you have critical mass. There is also the idea I used to call `sound absorbers'. When you get too many sound absorbers, you give out an idea and they merely say, ``Yes, yes, yes.'' What you want to do is get that critical mass in action; ``Yes, that reminds me of so and so,'' or, ``Have you thought about that or this?'' When you talk to other people, you want to get rid of those sound absorbers who are nice people but merely say, ``Oh yes,'' and to find those who will stimulate you right back.

比如,你跟约翰·皮尔斯谈话,不可能不被迅速激发。过去我常交谈的还有一群人。比如埃德·吉尔伯特;我过去定期去他办公室,向他提问、听他讲,出来时备受启发。我精心挑选和谁「头脑风暴」、不和谁「头脑风暴」,因为吸音体是一种祸害。他们就是些好好先生;他们占满整个空间,却毫无贡献,只会把想法吸走,而新想法就那么死掉了,不能回声激荡。是的,我觉得有必要和人交谈。我认为关门的人做不到这一点,所以他们的想法得不到打磨,比如「你有没有注意到那边有什么东西?」我对此一无所知——我可以过去看看。有人指了路。这次来访,我已经找到了好几本回家后必须读的书。当我认为有人能回答我、给我我不知道的线索时,我就去和他们谈、向他们提问。我会走出去,亲眼看! For example, you couldn't talk to John Pierce without being stimulated very quickly. There were a group of other people I used to talk with. For example there was Ed Gilbert; I used to go down to his office regularly and ask him questions and listen and come back stimulated. I picked my people carefully with whom I did or whom I didn't brainstorm because the sound absorbers are a curse. They are just nice guys; they fill the whole space and they contribute nothing except they absorb ideas and the new ideas just die away instead of echoing on. Yes, I find it necessary to talk to people. I think people with closed doors fail to do this so they fail to get their ideas sharpened, such as ``Did you ever notice something over here?'' I never knew anything about it - I can go over and look. Somebody points the way. On my visit here, I have already found several books that I must read when I get home. I talk to people and ask questions when I think they can answer me and give me clues that I do not know about. I go out and look!

问:在阅读、写作和真正做研究之间,你在时间分配上做了什么取舍? Question: What kind of tradeoffs did you make in allocating your time for reading and writing and actually doing research?

汉明:早年我信奉,花在打磨和呈现上的时间至少应该和做原始研究的时间一样多。如今,至少 50% 的时间必须花在呈现上。这是个很大、很大的数字。 Hamming: I believed, in my early days, that you should spend at least as much time in the polish and presentation as you did in the original research. Now at least 50% of the time must go for the presentation. It's a big, big number.

问:该花多少力气做文献工作? Question: How much effort should go into library work?

汉明:这取决于领域。关于这个我只说一件事。贝尔实验室有位老兄,非常非常聪明。他成天泡在图书馆里;什么都读。你要找参考文献,去找他,他能给你各种各样的文献。但在形成这些想法的过程中,我立下过一个论断:长远来看,不会有什么效应以他的名字命名。他现在已经从贝尔实验室退休了,是兼职教授。他很有价值;我不否认这一点。他写过一些很好的《物理评论》文章;但没有什么效应以他命名,因为他读得太多了。如果你总是读别人做过的东西,你就会按他们的方式思考。如果你想想出不同的新想法,那就照许多有创造力的人的做法去做——把问题理得相当清楚,然后拒绝看任何答案,直到你自己把问题想透:你会怎么做、你可以怎样稍微改变问题使它成为正确的那一道。所以,是的,你需要跟上。但跟上,更多是为了弄清楚问题是什么,而不是去读出解法。阅读是必需的,你要知道正在发生什么、什么是可能的。但为了找解法而读,似乎不是做伟大研究的路子。所以这个问题我给两个答案。你要读;但关键不在读的量,而在读的方式。 Hamming: It depends upon the field. I will say this about it. There was a fellow at Bell Labs, a very, very, smart guy. He was always in the library; he read everything. If you wanted references, you went to him and he gave you all kinds of references. But in the middle of forming these theories, I formed a proposition: there would be no effect named after him in the long run. He is now retired from Bell Labs and is an Adjunct Professor. He was very valuable; I'm not questioning that. He wrote some very good Physical Review articles; but there's no effect named after him because he read too much. If you read all the time what other people have done you will think the way they thought. If you want to think new thoughts that are different, then do what a lot of creative people do - get the problem reasonably clear and then refuse to look at any answers until you've thought the problem through carefully how you would do it, how you could slightly change the problem to be the correct one. So yes, you need to keep up. You need to keep up more to find out what the problems are than to read to find the solutions. The reading is necessary to know what is going on and what is possible. But reading to get the solutions does not seem to be the way to do great research. So I'll give you two answers. You read; but it is not the amount, it is the way you read that counts.

问:怎样才能让自己的名字挂到东西上? Question: How do you get your name attached to things?

汉明:靠做伟大的工作。我给你们讲讲汉明窗的事。我跟图基过不去,次数还不少,后来他从普林斯顿打电话给我到默里山。我知道他在写功率谱的书,他问我介不介意他把某一种窗叫做「汉明窗」。我对他说:「得了吧,约翰;你明明清楚我只做了一小部分工作,你也做了很多。」他说:「是的,汉明,但你贡献了很多小东西;你有资格分到一些功劳。」于是他就把它命名为汉明窗。好,我接着说。我过去常拿真正的伟大来打趣约翰。我说,真正的伟大是你的名字像安培、瓦特和傅里叶那样——小写拼写。汉明窗就是这么来的。 Hamming: By doing great work. I'll tell you the hamming window one. I had given Tukey a hard time, quite a few times, and I got a phone call from him from Princeton to me at Murray Hill. I knew that he was writing up power spectra and he asked me if I would mind if he called a certain window a ``Hamming window.'' And I said to him, ``Come on, John; you know perfectly well I did only a small part of the work but you also did a lot.'' He said, ``Yes, Hamming, but you contributed a lot of small things; you're entitled to some credit.'' So he called it the hamming window. Now, let me go on. I had twitted John frequently about true greatness. I said true greatness is when your name is like ampere, watt, and fourier - when it's spelled with a lower case letter. That's how the hamming window came about.

问:迪克,您能否评论一下做演讲、写论文和写书这三者的相对效力? Question: Dick, would you care to comment on the relative effectiveness between giving talks, writing papers, and writing books?

汉明:短期看,如果你想明天就激发某个人,论文非常重要。如果你想得到长期的承认,在我看来写书的贡献更大,因为我们大多数人都需要指引方向。在这个知识近乎无限的时代,我们需要指引来找到路。让我告诉你们什么是无限的知识。从牛顿时代到现在,知识差不多每 17 年翻一番,大差不差。而我们应对它的方式,本质上是专业化。照这个速度,往后 340 年会有 20 次翻番,也就是一百万倍,到那时每一个现有的领域会裂变成一百万个专业。这是不可能的。目前的知识增长会把自己噎死,除非我们得到不同的工具。我相信,那些努力去消化、协调、剔除重复、剔除成果较少的方法、把当今已知内容的底层思想清晰呈现出来的书,才是未来世代会珍视的东西。公开演讲是必要的;私下交谈是必要的;书面论文是必要的。但我倾向于相信,长远来看,把非本质的东西舍去的书,比把什么都告诉你的书更重要——因为你并不想知道一切。通常的回答是:我不想知道那么多关于企鹅的事。你只需要知道精髓。 Hamming: In the short-haul, papers are very important if you want to stimulate someone tomorrow. If you want to get recognition long-haul, it seems to me writing books is more contribution because most of us need orientation. In this day of practically infinite knowledge, we need orientation to find our way. Let me tell you what infinite knowledge is. Since from the time of Newton to now, we have come close to doubling knowledge every 17 years, more or less. And we cope with that, essentially, by specialization. In the next 340 years at that rate, there will be 20 doublings, i.e. a million, and there will be a million fields of specialty for every one field now. It isn't going to happen. The present growth of knowledge will choke itself off until we get different tools. I believe that books which try to digest, coordinate, get rid of the duplication, get rid of the less fruitful methods and present the underlying ideas clearly of what we know now, will be the things the future generations will value. Public talks are necessary; private talks are necessary; written papers are necessary. But I am inclined to believe that, in the long-haul, books which leave out what's not essential are more important than books which tell you everything because you don't want to know everything. I don't want to know that much about penguins is the usual reply. You just want to know the essence.

问:您提到了诺贝尔奖的问题,以及随之而来的名声对一些人的职业生涯造成的影响。这难道不是一个更宽泛的「名声」问题吗?一个人能做些什么? Question: You mentioned the problem of the Nobel Prize and the subsequent notoriety of what was done to some of the careers. Isn't that kind of a much more broad problem of fame? What can one do?

汉明:你可以做的事包括下面这些。大约每七年,在你的领域里做一次重大的——如果不是彻底的——转向。因此我周期性地从数值分析转到硬件,再转到软件,等等,因为你会把自己的想法用光。当你进入一个新领域,你必须像婴儿一样从头开始。你不再是那个大人物,你可以回到起点,重新播下那些会长成参天橡树的橡子。香农,我相信,就是毁在了这上面。事实上,他离开贝尔实验室时,我就说过:「香农的科学事业到此为止了。」我的朋友们把我骂了一顿,说香农还是和从前一样聪明。我说:「是的,他会和从前一样聪明,但他的科学事业到此为止了。」而我是真的这样认为的。 Hamming: Some things you could do are the following. Somewhere around every seven years make a significant, if not complete, shift in your field. Thus, I shifted from numerical analysis, to hardware, to software, and so on, periodically, because you tend to use up your ideas. When you go to a new field, you have to start over as a baby. You are no longer the big mukity muk and you can start back there and you can start planting those acorns which will become the giant oaks. Shannon, I believe, ruined himself. In fact when he left Bell Labs, I said, ``That's the end of Shannon's scientific career.'' I received a lot of flak from my friends who said that Shannon was just as smart as ever. I said, ``Yes, he'll be just as smart, but that's the end of his scientific career,'' and I truly believe it was.

你必须改变。过一阵你会疲倦;你会把一个领域里的原创性耗尽。你需要找一个邻近的东西。我不是说你要从音乐跳到理论物理再跳到英国文学;我是说在你自己的领域里你应该转换区域,免得自己变得陈腐。你们做不到强制每七年换一次,但假如可以,我会把它定为做研究的条件:你必须每七年更换你的研究领域——对什么叫「换」给出合理的定义——否则到第十年末,管理层有权强制你换。我会坚持要求换,因为我是认真的。老人们的情况是:他们掌握了一套技术,就一直用它。他们朝着的那个方向当时是对的,但世界变了。新方向在那边;而老人们还在朝他们原来的方向行军。 You have to change. You get tired after a while; you use up your originality in one field. You need to get something nearby. I'm not saying that you shift from music to theoretical physics to English literature; I mean within your field you should shift areas so that you don't go stale. You couldn't get away with forcing a change every seven years, but if you could, I would require a condition for doing research, being that you will change your field of research every seven years with a reasonable definition of what it means, or at the end of 10 years, management has the right to compel you to change. I would insist on a change because I'm serious. What happens to the old fellows is that they get a technique going; they keep on using it. They were marching in that direction which was right then, but the world changes. There's the new direction; but the old fellows are still marching in their former direction.

你需要进入新领域,在旧视角耗尽之前获得新视角。这件事你是可以做些什么的,但它需要努力和精力。说「是的,我愿意放弃我的赫赫声名」需要勇气。比如,当纠错码已经走上正轨、理论都建起来了,我对自己说:「汉明,你不能再读这个领域的论文了;你要完全不理它;你要试着去做点别的,而不是躺在那上面吃老本。」我故意拒绝在那个领域继续走下去。我甚至不读论文,逼自己有机会做点别的。我管理我自己——这正是我整场演讲在宣讲的东西。我了解自己的许多毛病,所以我管理我自己。我有很多毛病,所以我有很多问题——也就是说,有很多管理的可能性。 You need to get into a new field to get new viewpoints, and before you use up all the old ones. You can do something about this, but it takes effort and energy. It takes courage to say, ``Yes, I will give up my great reputation.'' For example, when error correcting codes were well launched, having these theories, I said, ``Hamming, you are going to quit reading papers in the field; you are going to ignore it completely; you are going to try and do something else other than coast on that.'' I deliberately refused to go on in that field. I wouldn't even read papers to try to force myself to have a chance to do something else. I managed myself, which is what I'm preaching in this whole talk. Knowing many of my own faults, I manage myself. I have a lot of faults, so I've got a lot of problems, i.e. a lot of possibilities of management.

问:您会怎么比较研究和管理? Question: Would you compare research and management?

汉明:如果你想当伟大的研究者,你去当公司总裁是当不成的。如果你想当公司总裁,那是另一回事。我不反对当公司总裁。我只是自己不想当。我认为伊恩·罗斯作为贝尔实验室总裁干得不错。我不反对;但你必须想清楚自己要什么。而且,年轻时你也许选定要当伟大的科学家,但活得久了,你可能会改主意。比如,有一天我去找我的老板博德,说:「你当初为什么当部门主管?你为什么不安心做个好科学家?」他说:「汉明,我对贝尔实验室的数学应该是什么样子有一个愿景。而且我看到,如果这个愿景要实现,我必须亲手促成它;我必须当部门主管。」当你的愿景是你单枪匹马就能做成的事,那你就该去做它。当你的愿景、你认为需要完成的事,大过你单枪匹马所能做的时候,你就必须走向管理。愿景越大,你就得在管理层走得越远。如果你对整个实验室应该是什么样、或整个贝尔系统应该是什么样有愿景,你就必须走到那个位置上去让它发生。你从底层很难让它发生。这取决于你有什么目标和什么渴望。当它们在人生中改变时,你必须准备好跟着变。我选择避开管理,因为我更愿意做我单枪匹马能做的事。但这是我做的选择,是有偏向的。每个人都有权做自己的选择。保持开放的心态。但当你选定一条路时,看在老天的份上,要清楚你做了什么、你做了怎样的选择。别想着两头都占。 Hamming: If you want to be a great researcher, you won't make it being president of the company. If you want to be president of the company, that's another thing. I'm not against being president of the company. I just don't want to be. I think Ian Ross does a good job as President of Bell Labs. I'm not against it; but you have to be clear on what you want. Furthermore, when you're young, you may have picked wanting to be a great scientist, but as you live longer, you may change your mind. For instance, I went to my boss, Bode, one day and said, ``Why did you ever become department head? Why didn't you just be a good scientist?'' He said, ``Hamming, I had a vision of what mathematics should be in Bell Laboratories. And I saw if that vision was going to be realized, I had to make it happen; I had to be department head.'' When your vision of what you want to do is what you can do single-handedly, then you should pursue it. The day your vision, what you think needs to be done, is bigger than what you can do single-handedly, then you have to move toward management. And the bigger the vision is, the farther in management you have to go. If you have a vision of what the whole laboratory should be, or the whole Bell System, you have to get there to make it happen. You can't make it happen from the bottom very easily. It depends upon what goals and what desires you have. And as they change in life, you have to be prepared to change. I chose to avoid management because I preferred to do what I could do single-handedly. But that's the choice that I made, and it is biased. Each person is entitled to their choice. Keep an open mind. But when you do choose a path, for heaven's sake be aware of what you have done and the choice you have made. Don't try to do both sides.

问:一个人自身的期望有多重要?或者说,身处一个期待你做出伟大工作的群体之中有多重要? Question: How important is one's own expectation or how important is it to be in a group or surrounded by people who expect great work from you?

汉明:在贝尔实验室,每个人都期待我做出好工作——这帮助很大。每个人都期待你干得好,于是你只要有自尊心就会干好。我认为身边有一流的人非常宝贵。我有意寻找最优秀的人。物理桌失去最优秀的人那一刻,我就离开了。当我看到化学桌同样如此时,我也离开了。我设法跟能力出众的人在一起,这样我可以向他们学习,他们也会期待我拿出伟大的成果。通过有意识地管理自己,我认为我比听其自然做得好多了。 Hamming: At Bell Labs everyone expected good work from me - it was a big help. Everybody expects you to do a good job, so you do, if you've got pride. I think it's very valuable to have first-class people around. I sought out the best people. The moment that physics table lost the best people, I left. The moment I saw that the same was true of the chemistry table, I left. I tried to go with people who had great ability so I could learn from them and who would expect great results out of me. By deliberately managing myself, I think I did much better than laissez faire.

问:您在演讲开头把运气说得无足轻重;但您似乎同时也淡化了那些把您带到洛斯阿拉莫斯、带到芝加哥、带到贝尔实验室的际遇。 Question: You, at the outset of your talk, minimized or played down luck; but you seemed also to gloss over the circumstances that got you to Los Alamos, that got you to Chicago, that got you to Bell Laboratories.

汉明:是有一些运气。另一方面,我不知道其他那些岔路会怎样。在你能说别的岔路不会同样成功、甚至更成功之前,我没法下结论。你做的那件具体的事是运气吗?比如,我在洛斯阿拉莫斯遇到费曼时,我就知道他会拿诺贝尔奖。我不知道他会凭什么拿。但我清清楚楚地知道他会做出伟大的工作。无论未来出现什么方向,这个人都会做出伟大的工作。果然,他做出了伟大的工作。并不是说你只在这个际遇下做出了一点点伟大的工作、那是运气——机会早晚会有很多。机会有满满一桶,在这样的处境里,你抓住其中一个,你就会在那边伟大,而不是在这边。运气的成分,说有也有,说没有也没有。运气偏爱有准备的头脑;运气偏爱有准备的人。这不是保证;我不保证成功绝对必然。我要说的是,运气改变胜率,但个人确实有一定的掌控。 Hamming: There was some luck. On the other hand I don't know the alternate branches. Until you can say that the other branches would not have been equally or more successful, I can't say. Is it luck the particular thing you do? For example, when I met Feynman at Los Alamos, I knew he was going to get a Nobel Prize. I didn't know what for. But I knew darn well he was going to do great work. No matter what directions came up in the future, this man would do great work. And sure enough, he did do great work. It isn't that you only do a little great work at this circumstance and that was luck, there are many opportunities sooner or later. There are a whole pail full of opportunities, of which, if you're in this situation, you seize one and you're great over there instead of over here. There is an element of luck, yes and no. Luck favors a prepared mind; luck favors a prepared person. It is not guaranteed; I don't guarantee success as being absolutely certain. I'd say luck changes the odds, but there is some definite control on the part of the individual.

那么,出发吧,去做伟大的工作! Go forth, then, and do great work!

[1] http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/YouAndYourResearch.html [1] http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/YouAndYourResearch.html

出处与译稿

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Sam Altman (personal blog)
发表时间
2014 年 6 月 29 日
译稿来源
机器逐句翻译 · qwen3.8-flash
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未经人工审校(reviewed = 0)
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