大多数时候,我们对尾部风险的担忧远远过度。 Most of the time, we worry far too much about tail risk. ¶
我们担心恐怖袭击和坏死性筋膜炎,却不怎么担心心脏病和车祸。但在 2011 年,全球范围内有 17 名美国公民死于恐怖主义,约 150 人死于坏死性筋膜炎。而死于心脏病的有近 60 万人,死于车祸的超过 3.2 万人。 We worry about terrorist attacks and necrotizing fasciitis, but not much about heart disease or car crashes. But in 2011, 17 US citizens worldwide died as a result of terrorism and approximately 150 from necrotizing fasciitis. There were nearly 600,000 deaths resulting from heart disease and over 32,000 from car crashes. ¶
根据目前的数据,你死于心脏病的可能性约是死于恐怖袭击的 3.5 万倍。所以所有聪明人都说我们对恐怖主义的担忧严重过度了,而迄今为止,他们是对的。 Based on current data, you are about 35,000 times more likely to die from heart disease than from a terrorist attack. So everyone smart says that we worry about terrorism way too much, and so far, they’ve been right. ¶
不管出于什么原因,我们似乎天生就会高估那些戏剧性的、可怕的但极不可能发生的风险,而低估那些平凡的、熟悉的、很可能发生的风险。 For whatever reason, we seem to be wired to overweight the risk of the dramatic, scary, but very unlikely and underweight the risk of the mundane, familiar, and probable. ¶
但也许有些尾部风险是我们真正应该担心的。 But maybe there are some tail risks we should really worry about. ¶
我们在风险评估上的校准失误会导致重要的盲区。我们见过核爆炸的画面;我们知道那有多可怕,所以我们恐惧它。大多数人都得过流感,所以我们不恐惧流感——我们知道流感有可能致人死亡,但大多数人不会死。死于流感不会触发大多数人的恐慌警报,因为我们所熟知的那个版本的流感是无聊而熟悉的。 Our risk-evaluation miscalibration leads to important blind spots. We’ve seen images of a nuclear explosion; we know how terrifying that is, and so we fear it. Most people have had the flu, and so we don’t fear that—we know it’s possible to die from the flu, but most people don’t. Death from the flu doesn't trigger most peoples' panic sensors because the version of it we know is boring and familiar. ¶
然而,我认为我们还没有集体认真思考过生物技术将如何改变格局。在所有「技术」中,它是唯一真正让我感到害怕的东西。[1] 生物技术在改善我们生活方面有着不可思议的潜力,甚至可能超过计算机,但当然,随之而来的是严重得多的下行风险。 However, I don’t think we have collectively thought enough about how biotechnology is going to change the landscape. Of all “technologies", it’s the one thing that really scares me. [1] Biotech has incredible potential to improve our lives, probably even more so than computers, but of course that comes with much graver downside. ¶
同样在 2011 年,一些研究人员研究出了如何改造 H5N1——禽流感病毒——通过同时引入五个突变,使病毒变得可怕得多:这些突变合在一起让病毒既易于传播又相当致命。这五个突变都可能在自然界中发生,但不太可能同时出现在同一个病毒拷贝上。我毫不怀疑媒体夸大了危险,但这仍然值得思考。 Also in 2011, some researchers figured out how to reengineer H5N1—avian influenza virus—to make it much scarier by causing five mutations at the same time that all together made the virus both easy to spread and quite lethal. These five mutations could all occur in nature, but it’d be unlikely in the same copy of the virus. I have no doubt that the media overstated the danger, but it’s still worth thinking about. ¶
我们现在已经拥有在实验室里制造病毒的工具。当有人制造出一种传播极其容易、死亡率超过 50%、潜伏期长达数周的病毒时,会发生什么?这样的东西一旦被坏人释放、而全世界又来不及准备,就可能在几个月内消灭超过一半的人口。误入歧途的生物技术实际上可能终结我们所知的世界。 We now have the tools to create viruses in labs. What happens when someone creates a virus that spreads extremely easily, has greater than 50% mortality, and has an incubation period of several weeks? Something like this, released by a bad guy and without the world having time to prepare, could wipe out more than half the population in a matter of months. Misguided biotech could effectively end the world as we know it. ¶
当 H5N1 研究出现时,围绕是否公开这项研究有过很多争论。研究人员曾自愿暂停发布相关信息,今年早些时候他们解除了这一暂停。 When the H5N1 work happened, there was a lot of debate about whether or not to release the research. The researchers put a voluntary moratorium on releasing the information, which they lifted earlier this year. ¶
试图保密不是答案。试图把关于危险事物的知识定为犯罪(我们在原子弹上试过这一招)也肯定不是答案。 Trying to keep things secret is not the answer. Trying to criminalize knowledge of dangerous things (we tried this with the atomic bomb) is definitely not the answer. ¶
但无视真正的危险同样不是答案。这个世界非常不善于协调行动。与原子弹不同——原子弹的后果虽然严重但是局部的——这类病原体中第一个被释放出来的,几乎可以在瞬间产生严重的全球性后果,留给我们反应的时间极少。浓缩铀需要举国之力的资源,而生物技术研发已经普遍由私人资助。 But ignoring real danger is not the answer either. The world is very bad at coordinated action. Unlike an atomic bomb, which has grave local consequences, the first of these pathogens that gets released could have grave global consequences almost instantly, and give us very little time to react. While enriching uranium requires the resources of nations, biotech development is already routinely privately funded. ¶
在主动防御生物攻击上投入大量精力,是我们应该给予极高优先级的事。 Spending a lot of effort on proactive defense against bioattacks is something we should prioritize very highly. ¶
当我们第一次能够在车库里编写软件程序时,它以非常根本性的方式(大多是正面的!)改变了世界。当我们开始能够在车库里编写生物程序时,我们应该记住,更大的变化很可能即将到来——改造我们的身体很可能比改造比特更强大。我们可能不得不比计算机革命时期更快地调整我们的社会。 When we first became able to create software programs in garages, it changed the world in very fundamental (mostly positive!) ways. As we begin to be able to create biology programs in garages, we should remember that bigger changes are likely coming--hacking our bodies will likely be more powerful than hacking bits. We may have to move even faster to adapt our society than we did with the computer revolution. ¶
感谢 Patrick Collison、Connie Gibstine 和 Nick Sivo 阅读本文草稿。 Thanks to Patrick Collison, Connie Gibstine, and Nick Sivo for reading drafts of this. ¶
[1] 生物技术在许多不明显的方面都很可怕。当然,超级病毒为什么可怕很容易理解。但另一种可能性是:我们工程化出一种完美的快乐药,没有任何副作用,于是没有人想做任何事情,只想整天躺在床上吃这种药,人类所有的雄心都被抽干。还有很多其他可能性,而我们很难想到它们,因为对于即将发生的事情,我们几乎没有任何经验。 [1] Biotechnology is scary in a lot of non-obvious ways. Sure, it’s easy to understand why superviruses are scary. But another possibility is that we engineer the perfect happiness drug, with no bad side effects, and no one wants to do anything but lay in bed and take this drug all day, sapping all ambition from the human race. There are a lot of other possibilities too, and it’s very hard to think of them because we don’t have much experience with what's about to happen. ¶