人人都声称自己理解天使投资中的幂律,但真正践行的人寥寥无几。我认为这是因为人们很难想象 3 倍回报和 300 倍(或 3000 倍)回报之间的差别。 Everyone claims that they understand the power law in angel investing, but very few people practice it. I think this is because it’s hard to conceptualize the difference between a 3x and a 300x (or 3000x) return. ¶
常见的情况是,你从单笔最好的天使投资中赚到的钱,超过其余所有投资加起来的总和。由此得出的结论是:真正的风险在于错过那笔出色的投资,而不是没能在其他所有公司身上保住本金(或者像有些人要求的那样,保证 2 倍回报)。 It’s common to make more money from your single best angel investment than all the rest put together. The consequence of this is that the real risk is missing out on that outstanding investment, and not failing to get your money back (or, as some people ask for, a guaranteed 2x) on all of your other companies. ¶
然而天使投资人仍在不断要求苛刻的条款,以对冲他们的「下行风险」。这样做的结果只是激怒创始人、让激励错位,并损害投资人投中最佳交易的机会——因为那些交易通常被众人争抢,而优秀的创始人会做背景调查。天使投资人更好的做法是专注于以合理的价格投资 [1],而不是试图在其他任何条款上「赢」。 And yet angel investors continue to ask for onerous terms to mitigate their “downside risk”. All this does is piss founders off, misalign incentives, and harm the investors’ chance of getting to invest in the best deals, because those are usually hotly pursued and good founders check references. An angel investor is much better off focusing on investing at a reasonable price [1] and not trying to “win” on any other terms. ¶
与其盯着下行风险 [2],更多投资人应该思考上行风险——错过那笔能带来所有人都在寻找的回报的公司。 Instead of downside risk [2], more investors should think about upside risk—not getting to invest in the company that will provide the return everyone is looking for. ¶
[1] 说到价格,创始人常犯的错误(对应于投资人过度关注下行条款)是过度追求高价格。我见过许多创始人把优秀的投资人挡在门外,让公司陷入一年后不得不面对折价融资的糟糕境地,而这一切只是因为他们痴迷于为公司争一个高标价。我认为这是因为高标价给了创始人一个可以量化比拼的东西。 [1] Speaking of price, the mistake that founders make (corresponding to investors focusing too much on downside terms) is focusing too much on getting a high price. I have seen many founders price out good investors and put the company in a bad situation facing a down round a year later, all because they were obsessed with getting a high sticker price for their company. I think it’s because it gives founders something quantitative to compete on. ¶
[2] 顺带一提,我认为大多数人对投资中风险/回报权衡的直觉普遍很糟——这并不限于私人公司。似乎每次我打开 CNBC(好在次数极少),他们都在谈论一场迫在眉睫的全面崩溃。世界末日只会发生一次;它极不可能就发生在某个周一早晨。但我们似乎天生就倾向于关注下行风险。看 CNBC 的人更好的做法是留一笔现金缓冲,而不是每次恐慌过后就抛掉股票。 [2] As a side note, I think most people have terrible intuition about investment risk/reward tradeoffs in general—this is not limited to private companies. It feels like every time I turn on CNBC (which is thankfully very infrequently) they’re talking about an impending total collapse. The end of the world only happens once; it’s very unlikely to be Monday morning. But we seem hardwired to focus on downside risk. The CNBC watchers would be better off keeping a cushion in cash and not selling their stocks after every panic. ¶