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温和的奇点

The Gentle Singularity

来源 Sam Altman (personal blog) · 英文原文出处

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我们已经越过了事件视界;起飞已经开始。人类已接近造出数字超级智能,而且至少到目前为止,它远没有想象中那么怪异。 We are past the event horizon; the takeoff has started. Humanity is close to building digital superintelligence, and at least so far it’s much less weird than it seems like it should be.

机器人还没有走上街头,我们大多数人也还没有整天和 AI 对话。人们仍然死于疾病,我们仍然不能轻易进入太空,关于宇宙还有许多我们不了解的东西。 Robots are not yet walking the streets, nor are most of us talking to AI all day. People still die of disease, we still can’t easily go to space, and there is a lot about the universe we don’t understand.

然而,我们最近已经造出了在许多方面比人更聪明的系统,它们能够显著放大使用者的产出。这项工作中最不可能完成的部分已经被我们甩在身后;把我们带到 GPT-4 和 o3 这类系统的科学洞见来之不易,但它们会带我们走得很远。 And yet, we have recently built systems that are smarter than people in many ways, and are able to significantly amplify the output of people using them. The least-likely part of the work is behind us; the scientific insights that got us to systems like GPT-4 and o3 were hard-won, but will take us very far.

AI 将以许多方式为世界做出贡献,但 AI 驱动更快的科学进步和更高的生产力所带来的生活质量提升将是巨大的;未来可以远远好于现在。科学进步是整体进步最大的驱动力;想到我们还能再拥有多少,实在令人无比兴奋。 AI will contribute to the world in many ways, but the gains to quality of life from AI driving faster scientific progress and increased productivity will be enormous; the future can be vastly better than the present. Scientific progress is the biggest driver of overall progress; it’s hugely exciting to think about how much more we could have.

从某种重大意义上说,ChatGPT 已经比历史上任何一个活着过的人都更强大。数以亿计的人每天依赖它完成越来越重要的任务;一个微小的新能力可以创造巨大的正面影响;而一个微小的错位,乘以数以亿计的人,也可能造成巨大的负面影响。 In some big sense, ChatGPT is already more powerful than any human who has ever lived. Hundreds of millions of people rely on it every day and for increasingly important tasks; a small new capability can create a hugely positive impact; a small misalignment multiplied by hundreds of millions of people can cause a great deal of negative impact.

2025 年,能够做真正认知工作的 agent 已经到来;写代码这件事将从此不同。2026 年,我们很可能会看到能够自己发现新洞见的系统到来。2027 年,能够在真实世界中执行任务的机器人或许会到来。 2025 has seen the arrival of agents that can do real cognitive work; writing computer code will never be the same. 2026 will likely see the arrival of systems that can figure out novel insights. 2027 may see the arrival of robots that can do tasks in the real world.

更多人将能够创造软件和艺术。但世界对两者的需求都远不止于此,而且只要专家们拥抱新工具,他们很可能仍然会比新手强得多。总体而言,到 2030 年,一个人能完成的事情将远多于 2020 年——这将是一个引人注目的变化,许多人会找到从中受益的方式。 A lot more people will be able to create software, and art. But the world wants a lot more of both, and experts will probably still be much better than novices, as long as they embrace the new tools. Generally speaking, the ability for one person to get much more done in 2030 than they could in 2020 will be a striking change, and one many people will figure out how to benefit from.

在最重要的那些方面,2030 年代也许不会有天翻地覆的不同。人们依然会爱自己的家人、表达创造力、玩游戏、在湖里游泳。 In the most important ways, the 2030s may not be wildly different. People will still love their families, express their creativity, play games, and swim in lakes.

但在另一些依然非常重要的方面,2030 年代很可能将与以往任何时代都截然不同。我们不知道智能可以超出人类水平多远,但我们即将找到答案。 But in still-very-important-ways, the 2030s are likely going to be wildly different from any time that has come before. We do not know how far beyond human-level intelligence we can go, but we are about to find out.

在 2030 年代,智能和能源——点子,以及让点子变成现实的能力——将变得极度充裕。长期以来,这两者是限制人类进步的根本瓶颈;有了充裕的智能和能源(以及良好的治理),理论上我们可以拥有其他一切。 In the 2030s, intelligence and energy—ideas, and the ability to make ideas happen—are going to become wildly abundant. These two have been the fundamental limiters on human progress for a long time; with abundant intelligence and energy (and good governance), we can theoretically have anything else.

我们已经在与不可思议的数字智能共同生活,经过最初的震惊之后,大多数人都已经相当习惯了。我们很快从惊叹 AI 能生成一段文笔优美的文字,变成追问它何时能写出一本文笔优美的小说;从惊叹它能做出救命的医学诊断,变成追问它何时能研发出治愈方法;从惊叹它能写一个小程序,变成追问它何时能创建一家全新的公司。奇点就是这样展开的:奇迹变成日常,然后变成基本配置。 Already we live with incredible digital intelligence, and after some initial shock, most of us are pretty used to it. Very quickly we go from being amazed that AI can generate a beautifully-written paragraph to wondering when it can generate a beautifully-written novel; or from being amazed that it can make live-saving medical diagnoses to wondering when it can develop the cures; or from being amazed it can create a small computer program to wondering when it can create an entire new company. This is how the singularity goes: wonders become routine, and then table stakes.

我们已经听到科学家说,他们使用 AI 之后的工作效率是之前的两到三倍。先进 AI 在许多方面都很有趣,但也许没有什么比「我们可以用它来做更快的 AI 研究」更重要了。我们也许能够发现新的计算基底、更好的算法,以及天知道还有什么。如果我们能在一年、乃至一个月里完成十年的研究,那么进步的速度显然将完全不同。 We already hear from scientists that they are two or three times more productive than they were before AI. Advanced AI is interesting for many reasons, but perhaps nothing is quite as significant as the fact that we can use it to do faster AI research. We may be able to discover new computing substrates, better algorithms, and who knows what else. If we can do a decade’s worth of research in a year, or a month, then the rate of progress will obviously be quite different.

从今往后,我们已经造出的工具会帮助我们找到进一步的科学洞见,并协助我们创造更好的 AI 系统。当然,这和 AI 系统完全自主地更新自己的代码还不是一回事,但无论如何,这已经是递归自我改进的雏形。 From here on, the tools we have already built will help us find further scientific insights and aid us in creating better AI systems. Of course this isn’t the same thing as an AI system completely autonomously updating its own code, but nevertheless this is a larval version of recursive self-improvement.

还有其他自我强化的循环在起作用。经济价值的创造已经启动了复利式基础设施建设的飞轮,用来运行这些日益强大的 AI 系统。而能制造其他机器人的机器人(以及从某种意义上说,能建造其他数据中心的数据中心)也并不遥远。 There are other self-reinforcing loops at play. The economic value creation has started a flywheel of compounding infrastructure buildout to run these increasingly-powerful AI systems. And robots that can build other robots (and in some sense, datacenters that can build other datacenters) aren’t that far off.

如果我们不得不用老式方法造出第一批一百万台人形机器人,但它们随后可以运转整条供应链——开采和精炼矿物、驾驶卡车、运营工厂等等——来制造更多机器人,而这些机器人又能建造更多芯片制造厂、数据中心等等,那么进步的速度显然将完全不同。 If we have to make the first million humanoid robots the old-fashioned way, but then they can operate the entire supply chain—digging and refining minerals, driving trucks, running factories, etc.—to build more robots, which can build more chip fabrication facilities, data centers, etc, then the rate of progress will obviously be quite different.

随着数据中心生产实现自动化,智能的成本最终应当收敛到接近电力的成本。(人们常常好奇一次 ChatGPT 查询消耗多少能源:平均每次查询约 0.34 瓦时,大致相当于烤箱运行一秒多一点的用电量,或一只高效节能灯泡几分钟的用电量。它还消耗约 0.000085 加仑水,大约是十五分之一茶匙。) As datacenter production gets automated, the cost of intelligence should eventually converge to near the cost of electricity. (People are often curious about how much energy a ChatGPT query uses; the average query uses about 0.34 watt-hours, about what an oven would use in a little over one second, or a high-efficiency lightbulb would use in a couple of minutes. It also uses about 0.000085 gallons of water; roughly one fifteenth of a teaspoon.)

技术进步的速度会持续加快,而人类有能力适应几乎任何事情——这一点会一如既往。过程中会有非常艰难的部分,比如整类整类的工作消失;但另一方面,世界会变得如此富裕、如此迅速,以至于我们将有能力认真考虑一些以前根本无法想象的新政策设想。我们大概不会一次性采纳一套全新的社会契约,但当几十年后我们回望时,这些渐进的改变将累积成巨大的东西。 The rate of technological progress will keep accelerating, and it will continue to be the case that people are capable of adapting to almost anything. There will be very hard parts like whole classes of jobs going away, but on the other hand the world will be getting so much richer so quickly that we’ll be able to seriously entertain new policy ideas we never could before. We probably won’t adopt a new social contract all at once, but when we look back in a few decades, the gradual changes will have amounted to something big.

如果以史为鉴,我们会找到新的事情去做、找到新的东西去想要,并迅速消化新工具(工业革命之后的职业变迁就是一个很好的近期例子)。期望会上升,但能力会以同样快的速度上升,而我们都会得到更好的东西。我们会为彼此建造越来越美妙的事物。人类相对于 AI 有一个长期重要而奇妙的优势:我们天生在意其他人,在意他们的所想所为,而对机器并不怎么在意。 If history is any guide, we will figure out new things to do and new things to want, and assimilate new tools quickly (job change after the industrial revolution is a good recent example). Expectations will go up, but capabilities will go up equally quickly, and we’ll all get better stuff. We will build ever-more-wonderful things for each other. People have a long-term important and curious advantage over AI: we are hard-wired to care about other people and what they think and do, and we don’t care very much about machines.

一千年前的自给农民如果看到我们许多人今天在做的事,会说我们干的都是「假工作」,会觉得我们不过是在吃饱了饭、享受着难以想象的奢侈品之后玩游戏自娱。我希望,当我们望向一千年后的工作时,也会觉得它们是非常「假」的工作,而且我毫不怀疑,从事那些工作的人会感到它们无比重要、无比满足。 A subsistence farmer from a thousand years ago would look at what many of us do and say we have fake jobs, and think that we are just playing games to entertain ourselves since we have plenty of food and unimaginable luxuries. I hope we will look at the jobs a thousand years in the future and think they are very fake jobs, and I have no doubt they will feel incredibly important and satisfying to the people doing them.

新奇迹诞生的速度将是惊人的。今天甚至很难想象到 2035 年我们会发现什么;也许这一年我们刚解决高能物理,下一年就开始太空殖民;也许这一年刚取得材料科学的重大突破,下一年就有了真正的高带宽脑机接口。许多人会选择以和今天差不多的方式生活,但至少有一部分人很可能会决定「接入」(plug in)。 The rate of new wonders being achieved will be immense. It’s hard to even imagine today what we will have discovered by 2035; maybe we will go from solving high-energy physics one year to beginning space colonization the next year; or from a major materials science breakthrough one year to true high-bandwidth brain-computer interfaces the next year. Many people will choose to live their lives in much the same way, but at least some people will probably decide to “plug in”.

向前看,这一切听起来难以想象。但真正身在其中时,大概会感到震撼却依然可控。从相对论的视角看,奇点是一点一点发生的,融合是缓慢进行的。我们正沿着技术进步指数曲线的长弧向上攀爬;向前看它总是近乎垂直,向后看它总是平坦,但它是一条平滑的曲线。(回想一下 2020 年:当时如果有人说 2025 年会有接近 AGI 的东西,听起来会是什么样;再对比过去这五年实际是什么样子。) Looking forward, this sounds hard to wrap our heads around. But probably living through it will feel impressive but manageable. From a relativistic perspective, the singularity happens bit by bit, and the merge happens slowly. We are climbing the long arc of exponential technological progress; it always looks vertical looking forward and flat going backwards, but it’s one smooth curve. (Think back to 2020, and what it would have sounded like to have something close to AGI by 2025, versus what the last 5 years have actually been like.)

伴随巨大的好处,也有必须面对的严峻挑战。我们确实需要解决安全问题——技术上和社会层面上都是——但在此之后,鉴于其经济影响,广泛分配超级智能的使用权至关重要。最好的前进路径也许大致是这样: There are serious challenges to confront along with the huge upsides. We do need to solve the safety issues, technically and societally, but then it’s critically important to widely distribute access to superintelligence given the economic implications. The best path forward might be something like:

- 解决对齐问题:我们能够稳健地保证 AI 系统学会并朝我们集体真正想要的长期目标行动(社交媒体的信息流就是错位 AI 的例子;驱动它们的算法极其擅长让你不停刷下去,而且显然很懂你的短期偏好,但它们的做法是利用你大脑中某个压倒长期偏好的机制)。 - Solve the alignment problem, meaning that we can robustly guarantee that we get AI systems to learn and act towards what we collectively really want over the long-term (social media feeds are an example of misaligned AI; the algorithms that power those are incredible at getting you to keep scrolling and clearly understand your short-term preferences, but they do so by exploiting something in your brain that overrides your long-term preference).

- 然后专注于让超级智能便宜、广泛可得,并且不过度集中在任何个人、公司或国家手中。社会是有韧性的、有创造力的,并且适应得很快。如果我们能驾驭人们的集体意志和智慧,那么尽管我们会犯很多错误、有些事情会搞得非常糟,我们也会快速学习和适应,能够用这项技术取得最大的好处、最小的坏处。在社会必须共同决定的宽泛界限之内,给用户很大的自由,似乎非常重要。全世界越早开始就「这些宽泛的界限是什么、我们如何定义集体对齐」展开对话,就越好。 - Then focus on making superintelligence cheap, widely available, and not too concentrated with any person, company, or country. Society is resilient, creative, and adapts quickly. If we can harness the collective will and wisdom of people, then although we’ll make plenty of mistakes and some things will go really wrong, we will learn and adapt quickly and be able to use this technology to get maximum upside and minimal downside. Giving users a lot of freedom, within broad bounds society has to decide on, seems very important. The sooner the world can start a conversation about what these broad bounds are and how we define collective alignment, the better.

我们(整个行业,而不只是 OpenAI)正在为世界建造一个大脑。它将极度个性化、让每个人都易于使用;我们的瓶颈将是好点子。长期以来,创业圈里的技术人一直取笑「只有点子的人」——那些只有一个点子、到处找团队来实现它的人。现在看来,他们即将迎来属于自己的高光时刻。 We (the whole industry, not just OpenAI) are building a brain for the world. It will be extremely personalized and easy for everyone to use; we will be limited by good ideas. For a long time, technical people in the startup industry have made fun of “the idea guys”; people who had an idea and were looking for a team to build it. It now looks to me like they are about to have their day in the sun.

OpenAI 如今有许多身份,但在一切身份之前,我们是一家超级智能研究公司。我们面前还有很多工作,但前方的大部分道路已经被照亮,黑暗区域正在迅速消退。能做我们正在做的事,我们感到无比感激。 OpenAI is a lot of things now, but before anything else, we are a superintelligence research company. We have a lot of work in front of us, but most of the path in front of us is now lit, and the dark areas are receding fast. We feel extraordinarily grateful to get to do what we do.

「便宜到不值得计价」的智能已经触手可及。这话听起来可能很疯狂,但如果在 2020 年我们告诉你今天会走到哪里,那听起来大概会比我们现在对 2030 年的预测更疯狂。 Intelligence too cheap to meter is well within grasp. This may sound crazy to say, but if we told you back in 2020 we were going to be where we are today, it probably sounded more crazy than our current predictions about 2030.

愿我们平滑地、指数级地、波澜不惊地穿过超级智能。 May we scale smoothly, exponentially and uneventfully through superintelligence.

出处与译稿

来源平台
Sam Altman (personal blog)
发表时间
2017 年 6 月 21 日
译稿来源
机器逐句翻译 · qwen3.8-flash
审校状态
未经人工审校(reviewed = 0)
译文存档
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原文存档
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