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创始人在融资上常犯的错误

Fundraising Mistakes Founders Make

来源 Sam Altman (personal blog) · 英文原文出处

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关于融资时该做什么的文章已经很多了,但关于创始人常犯错误的文章还没有那么多。下面是我经常见到的一些错误: There’s a lot written about what you should do when you raise money, but there hasn’t been as much written about the common mistakes founders make. Here is a list of mistakes I often see:

• 过度优化融资流程 • Over-optimizing the process

很多创始人试图在技巧上耍太多花样,以为这些能帮他们融到钱。其实这很简单:如果你的公司好,你大概率就能融到钱。与其钻研融资「柔术」,不如把功夫花在把公司做得更好上。 A lot of founders try to get way too fancy with tricks that they think will help them raise money.  It’s actually quite simple; if you have a good company, you will probably be able to raise money.  You’re better off working to make you company better than working on fundraising jiu jitsu.

流程很简单: The process is simple:

- 找人引荐给你想谈的投资人,然后联系他们——要并行,不要串行——这一点很重要,见第(3)条。 - Get intros to investors you want to talk to and reach out to them, in parallel, not in series - this is important, see (3).

- 向他们解释为什么你的公司很可能让他们赚大钱。这通常包括:公司的使命、产品、目前的进展、未来愿景、市场、竞争格局、为什么你们会赢、长期的竞争优势是什么、你们打算怎么赚钱,以及团队。 - Explain to them why your company is likely to make them a lot of money. This usually includes the company’s mission, the product, current traction, future vision, the market, the competition, why you’re going to win, what the long-term competitive advantage will be, how you’re going to make money, and the team.

- 营造竞争环境。(毫不意外地)当多个投资人为了挤进你这一轮而相互竞争时,你会拿到最好的条款。这是「这场游戏」里真正重要的一条规则——后文我会详细谈。 - Set up a competitive environment. You'll (unsurprisingly) get the best terms when multiple investors compete with one another for space in your round.  This is the one rule of "the game" that is really important--I'll talk about it more later on.

有些创始人会尝试这样一些做法:精心安排新闻稿的发布时间、不经意地向一位投资人透露自己将与另一位投资人共进晚餐、声称自己日程排得满满的只剩某一个特定小时,以及其他各种技巧——但如果你只是把公司做好,通常根本不需要这些。 Some founders try things like carefully timing news articles, casually mentioning to one investor that they'll be having dinner with another investor, claiming their schedule is really packed except for one specific hour, and other tricks - but if you just build a good company, you generally won’t need to.

很多小事其实根本没那么重要——比如,当一位早期投资人选择不参与后续轮次时所传递出的「信号」。如果公司做得好,这类事情很容易被忽略;如果公司做得不好,它反正也很难融到钱。 Many little things simply don't matter very much--for example, the "signal" sent when an early investor chooses not to participate in a later round. If the company is doing well stuff like this is easily overlooked, and if the company's not doing it will struggle to raise money anyway.

除非你做得天衣无缝,否则玩弄这些把戏会损害你在大多数优秀投资人眼中的形象。而且无论如何,你都应该值得信赖、诚实。投资人如果无法信任你,就不会投资你。 Unless you do it perfectly, game-playing will hurt you with most good investors. And you should be trustworthy and honest no matter what. Investors won't back you if they can't trust you.

• 过度优化融资条款 • Over-optimizing the terms

创业公司通常是一门「过与不过」的课程——要么成功,要么失败。如果失败了,或许你还能被「人才收购」,但这种情况越来越少,而且通常比直接去收购方公司找份工作好不了多少。 Startups are usually a pass-fail course -- either you succeed or you don't.  If you fail, maybe you get acqui-hired, but that's happening less frequently and is usually little better than just getting a job at the acquiring company instead.

重要的是找到好的投资人、拿到干净的条款,并且不要在融资上花太多时间。最大的问题来自追逐高估值。与很多人的想法相反,在 YC 我们鼓励公司寻求合理的估值。估值是创始人可以用来自我衡量的量化指标,而且愿意出高价的投资人多的是,所以他们并不总是听劝。但我再说一遍:试图拿到非常高的估值是一个错误。 The important thing is to get good investors, clean terms, and not spend too much time fundraising. The biggest problem comes from chasing high valuations. Contrary to what many people think, at YC we encourage companies to seek out reasonable valuations. Valuations are something quantitative for founders to measure themselves on, and there are lots of investors willing to pay high prices, so they don’t always listen. But I’ll say it again: trying to get really high valuations is a mistake.

如果你明显处于有利地位,争取高估值是可以的,但不要耍弄投资人。直接说出你想要什么,不要陷入大量来回拉锯或条款复杂化。还要记住,过高的估值往往会把优秀的投资人挤走。 If you’re clearly in a position of leverage, it’s fine to push for a high valuation, but don’t jerk investors around. Just say what you want and don’t get into a lot of back and forth or term complexity. Also remember that very high valuations often push out good investors.

还有,不要忘了融资策略的第一要义:把一切安排好,让自己永远不做降价轮(down round)。降价轮的坏处怎么强调都不为过;事实上,正是这种威胁,构成了有人给你报出超高价格时也不要接受的最佳理由。如果你以那样的价格融资,接下来一切都必须完美,你的下一轮才能是加价轮。 And don’t forget the prime directive of fundraising strategy: set things up so that you never do a down round. The badness of a down round is difficult to overstate; in fact, the threat of that is the best reason not to take a super high price when you’re offered one.  If you raise at such a price, everything has to go perfectly in order for your next round to be an up one.

• 没能营造竞争环境 • Failing to create a competitive environment

好,这是这场游戏中我真正认为关键的一个环节。要想在融资(就此而言,任何大交易也一样)中取得好结果,你通常需要营造一个竞争环境。 Ok, here is the one part of the game I really believe is critical.  You generally need to set up a competitive environment to get a good outcome in fundraising (or, for that matter, any big deal).

难的是拿到第一份投资意向书(offer)。一旦有了它,你就有了筹码——如果其他投资人不快点行动,你手里已经有一份可以接受的报价,他们就有错过一个潜在绝佳机会的风险(而且可能在合伙人面前显得很蠢,等等等等)。在那之前,他们可以一直拖延,想等多久等多久。第一份报价到来所需的时间之长、以及随后十份报价出现得有多快,都令人惊讶。 The hard part is getting the first offer. Once you have this, you have the leverage -- if other investors don’t act fast, you have an offer you can take, and they risk missing a potentially great opportunity (and maybe looking stupid to their partners, etc etc.) Until then, they can procrastinate and wait as long as they want. It’s remarkable how long it can take the first offer to come in, and how quickly the next ten can materialize.

所以有时候你得稍微「黑」一下流程,才能拿到这第一份报价。最好的办法是找到一个真心热爱你在做的事情、并且愿意行动的人。虽然用这份报价去撬动其他报价是可以的,但你也应该善待任何愿意率先行动的人:优先考虑他们的报价、想办法让他们进入这一轮(即使最终由别人领投),等等。 So sometimes you have the hack the process a little bit to get this first offer. The best way is to find someone who loves what you’re doing and is willing to act. Although it’s ok to use that offer to get others, you should be nice to anyone willing to act first by prioritizing their offer, finding a way to get them into the round even if someone else leads it, etc.

还有很多其他策略,以后我应该专门写一篇文章来讲。 There are a lot of other tactics for this that I should write a separate post on at some point.

不过要当心:在你没有任何报价时说「我们这一轮很快就要关闭了」之类的话,通常会适得其反。投资人之间会互通消息,会拆穿你的虚张声势。 Beware, though, that saying things like “our round is closing really fast” when you have no offers usually backfires. Investors talk and will call your bluff.

当你营造了良好的竞争环境时,主动权就转到了你这边——情况变化之大,会让你大吃一惊。之前三周都排不出时间见你的机构,突然能在周日安排出全体合伙人会议。而当多个竞标者真心想投时,很多「不可谈判」的条款——比如 20% 的股权和董事会席位——都会烟消云散。 When you have a good competitive environment the leverage shifts to you - you will be astonished at how much things change. Firms that previously couldn’t meet you for three weeks will suddenly be able to schedule full partner meetings on a Sunday. And when multiple bidders really want to invest, a lot of the "non-negotiable" terms like 20% ownership and board seats go away.

• 表现得傲慢、敌意、不尊重人,等等 • Coming across as arrogant, antagonistic, disrespectful, etc.

不知怎的,流传开了一个神话,说投资人喜欢这样的创始人,于是有些书呆子创始人会装出这种姿态。别这么做。要尊重人(这包括:除非你的轮次真的即将关闭,否则不要在第一次见面后就要求投资人做决定)。 Somehow, a myth got started that investors like this and nerdy founders sometimes put on an affectation.  Don’t do it.  Be respectful (which includes things like not asking investors to make a decision after a first meeting unless you really are about to close your round).

记住,投资人也是人。他们也希望被喜爱。我第一次融资时,不太愿意告诉我真心喜欢的投资人说我喜欢他们,因为我觉得这是在放弃筹码。但事实证明,告诉你真心喜欢的投资人你特别想与他们合作,会让他们对你更有好感,而不是相反。 Remember that investors are people too. They want to feel loved. The first time I raised money, I was hesitant to tell the investors I really liked that I really liked them because I thought I was giving up leverage. But it turns out telling the investors you really like that you especially want to work with them makes them more positively inclined to you, not less.

• 听不懂「不」 • Not hearing no

投资人不想扼杀选择权;创始人是乐观的人。这就导致投资人说出非常委婉版本的「不」,而创始人听到的却是「再多聊几次,我也许就能得到肯定的答复」。除了投资条款清单(term sheet)之外,任何东西都是「不」,所有理由都不重要。翻篇,去和其他投资人谈。 Investors don’t want to kill option value; founders are optimistic people.  This leads to investors saying a very nice version of "no" and founders hearing "with just a few more conversations, I may get to a yes."  Anything other than a term sheet is a "no", and all the reasons don’t matter.  Move on and talk to other investors.

• 没有领投方 • Not having a lead investor

很多创始人凑出由几十个投资人组成的「拼盘轮」(party round),还暗自庆幸没有任何单一投资人能对他们拥有多大权力。但实际上,投资人对经营良好的公司本来就没有多少权力,而他们真正拥有的是:没有一个投资人会全身心投入他们的成功。 A lot of founders put together party rounds comprised of dozens of investors and congratulate themselves that no single investor has much power over them.  But in practice investors have little power over companies that are doing well anyway, and what they actually have is no investor that is super invested in their success.

事实证明,有一位你每月见面、向其汇报进展的投资人,真的非常有价值。这种强制机制会在公司里创造出一种运营节奏,是很大的净收益。让我吃惊的是,搞拼盘轮的公司偏离正轨、误入歧途的频率要高得多。 It turns out it’s really valuable to have one investor that you meet with every month and report progress to. This forcing function creates an operational cadence in the company that is a big net positive. It’s remarkable to me how much more frequently the party round companies go off into the weeds.

• 路演讲得太差 • Pitching poorly

很多创始人陷在遵循某种完美模板里,没完没了地絮叨他们的竞争对手、市场演变等等。他们自己都讲烦了,而且看得出来。 A lot of founders get caught up in trying to follow a perfect template, and drone on and on about their competitors, the market evolution, etc.  They’re bored and it shows.

讲好路演的方法,是聚焦于业务中真正让你兴奋的部分。那种兴奋会自然流露出来,也会感染投资人。传达你对业务的热情,几乎和你说的内容一样重要,而且几乎无法伪装。 The way to pitch well is to focus on the parts of the business that truly excite you. That will shine through, and it will get the investors excited. Conveying your passion for the business is almost as important as what you say, and it’s almost impossible to fake.

即使你是内向的人,老练的投资人通常也能感受到。所以从你真正兴奋的部分开始讲。 Even if you’re an introvert, it will usually come through to a sophisticated investor. So start with the parts you’re really excited about.

投资人想听一个好故事,这包括:你是如何决定做这个想法的、它为什么重要、你和联合创始人是怎么认识的,等等。所以不要把这些部分从路演里删掉。 Investors want to hear a good story, and that includes things like how you decided to work on this idea, why it matters, how you met your cofounders, etc. So don’t leave those parts out of the pitch.

另外,记住聪明的投资人在寻找真正的大赢家。所以不要做一些显而易见的蠢事,比如在种子轮路演里谈论潜在的收购方——那会暗示你不是在努力打造一家真正的大公司。 Also, remember that smart investors are looking for the really big hits. So don’t do obviously dumb things like talk about potential acquirers in a seed round pitch - that will suggest you’re not trying to build a really big company.

• 不对主要投资人做背景调查 • Not reference-checking major investors

优秀的投资人能创造巨大的价值;糟糕的投资人能让你的生活苦不堪言。在签下一份要与某人合作将近十年的协议之前,花一小时给他们合作过的创始人打打电话,了解一下等待你的将是什么。 Great investors can add a huge amount of value; bad investors can make your life miserable.  Before signing up to work with someone for the better part of a decade, spend an hour calling founders they have worked with to get a sense of what's in store for you.

• 缺乏清晰的愿景 • Lacking a clear vision

如果你看起来没有任何强烈的感觉或信念,而且你对投资人就你业务提出的每一条建议都表示赞同,你就有给人留下「缺乏清晰愿景」印象的风险。聪明人说的话你永远应该听,但在你真正相信的事情上,你应该坚定。 If you don’t seem to have any strong feelings or conviction, and you agree with every suggestion the investor makes about your business, you'll risk coming across as lacking a clear vision.  You should always listen to what someone smart has to say, but you should be firm on the things you really believe.

有清晰愿景的创始人,通常能用寥寥数语解释清楚自己在做什么、为什么重要。清晰的愿景通常还包含至少一个重大的新想法。即使是一个熟悉的问题,也应该有某种重要的东西是投资人此前没听说过的。 Founders with a clear vision can usually explain what they’re doing and why it matters in just a handful of words. Clear vision also usually entails at least one big new idea. Even if it’s a familiar problem, there should be something important the investor hasn’t heard before.

当然,有一些巨大的未知数是可以的。没人指望你有所有答案,但你应该一开始就有清晰的论点(theses)。 It’s ok to have some big unknowns, of course. You’re not expected to have all the answers, but you should have clear theses to start with.

• 不了解关键指标 • Not knowing key metrics

在早期投资中,我真正看的是两个问题: There are two questions I really look at in early stage investments:

- 这个团队知道该做什么吗? - Does the team know what to do?

- 这个团队做得到吗? - Can the team do it?

第一个问题由上面那条要点来回答。第二个问题,则通过展示团队在乎运营质量来回答。我发现,执行力强的团队总是对自己的数字(如果处于研发模式,则是当前进展状态)了如指掌,而这是预测执行质量的最佳指标之一。令人惊讶的是,有那么多公司在向投资人路演时并不知道这些信息。 The first question is addressed by the bullet point above.  The second is addressed by showing that the team cares about operational quality.  I’ve found that teams that execute well always know their numbers (or current status if in R+D mode) cold, and that it’s one of the best predictors of execution quality.  It’s surprising how many companies pitch investors without knowing this information.

出处与译稿

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Sam Altman (personal blog)
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2014 年 2 月 20 日
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机器逐句翻译 · qwen3.8-flash
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