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创新怎么了?

What happened to innovation?

来源 Sam Altman (personal blog) · 英文原文出处

STATE2 中文可读 · 机器译文,未经人工审校 证据等级 A
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机器译文 本页中文为机器逐句翻译(qwen3.8-flash),未经人工审校,仅供阅读参考;引用与考据请以英文原文为准。 逐句机译与英文原文 1:1 存档(37 段);未经人工审校。

关于创新的步伐是否放缓、如果放缓了又意味着什么,人们有很多争论。在听了几个格外糟糕的路演——糟糕到像是《周六夜现场》对创业公司的恶搞——之后,我觉得有必要说点什么。这个问题无法用「是」或「否」来回答:创新在某些领域显著放缓了,在另一些领域却比大多数人想象的还要快。琢磨这其中的原因很有意思。 There’s a lot of debate about whether or not the pace of innovation has slowed, and if so, what that means.  After some particularly brutal pitches that felt like Saturday Night Live parodies of startups, I feel compelled to weigh in.  This question cannot be answered with a yes or a no; innovation has slowed dramatically in some areas and gone faster than most people would have thought possible in others.  It’s interesting to ponder why.

我们曾经非常擅长在物理世界中创新。有时我站在曼哈顿,会想这一切多么不可思议——我周围的所有东西都是从地里挖出来的,都是用从地里挖出来的材料造的。造一部 iPhone 要从把硅从地里挖出来开始,掺进一些杂质,做成芯片。然后由机器人——同样用从地里开采的金属造的——把所有芯片加上更多从地里挖出来的东西组装成一部手机。 We were once great at innovating in the physical world.  Sometimes I stand in Manhattan and think about how amazing it is that everything around me was dug out of the ground, and made with things that were dug out of the ground.  Making an iPhone starts with digging silicon out of the ground, putting some impurities in it and making it into a chip. Then robots, also made with metal mined from the ground, assemble all the chips plus more stuff dug out from the ground to make a phone.

但最近,软件(而且主要是互联网软件)成了创新的焦点,它的重要性很可能仍被低估了——它正在改变世界的方式存在复利效应,我们现在才刚刚开始看到。 But recently, software (and mostly Internet software) has been the focus of innovation, and its importance is probably still underestimated—there are compounding effects to how it’s changing the world that we’re only now beginning to see.

这一切发生得如此之快,令人惊异。 It’s amazing how fast it’s happened.

1990 年,互联网已经 21 岁了,却只有 280 万人能接入。(HTML/HTTP 还要再过一年才发布。)现在互联网用户已经超过 25 亿——23 年里增长了近 100000%。同样在 1990 年,移动电话用户有 1240 万。当然那是很基础的手机——即使到 1999 年也还不存在智能手机这种东西。2012 年,全球智能手机用户突破 10 亿,移动电话用户数则更多。现在移动订阅数(不是去重后的用户)已经大约和全世界人口一样多了! In 1990, the Internet was 21 years old and only 2.8 million people had access to it. (HTML/HTTP wouldn’t be released for another year.)   There are now over 2.5 billion Internet users—a nearly 100,000% increase in 23 years.  Also in 1990, there were 12.4 million mobile phone subscribers.  These were very basic phones, of course—even in 1999, there was no such thing as smartphone.  In 2012, the number of global smartphone users crossed 1 billion, and the number of mobile phone subscribers is much greater.  There are now approximately as many mobile subscriptions (not unique subscribers) as people in the world!

但同一时期物理世界的创新(除了手机和电脑)就没那么亮眼了。我们从第一架活塞引擎飞机到第一架喷气引擎飞机用了约 30 年;又过了 30 年,我们登上了月球。自 1939 年以来,喷气引擎当然有渐进式改进,但我还在等着坐冲压喷气式飞机旅行(顺便说一句,它在 1908 年就获得了专利)。当我们在 1969 年登月时——引导我们的是内存 64KB、主频 0.043MHz 的电脑,差不多相当于今天一支高端电动牙刷——人们以为太阳系的其他星球乃至群星都近在咫尺了。我们还在等。 But innovation in the physical world (besides phones and computers) over the same time period has been less impressive.  We went from the first flight with a piston engine to the first flight with a jet engine in about 30 years; 30 years after that we landed on the moon. Since 1939, jet engines have certainly improved incrementally, but I’m still waiting to travel by ramjet (which incidentally was patented in 1908). When we made it to the moon in 1969—guided by computers with 64KB of memory and a clock speed of 0.043MHz, similar to a modern high-end toothbrush—people thought the rest of the solar system and the stars were not far off.  We are still waiting.

[图片] [图片]

20 世纪 60 年代,我们的主要能源是石油,其后依次是煤炭、天然气、水电、核能,以及微不足道的一点点可再生能源。今天,排序是……石油、煤炭、天然气、水电、核能,以及微不足道的一点点可再生能源。 In the 1960s, oil was our primary energy source, followed by coal, gas, hydro, nuclear, and a tiny fraction of renewables.  Today, the order is…oil, coal, gas, hydro, nuclear, and a tiny fraction of renewables.

[图片] [图片]

我们没有谈论好得多的发电方式,而是在谈论减少用量。我完全支持节约能源,但这其中还是有某种败退的意味——我们不是本该到现在就能产生大量廉价、清洁的能源了吗? Instead of way better ways to generate energy, we talk about reducing usage.  I’m all for conservation, but there’s still something defeatist about it—weren’t we supposed to be generating huge amounts of cheap, clean energy by now?

材料科学、生物技术、食品、医疗等领域明显缺乏突破性进展的例子数不胜数。我还没法用「复制机」点餐。在某些方面我们甚至倒退了——我从小时候起就再没能以超过音速的速度旅行。(公平地说,也许现在有伟大的创新正在发生,只是难以看见。创新在发生时常常看起来像是在造无聊的玩具,只有事后回顾,我们才能看清那些发展真正有多重要。) There are countless other examples of apparent lack of breakthrough progress in materials science, biotech, food, healthcare, etc.  I can’t order food from a Replicator.  In some ways we’ve even backtracked—I have not been able to travel faster than the speed of sound since I was a kid.   (To be fair, there may be great innovation happening now that is difficult to see.  Innovation often looks like the creation of idle toys while it’s happening, and only in retrospect can we see how important developments really are.)

除了软件/物理这个维度,还有另一个重要考量——短期/长期(或者说渐进式/全新式)。我们看到的进展更多来自那些能在短时间内渐进改进的事物,而不是需要开放式、全新开发的事物。这对软件和物理事物都成立。例如,有大量的人在做让网站真正好看又好用的工作——他们做得很好——但没多少人在研究人工智能。有相当数量的人在研究更高效的喷气引擎,但几乎没有什么民间人士在研究用全新的东西取代喷气引擎。 There’s another important consideration in addition to software/physical—short-term/long-term (or incremental/radically new). We’ve seen much more progress on things that can be incrementally improved in a short time frame than things that require open-ended, new development. This is true for both software and physical things.  For example, there are a huge number of people working on making websites really nice-looking and easy-to-use—and they’re doing a fine job—but not very many people working on artificial intelligence.  There are a decent number of people working on more efficient jet engines, but not very many civilians working on replacing the jet engine with something new.

渐进式进步是好的——它会复利累积,是最终做出伟大事物的一种方式。它的成功率远比阶跃式创新高得多。它确实是我观察到的帮助许多创业公司取得巨大成功的模式。我认为 iPhone 是 2005—2010 年间最重要的创新,它的出现至少在某种程度上靠的是复利式的渐进进步。但其中也有几个关键的不连续跳跃,苹果花了他们需要的时间去攻克它们。他们还有一个奢侈条件:有一个人站出来说他们要做这些疯狂的事,比如发布一款没有键盘、运行真正操作系统、还要求人人都买流量套餐的手机。 Incremental progress is good—it compounds, and it’s a way to develop great things eventually.  It works a much higher percentage of the time than step change innovation.  It’s certainly the model I’ve observed help many startups reach great success.  The iPhone, which I think is the most important innovation of 2005-2010, came about at least somewhat via compounding incremental progress.  But there were a few critical discontinuities, and Apple took as much time as they needed to figure those out.  They also had the luxury of one guy saying that they were going to do these crazy things like ship a phone with no keyboard running a real OS and require everyone to buy a data plan.

互联网生意如此成功的部分原因在于,用渐进式的改动快速迭代很容易。这让它们成为有吸引力的生意。但有些东西是渐进式打磨永远给不了我们的。 Part of the reason Internet businesses have been so successful is that it’s easy to iterate quickly with incremental changes. This makes them appealing businesses.  But there are some things incremental refinement will never get us.

在软件这边,眼下为一个把既有的线下行业搬到线上的新网站或移动应用融资相对容易。在大多数情况下,这是真实但很小的一步前进。而为做不确定、长期、高回报项目(比如 AI)的软件公司融资就难得多。说到硬件,即便有清晰可行的计划和很短的发货周期,为消费硬件公司融资也是中等难度 [0]。而为新的汽车公司、新的火箭公司、新的能源公司融资就非常困难。 On the software side, it’s relatively easy right now to raise money for a new website or mobile app that brings an existing, offline industry online.  In most cases, this is a real, but small, step forward. It’s harder to raise money for software companies working on uncertain, long-term, high-reward projects (like AI).  When it comes to hardware, it’s medium hard to raise money for a consumer hardware company, even with a well-understood plan and a short timeframe to ship [0].  It’s very difficult to raise money for a new car company, a new rocket company, a new energy company, etc.

眼下在硅谷,大多数投资者对你的增长曲线比对你的长期计划更感兴趣——也就是说,对过去比对未来更感兴趣。对此可能的解释是风险厌恶和智力懒惰。(其实情况比这稍好一点——复利式增长是一种极其强大的力量,如果投资者相信增长会以同样速率持续下去,那他们可能是在做非常明智的决定。)这种聚焦让那些多年都不会有任何增长曲线的公司很难融到钱。 Right now in Silicon Valley, most investors are more interested in your growth graph than your long-term plan—i.e., more interested in the past than the future. Some possible explanations for this are risk aversion and intellectual laziness.  (Actually, it’s a little better than that—compounding growth is an extremely powerful force, and if investors believe growth will keep going at the same rate, then they can be making a very wise decision.)  This focus makes it hard for companies to raise money if they’re doing things that won’t have a growth graph of any sort for years.

回看过去并向前推演,对公开市场投资者是好事,他们大概本来就应当根据过往表现来评判一家公司。但风险投资者本该是在未经验证的技术和想法上承担风险的人。反常的是,在当前世界,公开市场投资者在给股票定价时热衷于对未来的投机(有时把自己烧得很惨,比如互联网泡沫),而大多数风险投资者——偶尔出现的 4000 万美元以上的 A 轮除外——似乎在朝本杰明·格雷厄姆的方向倾斜 [1]。 Looking at the past and projecting it forward is good for public market investors, who probably should judge a company on past performance.  But venture investors are supposed to be taking risks on unproven technology and ideas.  Perversely, in the current world, public market investors love to speculate about the future when pricing a stock (sometimes getting themselves badly burned, e.g. the Internet bubble) while most venture investors—the occasional $40+MM A round aside—seem to be leaning in Benjamin Graham’s direction [1].

如果把创新进展(以及吸引投资的容易程度)放进一个二乘二矩阵,一条轴是软件/物理,另一条轴是短期/长期,看起来是这样: A two-by-two matrix of progress in innovation (and ease of attracting investment) with software/physical on one axis and short-term/long-term on the other axis looks like this:

[图片] [图片]

(图:绿色为好,黄色为尚可,红色为差。) Green is good, yellow is ok, and red is bad.

我不认为说「创新放缓了」完全正确——实际发生的是,创新的能量大多被引向了软件领域中短时间框架的机会。这至少在很大程度上是理性的——说实话,过去几十年里,计算机行业的成功就是比生物技术、清洁科技等领域多得多。虚拟世界的监管远远少于物理世界,这让创业风险更低。(不过一个非常有趣的旁注是,最成功的互联网公司很多都是以某种方式把虚拟世界和物理世界连接起来的公司。)而且许多创始人,几杯酒下肚之后,往往会说他们想在短短几年内发财,而互联网上的时间尺度要快得多。许多投资者在这一点上更过分。 I don’t think it’s totally correct to say that innovation has slowed—what’s happened is that innovative energy has mostly been directed to short-timeframe opportunities in software.  This is at least mostly rational—honestly, over the last few decades there have just been way more successes in the computer industry than in biotech, cleantech, etc. The virtual world is far, far less regulated than the physical world, which makes it a less risky place to start a new business.  (Although a very interesting side note is that many of the most successful Internet businesses have been ones that connect the virtual to the physical world in some way.)   And many founders, if you catch them after a few drinks, will often say that they want to get rich in a small handful of years, and timeframes on the Internet are much faster.  Many investors are even worse on this point.

最重要的是,计算机太棒了。再说一次,把集体能量集中在这里,我并不确定我们就一定更糟,虽然我确实认为我们应该在长期机会上做更多。如果互联网是过去 30 年最重要的发展,那我们最优秀的人才大多在为它工作就是合理的 [2]。 And most importantly, computers are awesome. Again, it’s not clear to me that we’re worse off focusing our collective energy here, although I do think we should do more on the long-term opportunities.  If the Internet is the most important development of the last 30 years, it makes sense to have most of our best people working on it [2].

现在我们说到了今天创新的根本问题。人们——创始人、员工和投资者——都在寻找低成本(虚拟比物理成本更低)、短期的机会。但是什么造成了这种对低成本、短时间框架的偏好? And now we get to the fundamental issue with innovation today.  People—founders, employees, and investors—are looking for low-cost (and virtual is lower cost than physical), short-term opportunities.  But what causes the low-cost, short-timeframe preference?

其一,快速致富有一种深植于人性的吸引力,这大概历来如此。投资软件生意是管用的(有时),而且大概还会管用一阵子。软件成了一个在物理创新繁荣期并不存在的、引导投资资本的好去处。 For one, there is some deeply human appeal to getting rich quickly, which has probably been around forever.  Investing in software businesses has worked (sometimes), and will probably continue to do so for some time.  Software has been a great place—that did not exist during the physical innovation boom—to direct investment capital.

我们已经很久没有经历过真正资本密集型的战争了,这当然是天大的好事,但每次读到有多少真正的创新与军方或国家安全有关,我总是感到惊讶——很难以其他方式获得实际上不设上限的预算和专注度。互联网本身就来自军方。 We haven’t had a really capital-intensive war in a long time, and while that’s obviously great, I am always astonished when I read about how much real innovation has involved the military or national security—it’s hard to get effectively unlimited budgets and focus any other way.  The Internet itself came from the military.

非互联网行业的监管不确定性是另一个问题,这至少是可以改善的——尽管要赶上互联网的自由度会很困难。 Regulatory uncertainty for non-Internet businesses is another issue, which can at least be improved—although it will be challenging to ever match the freedom of the Internet.

也许最重要的是,我们可以用软件来驱动非软件世界的创新,做法是尽可能多地在软件中做事。我们应该聚焦软件与其他一切的交叉点——例如,让我们能在软件中做设计的程序,可以降低成本、缩短周期。我相信短的子项目周期几乎总是好事,而物理领域的许多公司似乎时间线很长、中间里程碑却很少。 Perhaps most importantly of all, we can use software to drive innovation in the non-software world by doing as much as possible in software.  We should focus on the intersection of software and everything else—for example, programs that let us do design in software can bring down cost and cycle time.  I believe that short sub-project times are almost always a win, and many companies in the physical realm seem to have long timelines without a lot of intermediate milestones.

我们能做的另一件事是更好地回报真正的长期投资。眼下的焦点是极端的短期——许多投资者主要关心下个季度的盈利,周期权交易量的上升令人印象深刻。不幸的是,华尔街的想法会顺着金字塔向下渗透到风险投资者乃至天使投资人,所以我们到处都看到时间视野在缩短。要完全阻止这一点大概很难,但我确信对多年持有的资产实行非常有利的税收政策(对短期持有则实行更不利的政策)会有帮助。 Another thing we can do is to better reward truly long-term investing.  Right now, there’s a focus on the extreme short-term—many investors care mostly about what earnings are going to be next quarter, and the rise in volume of weekly options has been impressive.  Unfortunately, what Wall Street thinks trickles down the pyramid to venture capitalists and even angel investors, so we see a shortening of time horizons everywhere.  This is probably difficult to stop entirely, but I’m sure that a very favorable tax policy on multi-year holdings (and an even less favorable one for short-term holdings) would help.

风险投资基金通常有十年存续期;把它延长到十五年或二十年或许有帮助。我也希望看到公司把创始人和员工的股权归属期改为五年或六年。 Venture funds commonly have a ten year life; lengthening that to fifteen or twenty might help.  I’d also like to see companies move to five- or six-year vesting for founders and employees.

又或许,我们需要一种面向激进创新的新融资模式。投资资本会寻找风险调整后最好的回报;眼下,许多投资者认为互联网公司就是它。如上所述,我们认为属于物理事物突破性创新的许多东西,都发生在计算机出现之前,那时没有一个如此现成又有吸引力的投资平台。投资者选择一个时间框架更短、所需资本更少的机会,往往是在做理性的决定。所以也许政府需要在探索发现上花更多的钱(尽管眼下它正在削减对国家实验室和 NIH 等机构的资助),也许存在某种合理的慈善模式。 Or maybe we need a new funding model for radical innovation.  Investment capital will look for the best risk-adjusted return; right now, lots of investors believe Internet companies are it.  As mentioned above, many of the things we consider to be breakthrough innovations with physical things happened before computers, when there was not such a readily available and attractive investment platform.  Investors are often making rational decisions by choosing a shorter-timeframe opportunity that requires less capital.  So maybe the government needs to spend more money on discovery (although right now, it’s decreasing funding for things like the National Labs and the NIH), and maybe there’s a philanthropic model that makes sense.

大概还有很多其他我们应该做的事。 And there are probably a lot of other things we should be doing too.

我是计算机时代骄傲的孩子。我无法想象没有它们的生活,也很高兴有很多人在努力让它们变得更好。尽管大多数创新以渐进方式发生在互联网上是有道理的,但如果我们这个物种失去了追求那种不连续创新的动力——正是那种创新最初给了我们互联网——那将是一种遗憾。我还不能住进电脑里,所以我也希望真实世界继续变得更好。 I am a proud child of the computer age.  I can’t imagine life without them, and I’m happy lots of people are working to make them better.  Although it makes sense that most innovation is happening incrementally on the Internet, it would be a shame for us as a species to lose the drive for the sort of discontinuous innovations that got us the Internet in the first place.  I can’t go live in a computer yet, so I’d also like the real world to continue to get better.

感谢 Jack Altman、Patrick Collison、Kevin Lawler、Eric Migicovsky、Geoff Ralston 和 Nick Sivo 阅读本文草稿。 Thanks to Jack Altman, Patrick Collison, Kevin Lawler, Eric Migicovsky, Geoff Ralston, and Nick Sivo for reading drafts of this.

[0] 过去这真的很难,但预售(preorder)让它变容易了。例如,Pebble 在不再需要钱之前一直无法从投资者那里融到钱——他们在 Kickstarter 上收到了超过 1000 万美元的有效预售。但在那之前,投资者对他们不屑一顾,说「我们不喜欢硬件」。 [0] ]It used to be really hard, but preorders have made it easier.  For example, Pebble was unable to raise money from investors until they no longer needed it—they collected more than $10MM in effective preorders on Kickstarter.  But until then, investors dismissed them, saying “we don’t like hardware.”

[1] 对 Color 的投资者绝无冒犯之意——他们在没有增长曲线的情况下坚信某个激进的东西,承担了巨大的资本风险。我很乐意看到更多这样的投资,只是希望是投向不同类型的公司。 [1] No disrespect to Color’s investors—they believed strongly in something radical, without a growth graph, and took a big capital risk.  I’d be happy to see more of that, but maybe for different sorts of companies.

[2] 关于 STEM——科学、技术、工程和数学的教育——的讨论大多是废话。截至 2013 年 6 月 20 日,用十周学会写 Rails 很遗憾是一个好的职业选择。用十年学物理的经济回报要差得多。在今天的世界里,我们有编程,然后是所有其他东西。至少就「获得更好工作的资格」这一计划而言,STEM 应该改名叫 CS。 [2] Talk about STEM—the study of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics—is mostly BS.  Learning to hack Rails in ten weeks is regrettably a good career move as of June 20th, 2013.  Learning physics over ten years has a much worse economic payoff.  In today’s world, we have programming, and we have everything else.  At least in terms of a plan to become qualified for better jobs, STEM should be renamed CS.

作为旁注的旁注,我并不责怪金融业挖走了我们的优秀工程师。失败之处在于非计算机科学的工程职业道路眼下看起来没什么吸引力。 As a side note to the side note, I don’t blame finance for stealing our good engineers.  The failure is that non-CS engineering career paths don’t look very attractive right now.

出处与译稿

来源平台
Sam Altman (personal blog)
发表时间
2013 年 6 月 20 日
译稿来源
机器逐句翻译 · qwen3.8-flash
审校状态
未经人工审校(reviewed = 0)
译文存档
正式档案库 · translation 表
原文存档
正式档案库 · segment 表
收录状态
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