关于如何成为优秀创业公司创始人的建议有很多,但关于如何成为优秀创业公司投资人的建议却没多少。 There is a lot of advice about how to be a good startup founder. But there isn’t very much about how to be a good startup investor. ¶
在继续之前,我应该指出:当下是投资创业公司的一个特别艰难的时期——现在做拿钱的人(capital-taker)比做出钱的人(capital-giver)容易。想当投资人的人似乎比想当创始人的人多,而且看起来有源源不断的资金在寻找投资创业公司的入场机会。 Before going any further, I should point out that this is a particularly hard time to invest in startups—it’s easier right now to be a capital-taker than a capital-giver. It seems that more people want to be investors than founders, and that there’s an apparent never-ending flow of capital looking for access to startups. ¶
供需法则已经发挥了作用。估值不断上涨,最好的投资机会被汹涌的兴趣淹没。正如我一位朋友最近观察到的:「让 LP(有限合伙人)把钱给你的种子基金,比在一个'热门交易'里拿到有意义的份额容易得多。」 The law of supply and demand has done its thing. Valuations have risen, and the best investment opportunities are flooded with interest. As a friend of mine recently observed, “it’s much easier to get LPs to give you money for your seed fund than it is to get a meaningful allocation in a ‘hot deal’”. ¶
话虽如此,要想作为投资人做得出色,你需要做好三件事:获得好的投资机会、对投什么做出好的决策、让你想投的公司选择你作为投资人。就这些!你常常可以帮助所投的公司变得比原本更大,但残酷的现实是:你最好的那些投资,没有你也会做得相当好。 That said, to do well as an investor, you need to do three things: get access to good investment opportunities, make good decisions about what to invest in, and get the companies you want to invest in to choose you as an investor. That’s it! You can often help the companies you invest in become bigger than they otherwise would have been, but the sad reality is that your best investments will do quite well without you. ¶
**接触渠道(Access)** Access ¶
获得投资机会是三类事情里最容易的:你只要努力干就行。令人意外的是,大多数投资人并不努力——但这是事实,而且是一个你可以利用的漏洞(bug)。 Getting access to investment opportunities is the easiest of the three categories: you can just work hard. It’s surprising that most investors don’t work hard, but it’s true, and a bug that you can exploit. ¶
在人脉(networking)上投入大量精力确实有效,前提是你不能只在别人从疯狂日程里挤出时间喝杯咖啡时才去「打个照面」。如果你真正琢磨出如何帮助你所尊敬的其他投资人、如何真正帮助优秀的创始人,好的投资机会自然会来到你面前。 Putting a lot of energy into networking actually works, as long as you aren’t just trying to touch base when people can find some time away from their crazy calendars to grab coffee. If you actually figure out how to help other investors you respect, and to really help good founders, then good investment opportunities will come your way. ¶
如果你正开始做全职投资人,就把「琢磨如何帮助那些将成为你未来项目来源网络的人」当成你的全职工作。不要只是请人脉告诉你有什么投资机会,而要问他们:能否让你每周花一天时间帮助他们最好的那家公司。一般来说,早期投资人能在锁定候选人、后续融资、客户引荐和一般性建议上帮上大忙。 If you’re starting out as a full-time investor, make it your full-time job to figure out how to help people that will become your future investment-sourcing network. Instead of just asking your contacts to tell you about investment opportunities, ask them if you can spend a day per week helping their best company. In general, early-stage investors can help a lot with closing candidates, future fundraising, customer introductions, and generic advice. ¶
品牌(brand)是获得接触渠道的另一条路。建立品牌有很多方法,但按照同样的「努力干」原则,一个好例子是写长文(难,很少有人做得好),而不是发推文(容易,每个人都做得不错)。 A brand is the other way to get access. There are a lot of ways to build one, but by the same principle of working hard, a good example is to write long-form content (hard, few people do a good job at it) instead of tweeting (easy, everyone does a pretty good job at it). ¶
**决策(Decisions)** Decisions ¶
伟大的创始人是伟大创业公司的关键。作为创业公司投资人做得极其出色的一条路径,是擅长在伟大创始人尚未伟大之前就预测出谁会伟大——市场会奖励发现「伟大但缺乏经验」的人。投资那些已经被证明的人也能做得不错,但你买入股份的价格会反映出这一点。 Great founders are the key to great startups. One way to do really well as a startup investor is to get good at predicting who is going to be great before they are—the market rewards finding great but inexperienced people. You can also do well by investing in people who are already proven, but the price of the shares you buy will reflect that. ¶
那么,如何识别未来的伟大? So how do you identify future greatness? ¶
如果你能当面见到本人、而且见好几次,那是最容易的。如果你在三个月里见了某人三次,每次都注意到可察觉的进步,就要重视这一点。进步的速率往往比当前的绝对能力更重要(尤其是,年轻创始人有时能以极快的速度进步)。 It’s easiest if you get to meet people in person, several times. If you meet someone three times in three months, and notice detectable improvement each time, pay attention to that. The rate of improvement is often more important than the current absolute ability (in particular, younger founders can sometimes improve extremely quickly). ¶
我见到一位创始人时问自己的主要问题是:我愿意为这个人工作吗?第二个问题是:我能否想象他们接管(统治)自己所在的行业。 The main question I ask myself when I meet a founder is if I’d work for that person. The second question I ask myself is if I can imagine them taking over their industry. ¶
我寻找的创始人是:既顽强彪悍(scrappy)又令人生畏(formidable)(这种组合比听上去更罕见);以使命为导向、对自己的公司着迷、不知疲倦、意志坚定;极其聪明(必要但绝不充分);果断、行动快、有主见;有勇气、信念坚定、甘愿被误解;善于沟通、是有感染力的布道者;并且有能力变得强硬而有野心。 I look for founders who are scrappy and formidable at the same time (a rarer combination than it sounds); mission-oriented, obsessed with their companies, relentless, and determined; extremely smart (necessary but certainly not sufficient); decisive, fast-moving, and willful; courageous, high-conviction, and willing to be misunderstood; strong communicators and infectious evangelists; and capable of becoming tough and ambitious. ¶
这些特质中,有些看起来比其他更容易改变;例如我注意到,人可以很快变得更强硬、更有野心,但人往往要么是慢行动者要么是快行动者,这一点似乎更难改变。做个快行动者是大事;一个有点琐碎的例子是:我投资那些对重要邮件回复不快的创始人,几乎从来没赚到过钱。 Some of these characteristics seem to be easier to change than others; for example, I have noticed that people can become much tougher and more ambitious rapidly, but people tend to be either slow movers or fast movers and that seems harder to change. Being a fast mover is a big thing; a somewhat trivial example is that I have almost never made money investing in founders who do not respond quickly to important emails. ¶
另外,这听上去像废话,但我投过的那些成功创始人,都相信自己终将成功、确信无疑。 Also, it sounds obvious, but the successful founders I’ve funded believe they are eventually certain to be successful. ¶
除了学会预测谁会成为伟大的创始人,你还必须至少还算擅长预测哪些市场会变好。 In addition to learning to predict who will become great founders, you have to be at least okay at predicting what markets will be good. ¶
创业公司很可能出现在多得多的行业里——凡是成本能压低、周期能加快的地方,创业公司都能赢。创业公司在技术快速变化的行业里表现尤其好,因为它们相对大型竞争对手的根本优势是速度和专注。变化速率越高,创业公司「猜对」的机会就越多,大型对手「绊倒」的机会也越多。 Startups are likely to happen in many more industries—startups can win wherever costs can be low and cycle time can be fast. Startups do particularly well in industries with rapid technological change, because their fundamental advantages over large competitors are speed and focus. A higher rate of change gives startups more opportunities to be right and the large competitor more opportunities to stumble. ¶
和看创始人、看公司一样,你真正该关心的是一个市场的增长率和最终规模(我不明白为什么大多数投资人如此痴迷于市场的当前规模,而不是他们自己认为十年后它会有多大——但这对你是个机会)。 Like the founder, and like a company, what you should care about is the growth rate and eventual size of a market (I don’t know why most investors are so obsessed with the current size of a market instead of how big they think it will be in ten years, but it’s an opportunity for you). ¶
最好的公司往往有勇气领先市场几年,但他们掌握着一个诀窍,能分辨真趋势和假趋势。对于真趋势,即使用户还不多,这些用户也会大量使用新平台并且热爱它。举例来说,尽管 iPhone 在头一两年因用户不多而被嘲笑,但拥有 iPhone 的人对它赞不绝口,那种方式是他们从未用于以往任何智能手机的。 The best companies tend to have the courage to lead the market by a couple of years, but they know the secret for telling the difference between a real trend and a fake trend. For a real trend, even if there aren’t many users, they use the new platform a lot and love it. For example, although the iPhone was derided for not having many users in its first year or two, most people who had an iPhone raved about it in a way that they never did about previous smartphones. ¶
最顶尖的公司往往乘着一个新的、重要的、快速成长的平台的浪潮。 The very best companies tend to ride the wave of a new, important, and rapidly growing platform. ¶
我投过的最好公司,其「光谱特征」惊人地相似。它们通常具备以下大多数特征:令人信服的创始人、一个能把人才吸引进公司轨道的使命、好到人们会自发告诉朋友的产品、快速增长的市场、网络效应和低边际成本、快速扩张的能力,以及一个要么是根本性全新、要么比现有选项好 10 倍的产品。 The spectral signatures of the best companies I’ve invested in are remarkably similar. They usually have most of the following characteristics: compelling founders, a mission that attracts talented people into the startup’s orbit, a product so good that people spontaneously tell their friends about it, a rapidly growing market, a network effect and low marginal costs, the ability to grow fast, and a product that is either fundamentally new or 10x better than existing options. ¶
你应该把自己限制在「如果做成了能成为 100 亿美元公司」的机会上(这意味着它们至少得有一个快速增长的市场和某种定价权)。幂律(power law)就是这么强大。这话说起来容易做起来难,我自己就很多次违反过这条原则。但数据是清楚的——失败无关紧要,小的成功也无关紧要,一切都在巨额回报里发生。 You should try to limit yourself to opportunities that could be $10 billion companies if they work (which means they have, at least, a fast-growing market and some sort of pricing power). The power law is that powerful. This is easy to say and hard to do, and I’ve been guilty of violating the principle many times. But the data are clear—the failures don’t matter much, the small successes don’t matter much, and the giant returns are where everything happens. ¶
我职业生涯至今的核心心得是:你可以、而且应该把有效的事情规模化(scale up)。规模的力量,以及规模有时带来的涌现行为(emergent behavior),是巨大的。我做每一笔投资时都会思考其未来规模的势能。大多数人在这方面糟糕透顶,所以这又是一个你可以利用的漏洞。 The central learning of my career so far has been that you can and should scale up things that are working. The power of scale, and the emergent behavior that sometimes comes from it, is tremendous. I think about the potential energy of future scale for every investment I make. Most people seem terrible at this, so it’s another bug you can exploit. ¶
尽管好点子有显而易见的诱惑力,但在早期投资中,它们的价值主要在于帮你识别好的创始人。然而,有时候糟糕的创始人也会有好点子,而投资他们是我最难纠正的慢性投资错误。(我第二大的慢性错误,是仅仅因为其他投资人喜欢某笔投资就去追。) Although good ideas are understandably seductive, for early-stage investing they are mostly valuable as a way to identify good founders. However, sometimes bad founders have good ideas too, and investing in them is the chronic investing mistake that has been hardest for me to correct. (My second biggest chronic mistake has been chasing investments primarily because other investors like them.) ¶
**成交率(Close rate)** Close rate ¶
投资机会越好(即相对于估值的期望价值越高),让公司选择你作为投资人通常就越难。 The better the investment opportunity is (i.e., expected value relative to valuation), the harder it usually is to get the company to choose you as an investor. ¶
传统的销售战术在这里相当有效。花大量时间陪创始人、解释你愿意为他们做什么、请过去合作过的创始人给他们打电话,等等。 Traditional sales tactics works pretty well here. Spend a lot of time with the founder, explain what you’re willing to do to help them, ask founders you’ve worked with in the past to call them, etc. ¶
「乐于助人到超出预期、随时找得到人」的名声在这里价值巨大,而且除了最好的那批投资人之外极为罕见。「对创始人友好」的名声也有帮助。最有帮助的,则是你以前投过的其他创始人说:「那个人是我迄今为止最好的投资人,没有之一。」 A reputation for being above-and-beyond helpful and accessible is worth a lot here, and rare among all but the best investors. A reputation for being founder-friendly helps too. What helps most of all is other founders you’ve previously invested in saying “that person was my best investor by far”. ¶
除了帮助获得投资机会,强势的品牌也有助于成交。如果你能让自己达到这样一种境地——单单是拿你的钱就能帮助一家公司被更严肃地对待——那是一股很好的顺风。 In addition to helping get access to investment opportunities, a strong brand also helps close them. It’s a nice tailwind if you can get yourself to the place where simply taking your money helps a company get taken more seriously. ¶
果断也有帮助——每个人都想被人想要,而大多数投资人都在等别人先行动。如果你决策快,尤其是抢在别人之前决策,创始人往往会欣赏这一点。我最近的两笔重要投资分别是:1)告诉一些我以前投过、并抱有巨大信念的人,还没等他们把想法讲完,我就说我会投他们的 A 轮;2)在一小时会议结束时,向从未谋面的创始人提出投他们的种子轮。我不建议经常这么做,但当你的信念强烈时,要让它显现出来。 Decisiveness also helps—everyone wants to be wanted, and most investors wait for someone else to act first. If you decide quickly, and especially if you decide before others do, founders tend to appreciate that. The two most recent significant investments I made were 1) telling people I’d previously backed and had huge conviction in that I would do their Series A before they finished telling me what their idea was, and 2) offering to do the seed round of founders I’d never met before at the end of a one hour meeting. I don’t recommend doing that very often, but when your conviction is strong, let it show. ¶
成交率低的最可靠办法,是不把创始人当作同侪(peers)对待。如果你选人得当,你投的创始人至少应该是你视为同侪的人。创始人对「谁会把他们当同侪、谁会把他们当下属」有第六感。而且如果他们足够优秀,他们会知道:你如果摆出老板做派,就是在智力测试上不及格。 The best way to have a poor close rate is to not treat founders like peers. If you’re picking well, you should be investing in founders that you think of as your peers at least. Founders have a sixth sense for who is going to treat them like a peer and who is going to treat them like a boss. And if they’re good, they know you’re failing an intelligence test if you act like their boss. ¶
**帮助他们(Help them)** Help them ¶
帮助创始人最重要的方式,是让他们更有野心——想得更大、更相信自己。帮助他们设定有野心但可实现的目标。势头(momentum)很重要,而且会自我强化——大多数人把目标定在预期刚好够不着的地方,这通常会挫伤动力。更好的做法是持续设定你刚好能够到的目标。 The most important way to help founders is to get them to be more ambitious—to think bigger and to have more self-belief. Help them set ambitious but achievable goals. Momentum is important and self-reinforcing—most people set goals that they expect to be just out of reach, which is usually demotivating. It’s better to continuously set goals that you can just barely hit. ¶
第二重要的事,是给他们具体的、战术性的建议(而不是泛泛的战略),告诉他们如何实现目标。好的战术建议是这样的:「看起来你已经自己摸索出了这家公司怎么做销售,那么你第一任销售雇员应该去哪里找、要找什么样的,以及你应该用哪个销售工具。」 The second most important thing to do is to give them specific, tactical advice (instead of general strategy) about how to achieve their goals. Good tactical advice is something like “it seems like you’ve figured out yourself how to do sales for this company, so here is where to look and what to look for in your first sales hire, and here is the sales tool you should use”. ¶
你能做的具体帮助有很多——牵线引荐、帮他们招人、帮他们找其他投资人、帮他们找办公室等等——但一般来说,你应该等到被请求时再做这些。 There are a lot of specific things you can do to help—make introductions, help them hire, help them find other investors, help them find an office, etc.—but generally you should wait to do these until asked. ¶
一个大的例外是:当你高度确信他们即将犯大错时,你应该主动告知,尤其是在事情已经运转顺利、而他们却没有为规模化做好准备的时候。 A big exception is that you should proactively let them know when you have very high conviction that they’re about to make a big mistake, especially once things are working and they aren’t setting themselves up to scale. ¶
理论上,另一个大的例外是真正帮助创始人想出好的新点子。我最早近距离观察的投资人是 PG(Paul Graham),所以我曾以为这是所有投资人都极其擅长的。但事实证明他是一个独一无二的点子生成器(sui generis),即使大多数伟大的投资人,在告诉创始人该做什么这件事上通常也还是很差。努力做到有自知之明是值得的。 In theory, another big exception is actually helping founders come up with good new ideas. The first investor I ever watched in action was PG and so I assumed this was something all investors were fantastic at. But it turns out he is a sui generis idea generator, and even most great investors are usually still bad at telling founders what to work on. It’s worth trying to be self-aware. ¶
最后,我发现大多数时候,当创始人打电话来寻求模糊的帮助时,他们真正想要的是一位朋友的情感支持。请他们到你家里来,给他们泡杯茶或倒杯酒,然后开始倾听他们的挣扎。 Finally, I’ve found that most of the time when founders call asking for vague help, what they are really asking for is emotional support from a friend. Invite them over to your house, make them tea or pour them a drink, and start listening to their struggles. ¶
感谢 Jack Altman、Max Altman 和 Luke Miles 审阅本文草稿。 Thanks to Jack Altman, Max Altman, and Luke Miles for reviewing drafts of this. ¶